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THANKS!

We are happy to announce that our bi-annual fund drive has ended successfully. We had set ourselves a quota of $10,000. We have thus far received cash and pledges totalling slightly more than $11,500. This is the largest sum we've ever raised in any of our drives, and it has been contributed by the largest number of friends. Not only does it enable us to keep going; it makes us feel good!

But in case we had any idea of relaxing a little, our printer, our mailing house, and now the U.S. Post Office have all announced unavoidable price rises. So we're not ahead, after all —just keeping pace. Nevertheless, we want sincerely to thank those of our readers who helped. And we hope, on our part, to keep improving the magazine.

The Editors

DISSENT issued March 1, 1967, is published bi-monthly, January-February, March-April, May-June, July-August, September-October, November-December, by Dissent Publishing Association, 509 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017. Subscriptions: $5.00 for one year; $8.00 for two years; $3.50 for students for one year; foreign subscriptions, including Canada, add $1.00 mailing costs per year. All payments from foreign countries must be made by United States money orders or checks payable in United States currency. Single copy, 95 cents. For special rates on bulk orders from organizations, teachers, etc., write directly to DISSENT. For information on newsstand and bookstore distribution write to: Eastern News Co., 225 Seventh Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10001.

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Irving Howe

THE CIA AND THE STUDENTS

February 20, 1967

I write these lines as a hasty last-minute response to the news that the CIA has been secretly subsidizing certain activities abroad of the National Student Association (NSA) and other student groups. By the time this issue of DISSENT reaches our readers there may well be further news concerning CIA intervention in the affairs of other organizations.

The whole business is appalling. That a secret government agency presumably devoted to espionage and counterespionage should intervene in domestic political life is intolerable. That it should intervene in the affairs of students is, if anything, worse.

The ostensible purpose of the CIA does not, at the moment, interest us. All powers, of whatever kind or ideology, have such agencies; none of these is palatable; but what presumably distinguishes such an agency in a democratic country is that its functions are strictly limited to projects abroad. For our part, we have no liking for either the CIA or any of its international equivalents; we would as soon see all of them collapse through lack of sustenance. But since there seems no possibility of such a happy event in the immediate future, we urge that everyone devoted to democratic values should join in a struggle to keep the CIA and all its works, fronts, agencies, and "foundations" out of domestic political life. *And entirely out!* Toward this end we hope that the investigation announced by Senator Eugene McCarthy will not languish, but will actively dig into the facts, regardless of which politicians the facts may hurt—Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, or Robert Kennedy. No longer should the CIA or any government agency be exempt from regular legislative inspection and public check. The methods the CIA has employed are those we associate with fascist and Communist dictatorships; they have no place in a democratic society.

Meanwhile, we hope the NSA will review its recent past, so as to make sure that no further scandals are possible in which one or two officers secretly commit—and contaminate—the organization. (The same holds true for all other organizations that may, knowingly or unknowingly, have been recipients of CIA funds.) No doubt, further changes in NSA policy and personnel will be desirable. But we hope that NSA itself will weather this crisis. For the truth is that, no matter how painful the revelations are, the NSA has played a constructive role in

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recent American life. It has by no means taken the kind of political stands that can be identified with the CIA. On the contrary, it has served for the most part as a progressive force on the campus. It has fought for civil rights. It has campaigned for student freedoms. It has helped in the fight against poverty. It has been critical of U.S. foreign policy, as for example in the Dominican and Vietnam situations. There is every reason to want to save what is after all the major student organization in the country.

As for those young people who were themselves responsible for the NSA connection with the CIA, we hope they will not become the object of brutal or indiscriminate attacks. Some of them were probably victims of an atmosphere in which norms of political independence had disintegrated and the lure of "big-shot politics" (expense accounts, international conferences, hush-hush arrangements) was too enticing. Others may honestly have been trapped by the difficulties, some years back, of having to struggle at international student congresses against subsidized and subservient "youth" representatives of totalitarian governments—and to have then seen as a sudden lifesaver financial aid from a seemingly innocuous "foundation." Still others may not have been very clear in their minds as to the reasons why many people make a sharp distinction between accepting open aid from a public agency of the government and taking funds from an underground outfit like the CIA—or why still other people are skeptical about student or other movements accepting aid from any governmental agency. Such confusions are part of the heritage of the last twenty years. and while the actions of the implicated NSA officials cannot escape judgment, neither should these young people become the victims of a dubious righteousness.

There will apparently be further and more widespread revelations. Good; let all the facts come out. But we would warn against any effort to create an atmosphere in which democratic institutions of this country, whatever their faults or even sins, can be assaulted wholesale. Fulton Lewis has already attacked the CIA for helping a "liberal" group like the NSA, and no doubt the Far Right will seize the opportunity to show how Washington has been taken over by "pinkos." At the opposite pole, among certain segments of the Left or pseudo-Left, there may be launched a campaign against various democratic and liberal institutions on the ground that they are all subservient to the power elite. For our part, while unambiguously convinced that all student, cultural, and trade union organizations ought to be entirely autonomous, we are prepared to defend them against ideological or demagogic attack.

What has been revealed is a deformation of democracy. That it has been possible for these revelations to be made in safety and with enormous publicity, nevertheless speaks well for democracy. Let us try to make sure that such things cannot happen again, which means to work for a fundamental renovation of society so that it will be genuinely imbued with democratic principles. The only cure we of DISSENT can see for the failures of democracy is— more and better democracy.

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DISSENT is a journal devoted to the ideas and values of democratic socialism. It seeks to serve as a forum for writers devoted to these ideas and values, while also welcoming a wide variety of other opinions. Each writer speaks for himself; there is no effort made to exact editorial consensus or uniformity.

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A BI-MONTHLY OF SOCIALIST OPINION

Stanley Plastrik

India and China: Two Paths in Politics

Both countries groan under the weight of the problems connected with modernization. But they take sharply different paths, and the contrast is instructive.

India is not a happy land today—far from it. At least 10 million of its people live on the edge of starvation. Economic growth came to a halt in 1966, and the base of modern technology inherited from the British is frail. The Congress party, which has ruled free India since 1947, shows signs of inner division and weariness. Charges of corruption fill the land. Other problems—the cow slaughter issue, the Hindu-Moslem conflicts—show how agonizingly difficult it is to try to modernize a backward economy while retaining democratic norms.

Yet those who have scorned the Indian path ought to pause for a moment. Let them take a hard look at China, whose "firm and remarkable" economic development (under totalitarian constraints, to be sure) has often been favorably contrasted with the stumbling of India. In China a terrible ordeal has been set in motion by the will of the top cadres of the party-state, and perhaps by one man alone. The masses "participate," but almost entirely along the path of manipulation. Rational criticism, free discussion, tolerated opposition are all impossible.

India's immediate troubles come as a result of natural catastrophe: the fail-

(Continued on page 246)

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COMMENTS AND OPINIONS

Michael Harrington

The Johnson Budget and Vietnam

In his 1966 State of the Union message, Lyndon B. Johnson said that if the war in Vietnam were to go on, it should not be financed at the expense of the worst-off in the society but rather by the best-off. In his various domestic policy statements early in January, 1967, the President took back that Populist outburst.

It is not, of course, that Mr. Johnson is leading some diabolical, malevolent attack on the poor. It's just that he is committed to spending almost $22 billion on a tragic commitment to a war on the Asian mainland and that, although it would be easy enough to honor last year's pledge in terms of economics, his consensus politics will not permit him to take the necessary steps. All those corporate chieftains, whom he has so assiduously wooed, would not be amused by equality of sacrifice or, God forbid, by meeting the Vietnam emergency by just a bit of income redistribution. They have predictably responded to the present situation by demanding cuts in programs for the desperate ("ruffles" some of the Republicans call them) and Mr. Johnson has proved his soundness by adopting the line he attacked so well a year ago. Guns win, butter loses.

This approach might be contrasted to the tactic of a Democratic President who suffered a rather spectacular midterm defeat twenty years ago. Harry Truman bounced back from his 1946 disaster and achieved his extraordinary triumph of 1948 precisely by challenging his "do nothing" Congress. But then those were the days of giving 'em hell rather than of reasoning together.

However, I do not intend in this brief space to attempt any extended political analysis of the retreat from the War on Poverty and the Great Society.

Rather, let me limit myself to some random comments on the Johnson economic policy which do, however, share a central theme. Assume that the war in Vietnam is good (which I emphatically do not); even grant that the meager social allocations of the current budget are dictated by economic necessity rather than political choice (which I certainly do not believe); even so, the President still failed in his messages to do what he could have done easily. He did not communicate any largeness of vision, any sense of social imagination. At times he even seems to move back toward that Eisenhower mood of celebration in which one emphasizes the accomplishments of the past rather than the needs of the future.

Mr. Johnson managed this meanness of thought at a time when the Automation Commission, the Ribicoff hearings on the city, the conference on air pollution, and many other individuals and institutions have all demonstrated, with the aid of official

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data, that we are in the midst of a profound social crisis.

President Eisenhower used to do his celebrating with optimistic, if somewhat incoherent, speeches. Mr. Johnson does his with statistics. Thus, there has been a concerted campaign to show that the 1967 budget actually proposes $25.6 billion in aid of the poor. To get this number, one adds in a $14.6 billion item which is mainly Social Security, i.e., money which the recipients have themselves contributed on the basis of a regressive payroll tax which is becoming a special hardship for the poor. The $4.2 billion health figure involves the same deception since it is primarily derived from Medicare, which is tied into the Social Security system. The Administration boast is also vague when it comes to the $3.8 billion in education and training funds which are supposed to be concentrated on the poor or the $3.1 billion in economic and community development funds.

In the budget itself there is similar accountancy hocus-pocus. Thus, the *New Republic* notes that a $500 million decrease in spending on education programs is transformed into a $600 million increase in "gross outlays" by assuming that private investors will buy into government loans to colleges. So in reality it would seem that the budget proposes $1.9 billion in new Great Society programs, an additional $280 million for the War on Poverty, and that it is thus substantially less than the sums which the Congress has already okayed for social purposes.

In addition, as I. F. Stone noted in his Weekly, the Director of the Budget, Charles Schultze, boasted that, if the costs of the war in Vietnam are set aside, Mr. Johnson's proposals take "the smallest proportion of the national output of any budget since 1948." Yet it is precisely this percentage which is the index of social justice in the nation, for it tells how we are distributing these unprecedented $40-$50 billion GNP dividends of the affluent economy. By this crucial measure, Mr. Johnson has sounded retreat.

I cite these statistical tricks as an example of that credibility gap which seems to open up in absolutely everything that Mr. Johnson does. But more than that, this campaign to overstate society's contribution to the struggle against poverty is part of a retrogression to the mood of celebration and complacency which characterized the Eisenhower fifties. And so, if there is some university or foundation interested in a valuable project, here is one: to do an annual, expert translation of the budget into plain English and social priorities. If this is not done, we will be at the mercy of Candide as a CPA.

Second, Mr. Johnson is once again refusing to face up to the problem of the fair shares of affluence. In the first phase of the New Economics, when unemployment was so high that labor's bargaining strength was not great, the chief function of the guidelines was to hold down wage increases. At the same time, as the Council of Economic Advisers acknowledges in its 1967 Report, profits went up and up and up. Eventually, a tighter labor market allowed the unions to attempt to catch up somewhat. In the process, the old, unfair guidelines were shattered. But how, then, deal with this problem? Is the slicing up of an enormous, and federally induced, increase in GNP of

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no concern to the government? Or worse, does Washington intend that the public funds shall contribute inordinately and exorbitantly to the private gains of the rich? This is the thorny, contradictory and conflict-laden aspect of the New Economics. And Mr. Johnson is apparently in no mood to face up to it. There is talk about voluntary corporate restraint, but that's all.

Third, Johnson is now taking a most conservative position on the issue of full employment. For all intents and purposes, the Council accepts a 4 per cent jobless rate as an inevitable fact of life in the economy. Yet, in Europe this figure would be considered intolerable by almost everyone—and in England Harold Wilson is in trouble for allowing the unemployment figure to reach half of what we are now asked to consider as normal. But then, things are, as usual, worse than the statistics indicate, for these percentages do not describe the depression rates of idleness still prevalent among Negro youth; they do not take into account the number of people who have been driven out of the labor market altogether, they do not compute part-time unemployment and full-time underemployment, etc.

Related to this conservative position on unemployment (which represents a retreat from the goals set by President Kennedy in 1961) is the assumption that the economy must slow down in the coming period. But why? It is clear, for instance, that if the proposals of the Freedom Budget were adopted in the area of housing—that is, if we made a specific, targeted commitment to do away with the slums in ten years —there could be a more rapid growth rate and a much larger fiscal dividend at the end of the process. This is particularly true since the resultant guaranteed full employment in the building trades could well lay the basis for ending some of the ancient restrictive practices which grew up so naturally in that precarious, seasonal industry. In other words, this is an area where dramatic progress could be made by the utilization of existing resources, among them the potential of Negroes and other underemployed groups, rather than by competing for new resources. So, it is a way to growth which does not threaten inflation.

But there were no such large ideas in this year's economic messages. There are some leaders—most notably, Senator Ribicoff—who have begun to speak of the huge, multi-billion dollar figures required for desperately urgent social construction. There is talk at the University of Minnesota of building a new ctiy for 250,000 people from the ground up. There is a growing understanding in the society that unless something radical is done, we are likely to be the victims of our own ingenious technology rather than its masters.

Mr. Johnson might say that he could not confront these problems in the midst of a war. That, of course, is true as long as the President is unwilling to make the hard political choices which would place the burden of the conflict on the rich rather than the poor. But even so, a few ideas, a thought or two about the period after the war, a modest exercise of the social imagination—these things could have been done without adding any real cost to the budget. But Mr. Johnson is not simply going back on the old promises. He is thinking small as well.

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Larry L. King

Mood in Washington: Unconditional Surrender

Washington is a dismal place just now. The muddy Potomac, dreary and snuff-colored, stirs slowly and painfully like and old man waking to the agony of his years. Somehow, even the Capitol dome conveys an impression of timidity in pointing toward an anemic, sluggish sky. In the morning fog the city's massive monuments and slabs loom as bleached sepulchers: melancholy repositories for old bones and old deeds and old dreams. One knows there will be no spring this year: neither flowering of the bush nor of the spirit.

The Ninetieth Congress, from the liberal view, is like the little boy from a dimly remembered song of childhood: made of "snaps and snails and puppy-dogs' tails." President Johnson—that merry, mercurial Field Marshal of yesteryear's battles—privately snarls at the political war gods and publicly waves the white flag to a ragtag Congress that apparently defeated him before it fired a shot. His generals of the Cabinet, and their vast army of civil servants, have marched back down the hill to entrench in defensive positions. Though the British once sacked Washington and the Army of Northern Virginia menaced its gates, seldom has the Capital seemed more vulnerable than now. The American Dream must wait.

There were signs that the American Dream must wait yet a little longer even before Lyndon B. Johnson made it official in his State of the Union message. A year ago when Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield suggested a moratorium on the Great Society, it was dutifully noted by correspondents and then largely forgotten. When Mansfield again applied the brakes this year, everybody who is anybody in the federal scheme rushed to board the stalled vehicle. It was as if they said: "I'm weary of the road and the traffic and all these dizzy speeds. Let me sit in the bus and rest." This was the mood of the country—the country said as much in the November elections—and it quickly became the prevailing mood in Washington. One is reminded of the late Huey Long's favorite cynicism: "There go the people. I must follow them, for I am their leader."

That Lyndon Johnson chooses to sit in the bus and rest with everyone else should surprise few literate Americans and no Potomac bird watchers at all. For all his heralded walking on legislative waters, his fantastic energies, colorful wheeler-dealing and mad hoohawing, Johnson has never been one to swim against strong political tides. His "victories" as Senate Majority Leader were carefully forged in Capitol corridors, cloak rooms, and over pleasing blends of grog. If a given issue could not be satisfactorily compromised or its fate preordained in advance, then the roll would not be called up yonder if LBJ had his way. Johnson is not a daring riverboat gambler: he might bet his bundle if

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he is holding four aces *and* has read his opponent's hole card. No brave but foolish charges for him into the valley of death.

President Johnson changes his political colors as artfully as the head shop steward at Chameleons' Local No. 123. Some built-in radar (often suspiciously resembling Lou Harris's polls) tells him when to change. He sensed in the first days of his rule that he could use the martyred John F. Kennedy's memory to pass civil rights legislation and other progressive bills long gathering dust. He knew the country was not yet ready for Goldwater and The Bomb in 1964, shrewdly exploiting the blunders his GOP opponent so generously sprinkled as gifts along the campaign trail. With the new, progressive Eighty-ninth Congress eager to accept its overwhelming mandate, he encouraged its instincts. Now, however, he is just as readily encouraging the Ninetieth Congress in its less noble reflexes. More and more he clearly emerges as the "Consensus President," ready to compromise or logroll until the majority agrees—and never you mind what the majority agrees on. If LBJ is not firmly wed to Ole Dame Halfloaf, then he is at least still living with her in a common-law state.

The President cued the new Congress to his mood when he offered it "a partnership" in his initial address of the session. This may have been a fatal mistake. Even the greenest freshman in the back row knew that Lyndon Johnson offers neither deal nor gift when operating from a stance of power. His further admissions of retreat—only an oblique reference to a "fair housing" law without ever committing himself to new legislation in that field, an otherwise total absence of the mention of civil rights, the implied acceptance of Senator Mansfield's exhortations to re-examine that which has so recently gone before, the stress placed on a larger role for foot-dragging state and local government units—only encouraged the wearying old coalition of reactionary Republicans and befogged Dixiecrats to rise again, howling.

Perhaps the damage was done even before the speech. Despite the President's love of secrecy and his reputation for harsh dealing with tale-bearers, rumors persisted of a premature surrender. Liberals, already reduced in numbers, lost more of their remaining vitality when they heard of Sheriff Johnson's private lamentations from The Ranch. Vietnam: "Why do they want me to put my pistol on the table and just sit here while the enemy is killing my boys?" Civil Rights: "Martin Luther King went out to Chicago and stirred up a hornet's nest just when I needed Ev Dirksen's help." November's reversals: "Well, sometimes the country swings Left and sometimes it swings Right and in the end maybe that gives us the balance we need."

Nor could liberals look to their Congressional *honchos* for inspiration. Speaker McCormack, at age seventy-five, spends more time in tiresome rhetoric about "fighting Communism" than in looking to the legislative future. House Majority Leader Carl Albert may be forgiven a certain caution following his September heart attack. Rep. Hale Boggs, Democratic Whip, is conscious of the Yahoos and Main Street bourbons within his Louisiana

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constituency. Senate Majority Leader Mansfield stands in the road waving his red lantern, while his top chieftain, Senator Russell Long of Louisiana, resembles a pudgy Barry Goldwater in his hawkish cries about Vietnam. The Republicans? Senator Dirksen is best known these days as a "recording star" and House GOP Leader Gerry Ford is at once part Lions Clubber, part Chairman of the Board, and part snows of yesteryear.

Thus Congressional liberals arrived in Washington in a state of acute apathy— or confusion, or both. Their hang-dog attitude was reflected in their appalling acceptance of retreat from the 21-day rule in the House on the grounds that "improved" make-up of the Rules Committee renders the safeguard unnecessary. This may be the most short-sighted view since Sherman Adams greeted news of Sputnik I with the comment that "We aren't interested in engaging Russia in an outer-space basketball game." Mankind is not one bare bone better off with Mississippi's Rep. William Colmer in the Rules Committee chair than it was with Virginia's dour old hanging judge, Howard Smith, mesmerized there. And now the liberals have meekly surrendered their only effective weapon for jarring progressive bills out of this ancient legislative graveyard.

Liberals similarly engaged in various forms of fratricide in the Adam Clayton Powell controversy. The majority followed Rep. Morris Udall of Arizona in stripping Powell of his Education and Labor Committee chairmanship, even though Speaker McCormack personally—if ineffectually— urged the Democratic caucus against this course. On the floor, Udall's effort to bind the bleeding wounds by offering a leadership-backed resolution to seat Powell in the House was, we now know, ripped asunder by the familiarly dismal union of Republicans and Dixiecrats—joined by so-called moderates with skittish eyes on "the white backlash." This combination, conceived anew in victory, will eat the Administration's lunch again and again as it grows old and fat.

Ill will stirred up by the Powell incident, coupled with President Johnson's near-neglect of civil rights in his State of the Union message, is sufficient reason to predict more "trouble in the streets" come the long, hot summer— or possibly even before the winter's thaw. Though the President's more enthusiastic chroniclers tell us that LBJ is "not retreating," they offer little evidence. How far he has turned away from the President who only short months ago promised that "We shall overcome"! One must conclude that civil rights, like virtually everything else, is sitting in Senator Mansfield's stalled bus to catch its breath.

Nor is the poverty fight hopeful. Among new House members the concept of "warring on poverty" quite possibly is throwing stones at bums. Reactionaries are branding the program a failure, the poor themselves are carping because their great expectations have not been realized, and the President not only sounds like a defensive, paper-shuffling bureaucrat but invites more trouble in speaking of the time required "to get money for these various new programs into the mainline." How easy for detractors to interpret this to their liking! One almost hears the sizzle and pop of fried-

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pie oratory now: "Wah, they askin' us to vote 'em all these new millions and billions when the President already *sed* they near-about *chokin'* on dollar bills now!" Among the various antipoverty programs, only "Operation Head Start" has even been mentioned for possible expansion. The war on poverty is going nowhere fast.

There is yet another reason that many basic Great Society programs may go nowhere fast. Conservatives control the House Appropriations Committee in the Ninetieth Congress; it is there most major battles must be fought. In terms of pure numbers, Democrats retain a 30–21 margin (down from 34–16) but no less than seven nominal Democrats can be expected to line up for wholesale cuts in domestic spending. One doesn't require a high grasp of exotic mathematics to deduce that even if one allows for a couple of GOP defections the economy bloc will be in charge. All Great Society programs must run the Appropriations Committee gauntlet. From here, it looks about as easy as Hell Week for the fraternity pledge.

Not many observers have seen the opening-day death of Rep. John E. Fogarty (D-R.I.) as a major setback. They should have. Fogarty was a totally committed liberal. As chairman of an Appropriations Committee sub-unit (on Health, Education, and Welfare) he managed a high percentage of Administration bills. More, he often lashed timid bureaucrats for not being interested enough in the programs they administer, to think big, plan boldly, or request adequate funds. Fogarty was also the undisputed (if unofficial) leader of twenty-odd liberals (some of whom needed periodic injections to keep the faith) who almost invariably followed his lead on close votes. More times than most outsiders realized, Fogarty made the positive difference.

Vietnam. Ah, what can one say of Vietnam that has not been said before? (Unless one talks sense.) We are there. We are staying. We have just begun to fight. This we have on the President's own authority. And on that of Rusk, General Westmoreland, and others of McNamara's band. We have it on the authority of Bob Hope, Joey Heatherton, and every oboe player, or Miss Something-or-Other returned from entertaining Over There. We have it from every junketing Senator, and from the crew-cut young Captains or Sergeants who pause in burning villages and in dumping Red rice into dirty rivers long enough to step before the cameras and microphones bringing the war into our homes, in living color, through the courtesy of the NBC peacock and manufacturers of odorless body sprays.

The daily press commends President Johnson for "leveling" with us, at long last, on our determination to stick it out from Saigon to the muddier Delta bogs, and for warning us of the sacrifices required—the blood, toil, tears, sweat, and taxes—as if this tardy candor, admitting only that which everybody knew in the first place, somehow magically justifies the expansion of an old and horrid mistake.

To be sure, Vietnam will spark many verbal fireworks in the Ninetieth Congress. A small covey of doves will cry into the wind that we should quit Vietnam, or never have gone in. A larger band of hawks will demand

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what they call Total Victory. A muddled middle group will privately mutter over their nocturnal cocktails in the Congressional Hotel of how they are meanly trapped and will wish aloud to God that Vietnam would dry up and blow away. These few, their drinking and praying done, will then follow the President and the other pied-piping hawks. The $74 billion dollar war budget, third largest in U.S. history, is evidence enough of future Presidential directions in Vietnam. LBJ will not, of course, deprive us of our occasional verbal table scrap: we remain ready to negotiate, we seek peace, we hold out the olive branch; come let us reason together. And yet the war will go on and on and on. It is all dismally predictable down to the repeated sacrificing of butter in the name of guns.

Some few say the Ninetieth Congress could be a re-play of the Eightieth Congress of 20 years ago. That, after two years of Congressional "Do-nothingism," Lyndon Johnson will tell the country to "give 'em hell." This misses the obvious point that LBJ would be giving hell to a Congress at least nominally of his own political persuasion, where Harry S. Truman was able to flay an obvious and partisan enemy of record. The notion persists here that for all his flamboyancy and indiscriminate goddamning LBJ isn't the natural hell-giver that HST was. HST never worried about consensus, for one thing. He may have had trouble even defining the word. Nor did Truman fear defeat as the squire of Pedernales Stream fears it, even in small things. Only if some abrupt, wild-growing flowering of the spirit occurs out there in the great wheated midlands of America, and in other exotic precincts, will Lyndon B. Johnson likely be motivated to put down the Congressional counterrevolutionaries. The betting in Washington right now is that it won't happen.

H. Brand

On "Containment" in Asia

A qualified victory in Southeast Asia was recently claimed by C. L. Sulzberger of the *New York Times* (January 29, 1967). The containment of China—assertedly the basic objective of U.S. policies in Southeast Asia, reaffirmed as such by Secretary of Defense McNamara in his annual statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee—is said to be in the process of succeeding. If the adversary in Vietnam has not as yet been brought to his knees, time has nevertheless been gained, facilitating China's containment. The struggle in Vietnam, Sulzberger implies, is merely a battle in the Cold War against China—a battle in which victory in the field matters less than time gained to overcome the enemy on other, broader fronts.

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And this is indeed being accomplished: Indonesian generals, taking heart from America's stand in Vietnam and Thailand, have seized power in their country and inflicted a fatal blow to China's hope for a puppet regime in Djakarta. China herself is torn by debilitating strife. North Vietnam is increasingly falling under the moderating influence of Moscow and rejecting Peking. "The overall strategic situation into which the Vietnam war must be fitted has . . . radically changed," in favor of the U.S. But Sulzberger, defending the policies of the Johnson Administration, imputes a rationality to them which they do not, by the evidence, possess. What he or the Administration mean by containing China is not comprehensible. The forces that would do the containing lack coherence; the forces to be contained, far from presenting a monolithic threat, are themselves disintegrating, losing whatever homogeneity they had to begin with.

Containment, when it was first formulated by George Kennan as a policy alternative to "liberation," was a thoughtful, if conservative reaction to the Russian expansionism of the mid-forties. Chinese expansionism is a fiction. There is no significant recent history of Chinese territorial aggression. Russia, not China, renders major outside aid to Hanoi: last year, an estimated $1 billion worth of war matériel and fuel was shipped by Moscow; additional aid flowed from Russia's East European allies. American planes over North Vietnam are shot down by antiaircraft guns and missiles supplied by Russia. More generally, it is Russia's, not China's, presence that has prevented a widening of the war in Southeast Asia.

Containment assumed that Communism was monolithic. Whatever truth there was in this under Stalin, it has long ceased to hold. Indonesia, had the Communists won the upper hand there, would no more have turned out to be China's puppet than would any other state with a history of militant nationalism. Even North Korea refuses to toe China's line. True, Communism is not necessarily a less serious problem because of the Stalinists' demise; but containment cannot deal with it.

Containment also presupposed, on the part of those engaged in its practice, interrelated economies, framed by loosely articulated institutions; and common civilizational impulses, such as the term "The West" connotes. It was a political proposition: ". . . Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the Western world is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy . . ." wrote Kennan in his famous *Foreign Affairs* article in June, 1947—about the time when the Marshall Plan was conceived, and long before Germany was rearmed.

"The East," however, conveys none of the social and cultural homogeneity associated with "The West." Asia's social structures have suffered decay for 150 years. Its ruling classes, except for those of Japan, cling to ancient privileges, justified by protective functions which became extinct long ago; or they derive wealth and status from a newly evolving state capitalism which,

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in its nature, emphasizes personal advancement over public responsibility and deepens the gulf between rich and poor. These ruling classes are generally alienated from the population at large and frequently inept and corrupt. This is particularly true in the Philippines, Thailand, South Vietnam, and South Korea, the only Asian countries that participated in the Manila Conference, which was meant to place a multi-national seal on the policy of containment in the East. Such allies cannot provide a political base for containment comparable to that created in Western Europe after 1947, even if containment were a feasible policy to begin with.

Vietnam demonstrates the practice of containment in Asia: whatever internal political bases existed there, they rotted away under the very impact of the American presence—which favored the authoritarian Diem and his militaristic successors over existing representative institutions and fostered an urban-oriented consumer economy over peasant interests (see John McDermott's "Welfare Imperialism in Vietnam," *The Nation*, July 25, 1966). The crisis became defined in the militarization of the conflict and the repression of oppositionist groups. In this sense, Vietnam represents the American counterpart to Russia's forcing Hungary to remain within *its* sphere of power in 1956—except that Russia's self-interest was more patently involved in Hungary than is America's in Vietnam.

No doubt, Washington's costly experience in Vietnam has taught some lessons. One may surmise that the fallaciousness of counterinsurgency theories is being recognized. It has also become evident that "forces in being," presumably needed for rapid response both to nuclear attack and brush fire wars, cannot be maintained at relatively stable levels, as the Pentagon had figured, but may prove uncontrollably fluid, requiring resources which even a rich country, where foreign "police actions" are broadly supported, will not yield up without difficulty. Perhaps most important, technological and organizational superiority has failed to defeat a poor, backward but determined enemy.

American soldiers, civil servants, and other travelers often like to think of themselves as "modern Romans." And indeed, like the Romans, Americans are reluctant imperialists, and seek to extend welfare standards as the Romans extended citizenship to their subjects. The Romans, too, in their time possessed seemingly unchallengeable superiority in military technique and organization. Yet they met fateful defeat at the hands of primitive Germanic tribes in the forest of Teutoburg in 9 A.D.—a defeat which permanently checked their advance into Central Europe and beyond. Vietnam may well turn out to have been the Americans' Teutoburg, unless Washington is prepared to reduce half the world to a state of barbarism in order to assert its dominance. For unlike Rome, whose basic resource was, after all, simply manpower, Washington possesses limitless technical means of destruction.

Optimism in this respect is scarcely warranted. Johnson has committed this country to playing a role as an Asian and not merely a Pacific power. ("The theory of the U.S. as an Asian power was the tacit point of President Johnson's Manila tour, as it has been the

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explicit point of Vice President Humphrey's eloquence about a Great Society for Asia," writes Arthur Schlesinger in his new book, *The Bitter Heritage*.) This commitment cannot but be construed by the people of Asia as a continuation on a broader front of the defense of white Western, rather than indigenous Asian, interests. Thus, while it may be that in Vietnam unique political and military factors have been at play, giving rise to a situation unlikely to be repeated elsewhere, Johnson has refused or been unable to draw basic *political* lessons from the experience: his new commitments presage quagmires worse than Vietnam.

Eisenhower at least attempted to disengage from continental Asia. McMillan, replacing Anthony Eden, put an end to British forays into post-imperialist ventures; Mendès-France and de Gaulle cut loose from untenable colonial positions; Moscow progressively relaxed its hold over Eastern Europe; Kennedy, by aborting the Cuban invasion, signaled disengagement from Latin America, as F. D. Roosevelt had done when he refused to intervene against Mexico's nationalizing her petroleum resources. Whatever the evils of our era, the end of empire has been a positive good, an indispensable prelude to shedding shackles of resentment, and to self-development. Johnson, however, has moved in an opposite and profoundly reactionary direction in Asia and Latin America.

Johnson's search for a durable détente with Russia and his relatively passive European policy (which is a condition of détente) have facilitated his trans-Pacific ventures and the resurrection of some of the ugliest features of Yankee imperialism in Latin America. "Manifest Destiny," which pointed westward and across the Pacific, has in a sense been revived. In the nineteenth century the doctrine bore some fruit and had some plausibility: it helped make the U.S. a geographic entity, enhanced its sense of national unity, lent impetus to opening up the Far East to American trade. But who can fathom the function of an "Asian commitment" today? It can hold few attractions to American business, and certainly no prospect of order to its intended beneficiaries. If, as some on the Left believe, American capitalism is neo-colonialist in tendency, Johnson hardly acts in its interest. Judging by postwar experience, neo-colonialism (let us assume we know what the term stands for) would seem to presuppose disengagement and a minimum of, or no, direct intervention—and, surely, low or no visibility of the military attached to the neo-colonialist power. Johnson's policies do not meet these conditions.

Johnson is an American Anthony Eden. He will not perceive, or at least adapt to, the reality that attempts at dominating the people of industrially less developed nations cannot work. Repression by military means, itself a more and more expensive undertaking, becomes the price of a specious success.

Naturally, broad strata of American society would not want to see American power diminished. Johnson finds strongest support among those who have material and ideological stakes in expansionary policies—the military and its allies in industry, and the technological elite.

Johnson's policies will fail in time,

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as did Eden's—not because they carry the threat of world war (I do not believe they do) but because their disastrous results will have been bought at increasing sacrifice of men and resources. No society with as much vitality as America's will long tolerate lack of success stemming from inability to adapt to new conditions. However, such adaptation has always been preceded by severe internal crises; it will require at least a changing of the guard. Johnson's policies will fail of their own contradictions.

The Meany-Reuther Conflict

The communication we print below is from a long-time trade unionist who describes himself as "a friend of DISSENT *and the* LID." *He asks us to note that he writes with an avowed bias: "I think that Reuther has used his position constructively and honestly and has somehow contrived to remain uncorrupted (in the broadest possible sense) by position and power." We hope to print other articles, with various interpretations, in later issues.*—ED.

A good part of the comment about the dispute inside the AFL–CIO has been empty of understanding. Reporters have made much of the votes inside the Executive Council, but these votes have limited meaning. Jacob Potofsky of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers is recorded as supporting Meany's position, but his union has publicly declared itself for the recognition of Red China. Does anyone really suppose, then, that he supports Meany's foreign policy? There is a tradition of public unanimity at the Council level, and it is precisely this tradition of unanimity with which Reuther is breaking. The Council votes mean little; it is what happens in the field that will be important.

Reuther has, in effect, decided to give up standing in the wings while he suffered what he regarded as exclusion and abuse, waiting for a crack at a job that he knew in his bones he would never inherit. By any reasonable standard, Reuther is "entitled," but Meany has made no secret of his intention to block him at any cost. Reuther is the kind of man who feels compelled to go along so long as he is part of a "leadership team," but now he wants out, wants more elbow room, and so he has moved for greater independence. There will be no formal break with the AFL–CIO —unless Meany aggressively seeks one. There will, instead, be a gradual drawing apart. Here and there, at local levels, the UAW will go it alone, but in most places it will continue to cooperate with the AFL–CIO.

The differences that have caused the break are not in any sense ideological

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—though they are, in fact, significant and sharp. The two men are poles apart temperamentally, though on domestic political issues they are relatively close to each other, and both stand substantially to the Left of the American population.

Perhaps more than anything else, habits become reflexive through years of training and experience make it difficult for the two men to work together. Meany is a craft unionist. He is, in the literal sense, not much of a unionist at all. Reuther's scorn for Meany's lack of "real trade union background" almost matches that expressed by Jimmy Hoffa. *Though most outsiders would probably think of him as more practical than Reuther, the truth is that Meany has had little to do with bread-and-butter unionism, and almost nothing to do with policy-making collective bargaining.* It is precisely in this area that Reuther has had his greatest success. The UAW, under his leadership, has been a pace setter in negotiating pensions, guaranteed employment plans, health and hospital insurance plans, as well as in wages, hours, and working conditions.

Meany, on the other hand, proudly states that he has never walked a picket line. His talents were developed and displayed in political maneuvering (generally off-stage) as a very skillful representative of craft union interests in New York State politics. People who should know claim that he was the best labor lobbyist ever. But he has almost never had to deal with the delicate problems of collective bargaining, and this makes all the difference in his way of operating and administering the affairs of the labor organization.

Union leaders trained in large-scale collective bargaining necessarily learn to consult with others inside their organizations, or develop—as John L. Lewis seemed to—an acute sensitivity to the needs of their members. A successful leader in national collective bargaining must continuously share leadership with others. He must be able to bring them along. If they are to be persuaded to accept compromises in bargaining, they must be convinced that proposed compromises are adequate to the situation, or unavoidable.

As the subject matter of collective bargaining grows more complex and the *groups of workers represented grow larger and are more dispersed,* the need for consultation, explication, indoctrination, and persuasion grows too. This is one reason that in recent years we have witnessed the rejection by union members of leadership-proposed settlements. A good many unions, accustomed to dealing with small, localized groups of workers, concerned with relatively simple problems, have found it difficult to adjust to the new complexities, have failed to involve local leaderships in the continuous education of direct participation and have, as a result, found themselves completely out of touch with their members at critical moments.

David McDonald lost the presidency of the Steel Workers because he persistently failed to consult with regional and local leaders of the union. The revolt of the airline mechanics against the leadership of the IAM might have been averted, had the union developed less archaic methods of bargaining and brought local leadership into direct participation at national levels.

Because he is the product of a union

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which, out of tradition and preference and early recognition of necessity, has always sought to draw local leadership into policy and decision-making, Reuther has tended to make few significant decisions without consulting others. More often than not—in truth, almost always—his ideas and proposals have a way of prevailing, but he almost never seeks to impose them by fiat. He tries to persuade, and he does have enormous gifts of persuasion.

In bargaining with General Motors, for example, Reuther consults continuously with the popularly elected rank-and-file negotiating committee. Union demands are formulated by a General Motors Council of about 500 local union delegates, and this Council is generally called into session two or three times when negotiations are in progress.

Before final settlements are arrived at, they are first presented to a meeting of this Council and are not sent to local unions if the Council disapproves —as it has been known to do. Similar procedures are followed in all UAW negotiations.

There is consequently reason to believe that if Reuther were the head of the AFL–CIO, he would draw others into close consultation. He would not have decided, even momentarily, to withdraw from the International Labor Organization—as Meany did—without first consulting with the most important officers of the AFL–CIO. Or, if he felt forced to make a quick decision, he would have been in touch with other leaders as soon as possible, by phone and in person, to explain his decision and to try to persuade them that it was a correct one.

Because he is required to consult others, Reuther expects to be consulted. His fundamental complaint against Meany is that he learns about too many AFL–CIO decisions through the newspapers, and that he and others do not learn about policy until it has been translated into action. This exclusion is, by now, resented to the point of obsession.

There are, of course, other important points of difference. In foreign affairs, the differences between Reuther and Meany are hard to define—but they are significant. Reuther supports official American policy, but he maintains a somewhat independent stance and is likely to be critical on details of State Department activities in foreign lands, especially in the underdeveloped countries. Reuther supports and works with overseas unions, if they seem representative and legitimate, even when they are critical of American policy. Meany, on the other hand, acting through Jay Lovestone (who is notoriously preoccupied with rooting out every last trace of pro-Comintern sentiment even where it seems nonexistent) eschews any form of cooperation with unions which are, in his judgment, suspect on this score. This has led Meany to the absurdity of refusing cooperation with Latin-American worker organizations, some of which, though Roman Catholic in inspiration and orientation, are nonetheless sharply critical of the United States and its policies in that part of the world.

(During discussions at the last meeting of the AFL–CIO Executive Council, Meany was asked by one International Union president if it was reasonable to infer from a proposed policy statement that the AFL–CIO eval-

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uated the political systems of Yugoslavia and China as identical. Meany, according to some who were present, fudged his answer but finally did not boggle at the implication. In contrast, the UAW convention, at Reuther's urging, has called for "a new look" at American policy overseas, and specifically endorsed the inclusion of Red China in the United Nations.)

Again, the differences are linked to background. Meany is solid, working-class Irish Catholic—more or less radical in economic matters but conservative socially and, above all, theologically. Jay Lovestone does not, as many suppose, create policy for Meany—he rather provides the intellectual rationale and know-how to implement it abroad. Meany's foreign policy attitudes are probably not much different from those of the average Irish working-class Catholic—still untouched by the influence of Pope John and the currents of change set loose by Vatican II.

Reuther, of course, is social democratic in orientation, even if not ideologically. He has a more open view of the world and rather expects that unions and nations outside the United States will tend to be more collectivist than he would choose to be.

But the difference in their trade union backgrounds may be even more significant. Reuther is accustomed to accommodation through negotiation. After all, he has learned to live in relative peace—even if not always amicably—with General Motors, Chrysler, Ford, International Harvester—even with Kohler. His experience has taught him that negotiations of immediate quarrels can—if ideology is kept off the table—lead to a succession of temporary settlements that, taken together add up to a continuing avoidance of all-out conflict. Reuther would try to negotiate with the devil himself if the alternative was to go to war. Acting for President Kennedy, he even tried it with Castro in the abortive attempt to trade American-made tractors and bulldozers for those prisoners captured in the Bay of Pigs fiasco.

Meany—as his treatment of Reuther would indicate—is the more intransigent, though he almost certainly would not be if he'd been trained as a leader of workers engaged in collective bargaining.

Reuther and the UAW will make no revolutions. They will more actively support campaigns to organize farm workers and the working poor generally. They will experiment with new techniques and alliances in attempts to organize communities of the poor. They will act more independently in the political arena and will seek recognition in places where influence and power count. In some places, important political figures will learn, if they do not already know, that consultation with Meany is not enough, but that they'll have to talk with the UAW too.

The UAW is a large and powerful union. With the exception of the two major parties, it may have more political activists in its ranks than any other organization in the country. It has more than 1200 local unions operating in about 40 states. It is strongest in the Middle West, not only in Michigan, but in Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Ohio, and Wisconsin as well. It is also probably the largest single union in Connecticut, Maryland, and New Jersey. It has significant

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clusters of membership in California, Colorado, Georgia, Massachusetts, New York, and Tennessee. It contends with the Steel Workers for first place in size among all unions in Canada, where in the past year it has rolled up a dazzling record of more than 40 consecutive wins in labor board elections. The total number of *new* workers organized by UAW since January, 1964, now exceeds 100,000! It pays per capita tax on nearly 1.4 million members to the national AFL-CIO.

UAW is no longer as dynamic as it was in the thirties, nor even the forties, but it is still quite a force. Much of the union's leadership believes that it can recapture a good deal of its old vitality as it begins to operate more or less on its own. The union has financial muscle, too. In addition to dues payments, it leads all unions in the collection of voluntary political contributions from its members (about $500,000 in the recent non-presidential year), and the interest from its strike fund of about $45 million is spent to support international and community activities. It is from this source that $60,000 a year for the California grape strikers is drawn, and money to support overseas activities rivaling, perhaps exceeding in scope the work of the entire AFL-CIO.

The UAW's ability to use this base effectively shows up at critical moments. At any recent National Democratic party convention, for example, going back at least to 1952, the number of UAW members seated as delegates almost certainly exceeded the total for all other unions combined. UAW was a more or less critical force in the campaigns to nominate Adlai Stevenson in 1952 and John F. Kennedy in 1960.

Ironically, Reuther's recent moves may enhance his standing and influence inside the trade union movement. Whatever Meany's disposition, many old-line AFL-CIO leaders will not be eager to part company with the UAW. A point that seems to have escaped most labor commentators is that until now Reuther has merely argued and debated with Meany at meetings of the Executive Council—a quite different thing from opposition. As UAW moves openly, Meany may find himself on somewhat less solid ground than he now occupies. Not that the craft unions are likely to desert Meany; but many craft leaders may soon begin to feel the *need* to conciliate and to minimize tensions with the UAW.

In the automobile centers, members of craft unions work alongside UAW skilled tradesmen as a supplementary work force during model change periods. They remain there on sufferance of the UAW. This work, recurring each year and sometimes lasting for months on end, is generally done under high pressure, with a great deal of premium time for overtime. It is the bread and butter of craft locals in cities such as Detroit, Cleveland, Buffalo, Milwaukee, Atlanta, Toledo. Business agents in those towns will not be anxious to man battle stations in a war over "abstractions" that disturb the relationship of Meany and Reuther. They certainly owe no fealty to Jay Lovestone, who may often seem to them responsible for the friction on top. They are not looking for trouble and they will find ways to let Meany know they're not.

In many localities and states UAW

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per capita payments to city, county, and state labor organizations are critically important. The UAW is the *only* union that has always *required* its local unions to affiliate with and pay per capita to local and state labor organizations. Threats of withdrawal, expressed or implied, at these levels, will probably be enough to cause a good many leaders of these groups to begin to say openly that "George ought to lay off."

At least a few presidents of international unions who have, even if covertly, opposed Reuther, are likely to begin hearing from significant local units which rely heavily on UAW for support and cooperation. The IUE and IAM, for example, whose presidents are said to be in the Meany camp, conduct joint negotiations with UAW in General Motors, Ford, General Electric, North American Aviation, Douglas Aircraft, and other large corporations. The unions have long had formal and informal mutual assistance agreements and arrangements, and their area leaders often work in tandem. It is hard to believe that these factors will not find expression, if the argument on top begins to reflect itself in deteriorating local relationships. Similar currents are running in other places. One can be sure, for instance, that a number of the larger districts of the State, County, Municipal Workers will not silently accept attacks on UAW by the president of that union, if UAW spokesmen begin protesting vigorously—especially at moments when they are called upon by that union for support in critical struggles.

So long as the differences between Meany and Reuther were expressed only at meetings of the AFL–CIO Executive Council, Reuther's peers could join the fun of "slapping the Redhead down." Many of them, however, will probably show less stomach for the game if it begins to create headaches for them in their own constituencies, and it will if Reuther really decides to build an opposition.

More affirmatively, the Steel Workers, IUE, Rubber Workers, Packing House Workers, Amalgamated Clothing Workers, Teachers, and others have strong ties with the UAW that are rooted in tradition and emotional identification. While none of these will support a split of the AFL–CIO, more often than not their power and influence will be on UAW's side.

Short of disaffiliation, Reuther has many weapons in his arsenal, and he is likely to use them. Many people in the leadership of the UAW believe that he should have begun long ago. Reuther never before adopted a posture of opposition and it was, therefore, not possible to mobilize UAW's considerable power on his side of the argument on top. A local business agent who remains unthreatened by UAW action at his level, or a state AFL–CIO official, whose organization is placidly supported by all UAW locals within his jurisdiction, is likely to remain neutral at best in any controversy between Meany and Reuther. But if trouble threatens at local levels, or income is shut off, the local officials, so the argument goes, will want Meany to sue for peace with Reuther and will begin searching for ways to put the pressure on him to call off or at least minimize the conflict.

Ironically, it is quite possible that Meany, in the coming months and years, will seek to avoid public con-

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flict with Reuther, and that relationships between the UAW and the AFL–CIO will grow more, rather than less, placid. The effect of Reuther's open opposition probably will be to move Meany somewhat to the "Left." He will be under great pressure to compete and will very likely begin to place greater emphasis on the organization of agricultural workers, on the need for political action, and the broadening of the national organization's social and political programs.

It is just possible, on the other hand, that Meany's abiding dislike of Reuther (which seems very real and intense) will cause him to sweep aside all cautionary warnings and go after Reuther and the UAW in open war. It is hard to believe that he will follow this course, since he has nothing to gain. No matter what Reuther does, Meany will die in office, if that's what he chooses to do, and the power of the organization he leads can be greatly weakened only if he chooses to fight battles that can be avoided.

What seems more likely to happen is that Reuther will go his separate way. He will, as a result, enjoy five or six years during which his influence in American life will increase. His need for recognition will not be met, but it will be more nearly fulfilled than if he continues along present paths. His separation from the AFL–CIO leadership will make it possible for him to work more closely with non-labor, liberal groups, and the influence of his union will very likely increase. How significant this will be for the nation and the trade union movement it is not possible now to foretell.

A Special Correspondent

A. J. Muste

We learned with sorrow of the death of A. J. Muste, veteran leader of the pacifist and radical movements, at the age of eighty-two. A. J.'s life spanned the major experiences of the American Left during the past half century. He worked with an absolutely selfless determination in behalf of the causes to which he was dedicated. He was one of that splendid generation of American radicals who serve as a model for all of us; and it comes as a harsh blow to think that he will no longer be among us, to work with, to discuss and argue with, and above all, to admire.

I. H.

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Henry Pachter

MAO'S THIRD CIVIL WAR?

Further Speculations on the Struggle in China

February 10, 1967

It is necessary to date one's commentaries on China; the events are overtaking us, and only by sheer luck did our articles in the two preceding issues remain topical until they were in the hands of our readers. Meanwhile, in the last few weeks, many more reports have come in, some more confusing, but others capable of sharpening our perceptions. I think we were correct in de-emphasizing the foreign policy aspect of the conflict in China, and also in insisting that the People's Liberation Army neither initiated the present upheaval nor could be its main instrument without being turned inside out. Most professional China watchers now have taken similar views and have also confirmed the three aspects which we singled out as strategic in the present conflict:

- the experts of all kinds, the Party hierarchy, and the government bureaucracy have resisted the whiplash of a supreme leader who desperately tries to continue the revolutionary dynamism of the heroic period;
- these power-holders have become the spokesmen of vested interests and of groups, notably the workers, who resist demands for more effort, more sacrifice, and more initiative;
- since the leader had gotten out of touch with his regular power apparatus, he had to call upon new cadres which might be ready to continue the revolution.

These new cadres were the mobs who were encouraged to re-enact the Great March, terrorizing officialdom and those parts of the population who are wary of revolutionary "leaps," imposing on all a ritualistic cult of the "thought of Mao" and clamoring for a "cultural revolution" which threatens to disrupt the web of traditional Chinese society.

If I am not mistaken, we must take the cultural revolution seriously. It is much more than a mere "ideology"; it is a new principle of organization and an attack on time-honored customs in the land of mandarins. While savagely "Asiatic" in form, it is at the same time a desperate

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attempt to catch up with the West in a hurry (and in a Chinese way). It is an effort to do away with Chinese sluggishness and inefficiency, to abolish routine methods of work, to create a severe work ethics, to overcome the mandarin system, and to eradicate the Chinese tendency for officials (whether Communist or otherwise) to fall into corruption, rote, and authoritarianism; it is to create a new dedication to the revolutionary state; to fight the individualistic peasant spirit of ancient China and to generate a new industrial spirit of cooperation, spontaneity, and initiative. If it were not called Maoism, we might name it Chinese socialism.

Ironically, before the Japanese invasion, Chiang Kai-shek tried something similar on a Christian basis, with a "moral renewal" movement appealing notably to the students. The coincidence is not accidental: both Chiang and Mao recognized the "historical task" of quickly getting China out of the seventeenth century of Asia and into the nineteenth century of Europe, a task that Mao felt—and until recently his Central Committee agreed—could be achieved only with the aid of despotic methods and with a revolutionary organization that could borrow its inspiration only from the "*levée en masse*" of the Jacobins and the Bolsheviks. The alternative is a military absolutism modelled on Cromwell or Napoleon, or borrowed from Spengler's ideas on "Prussian Socialism." Should neither of these methods succeed in making old China over into a modern nation, then it would naturally slide back into its old evils of regionalism, warlordism, bureaucratism, inefficiency, and powerlessness. (Once more: it is worth the effort to re-read Max Weber on Chinese bureaucracy or to study Chinese history for precedents of the current crisis.)

I am going to suggest that something of the kind already is happening. Chinese society is falling the way it always tends to fall when the state does not hold it together forcefully. And the Chinese state is disintegrating partly from the stress of its internal tensions, partly under the blows of the leader who tries to regenerate it by acts of violence. China is an extremely big country with a decidedly underdeveloped communications system. Bandits used to be hardly distinguishable from local government. (And for a long while Mao's armies had some resemblance to such bandits.) Warlords ruled their provinces pretty much as they saw fit, not caring much for the orders of the central government.

There is no technological reason why the Chinese Communist party should not have produced the same kind of provincialism which the Kuomintang had produced before it. With this difference, however: then warlordism was largely regional, today it may also be functional. There

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are economic, administrative, educational, and other satrapies, each constituting its own little power machine. And each functionary is more intent on defending his own bailiwick against intrusions from above, or maybe against infringements by his equals, than on fulfilling the Plan. In fact, it has not been possible to publish a plan which has any likelihood of being fulfilled, and this alone may have been a sufficient signal for Mao Tse-tung to unleash the new wave of revolution. But he did not succeed in shaking the Party into action; neither did the Army follow him unequivocally. Instead, the campaign reports which appear in the poster war keep informing us about the large areas of disaffection which must painfully be reconquered—and often fail to succumb to the Red Guards. Mao has spoken of "administrative kingdoms," but his method of smashing them has provoked a reaction which has increased their number and their independence.

The posters tell us of a state of anarchy, with armies deciding from day to day whether they will take orders from Mao or from the Party, with provinces declaring their loyalty to this or that leader or council, with departments of government working for or against the ruling party, with terror gangs of different types "seizing power" in the name of the revered leader or of his enemies. Most bewildering of all, none of this seems to fit into any organized scheme of ideological order. No one knows who is Left and who is Right, who is a revolutionary hero and who is a saboteur, and as in the Soviet Union of the thirties, a man might be a rising star of the revolution today and find himself accused of "revisionism" or of "capitalist ways" tomorrow. In the Soviet purges at least one knew, or believed one knew, that some people were on the Right and others on the Left. The ones were Bukharinites, the others Trotskyists, and then there was a Stalinist center.

Now we have to learn a completely new vocabulary which is not very helpful; for Liu Shao-chi is as "Left" as Mao himself and Lin Piao, and among those in disfavor now we find political figures who were enthusiastic and others who were skeptical about the Great Leap in 1957. During the Russian purges, one was able to construct a condemned man's platform from his Party history, former attitudes, and also from the kind of vilification he was exposed to. There were those who were merely undialectical and others who were Trotskyite deviationists. Today everybody is a saboteur, an economic pragmatist, and a deprecator of Mao's thoughts, a victim of "capitalist ways," and of materialistic temptations; and they don't even stop to differentiate between "revisionists" and capitalists. What matters seems only to be loyalty to Mao Tse-tung.

If, as some have suggested, Mao were "farther to the Left" and the

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opposition more "realistic," then the latter would publish a "platform," or we might learn through the poster mail approximately what they propose to do for the masses, for the revolution, or for the war against imperialism.

Moreover, it seems that some Red Guards loyal to the Party hierarchy have tried to outflank Mao on the Left, hurling charges of "sabotage" and "capitalist ways" at his own henchmen. We have ideological anarchy on top of the anarchy of power, and the lack of ideological precision in this game of mutual recriminations seems to reflect an uncertain grip on the problems Mao proposes to solve and on the apparatus with which he proposes to solve them. Stalin, surely, killed his adversaries or humiliated them; but at least he seemed to know what he was doing and he displayed remarkable skill in liquidating one apparatus with the aid of the other. But what, in the name of Lenin, is Mao up to? Does he really think he can mold the wild and untrained Red Guards into a new party, as he did shape a bandit army into a ruling party thirty years ago? Or does he hope that the turmoil will help the Party to renew itself and regain its original ardor? Either proposition seems fantastic. Yet the Party does not seem to have a coherent conception of its future either. While all the satraps individually resist Mao and his Red Guards, they do not seem to have sufficient coherence among themselves to beat him. The best they hope for is that he will wear himself out—and by the way, they don't seem to think that Lin Piao can outlast Mao. So they just resist individually—a mode of action one might justly call "sabotage"—and wait patiently for Mao's time to run out. Again, there seems to be something enormously Chinese about this waiting game which Mao, in his turn, is trying to beat by outflanking the Party on the youth front: not only will he survive through the Red Guards who recite his "thoughts"; he appointed his (comparatively) young wife to guide them.

There is something pathetic about the old leader who is so isolated that he can trust only his wife to carry out his orders and to succeed him. Even Stalin did not put his son in charge of anything bigger than an airplane; he always found people who were servile enough to help him liquidate others until they were liquidated themselves. Mao has to resort to his own family; his despotism is much more personal. His cult also has taken proportions even Stalin could not have imagined (I understand that on Chinese airplanes the cantor indicates the place in Mao's works one is supposed to recite). The cultural revolution is supposed to leave no trace of old China in the empty heads and to fill them with nothing but Mao's thoughts. It is possible that this has succeeded at least to the extent that no one yet has dared to kill Mao. But the awe of Mao into

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which all of China is being hypnotized has not beaten down the resistance of the satraps. The civil war has been fought to a standstill so far, with neither the Maoists nor the mandarins being able to overcome each other. In contrast to the Soviet purges, the Chinese civil war is not one-sided but a seesaw fight.

This is extremely rare in the history of revolutions. It is as though Robespierre, having miraculously survived the Thermidor, had aroused the provinces against the Convention—or as though Lenin had "gone to the sailors of Kronstadt" as he had threatened more than once in order to make the Party compliant; as though Trotsky had raised the banner of international revolution in 1925 before Stalin had time to consolidate his power—or as though Khrushchev, in 1964, had refused to bow to the decision of the Presidium and had marched against Moscow at the head of the Communist Youth.

But Khrushchev had no instrument of power after the Party had asserted its sovereignty against his dictatorial aspirations (he, too, had resorted to members of his family). That Mao could mobilize support for himself is proof of the weakness of the Chinese Party system, or perhaps of the inadequacy of such an organization in such a big country. Mao had given the Party sufficient power to rule the country, but he also had set up rivals, above all the Army and the Red Guards. I know of few historical parallels which could guide us in understanding the mechanism of government he had in mind. Perhaps we might think of Cromwell's repeated overthrows of the Parliaments he had intended to use, with the aid of an army which upheld him but of which he was utterly suspicious, too.

Perhaps we might think of the old Polish marshal, the ex-socialist Pilsudski, who periodically retired and re-emerged to overthrow a government he had previously established in power. In my earlier articles I may have looked too much for close parallels in Soviet history or in the history of the French revolution. Though the latter still provides us with the classical terms "Thermidor" and "Bonapartism," these must be understood as analogies rather than patterns other revolutions have to follow. I already noted that Stalin tried to avoid the appearance of "Thermidor." The Chinese situation is different again, and no two historical phenomena can be understood as modifications of one model. Therefore, while it still may be helpful to compare the Party hierarchy with the "Thermidorians" and the Maoists with either the Commune or the Bonapartists, it really might be preferable to treat the Chinese revolution as a thing by itself and to consider Mao's model of the revolutionary state quite apart from historical precedents.

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The instrument of Mao's struggle has recently been dubbed "Commune," reminiscent of both the classical Commune of Paris in 1871 and of the Chinese village communes which symbolize the revolutionary collectivism of the Maoist movement. It seems that Mao's ideological spokesman, Chen Po-ta, has suggested the model of the great Paris Commune—but let us be sure which: not the one of 1871 which Marx described and which was considered as the classical model of a revolutionary, democratic government. The one Chen Po-ta seems to have had in mind was the Paris Commune of 1792–94, the "parallel government" which gave strength to Robespierre and succumbed shortly after his fall. Its function was to invade the Convention from time to time and to impose on it the laws that "the people" desired. The feature of the 1871 Commune which appeals to Mao, of course, is the provision that deputies may be recalled and replaced instantly by the voters; but that Commune was an orderly, organized government. What Mao has in mind, rather, is the direct and permanent vigilance of "the masses" which Lenin erroneously praised in the Commune.

This reminiscence may have been invoked when Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping were removed from their posts as President and Party Secretary, respectively. But it was not "the masses" who pronounced them unworthy; it was Mao with a (probably engineered) majority of his Central Committee, and the masses were apprized of their "role" in this historical event only as an afterthought. Nevertheless, seeing that the Party machine did not follow him and did not accept the removal of their two leaders, Mao called on "the people" and then his ideological mannekin, Chen Po-ta, started "studying the Paris Commune." We now learn of several such "communes" which have been set up in big cities as "parallel governments," thereby announcing that a state of civil war exists between the regular government and the Maoist movement.

As I see the present civil war in China, it seems to be a sequel to the two or three civil wars Mao has conducted in the past. He participated in the first phase of the Chinese revolution, which led from the coalition between the Communists and the Kuomintang to the slaughter of the former by the latter; he organized the guerrilla war and the Long March which led him to Shensi, where he established the first Communist government. He harassed the Japanese and after World War II led his troops to victory over Chiang Kai-shek. After a period of consolidation he again renewed the revolutionary spurt and started the "Big Leap," whose failure probably caused his eclipse in the early sixties. But here he is, pressing again, trying to prod the weary, opportunistic Party into revolutionary fervor.

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In all these actions Mao has always influenced the course of events from without. He was part of the national revolution and part of the Communist revolution; but he fell out with both. The revolution which really stirs his passion is the Puritan revival, the permanent rejuvenation and purification of the people. It also is a revolution in which the people are much more active than the hierarchy now allows them to be, or as they would be if they followed their ancient routines. The thought of Mao is essentially a do-it-yourself faith which requires and encourages constant spontaneous cooperation, as guerrillas learn in the field or in the homely household examples which the enraptured readers of the "thoughts" recite interminably. Mao's romantic despotism has this touch of Bakunin in it, but while Bakunin usually left the revolutions in which he became involved, Mao constantly returns to them. He does not merely rule them, he also prods them.

This dialectics of despotism and anarchism should surprise no one familiar with the course of revolutions. A streak of the same spirit may be found in Fidel, whose good fortune it is to govern a small island. Big, enormously complicated China offers more opportunities for both mandarins and anarchists, despotism and bureaucracy. For 18 years now the Chinese have enjoyed being a nation; under the iron rule of the Communist party they were thankful for peace. Now they have to cope once more with satraps and with civil war, and possibly with the danger of provincial separatism. The danger is serious in Sinkiang (Chinese Turkestan), which happens to be (a) the seat of China's nuclear establishment, (b) ethnically related to the adjacent areas in the Soviet Union, (c) closer to communications and trade centers of the Soviet Union than to those of China, (d) possessed of a tradition of Russian interference in her internal affairs, (e) in the power of a leader who, even while a Communist, nevertheless displays all the characteristics of an independent warlord.

Other provinces are not so directly threatened by foreign powers, but they are now gaining back some of their old independence. The Communist bosses thus seem to fall into the same groove of regionalism which was characteristic of their predecessors. It is said that the Southwestern Regional Administration, comprising the provinces of Kweichow, Yunnan, and Szechwan (ironically, that is where Mao's triumphant Party Congress of 1934 was held) has been branded anti-Maoist—an enormous territory of about 250,000 square miles. But in contrast to Sinkiang, there is no separatism here. The Chinese generally are very nationalistic, and the centrifugal forces may disrupt or sabotage, but will not question the power of the central government. Maoism, for

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all its anarchical traits, represents a national and centralistic force.

Normally, such a national despot would ally himself with those strata of a population that are technologically most advanced. Surprisingly, unlike Cromwell, Mao Tse-tung has done the opposite. Though originally the technical intelligentsia was annoyed by the unreasonable demands of the Party bosses, it now seems that the regional and functional satraps are in league with the experts. And instead of encouraging co-operation between those who have modern know-how and those whose enthusiastic initiative should heave China out of her routine ways of backwardness and lethargy, Mao has identified initiative with know-nothingness and has driven into opposition almost all of those who have certain skills. He is still feeding on the reminiscences of the Long March, the civil war, and the war, when indeed devotion and a militant spirit had to substitute for machinery and knowledge.

All Mao's "thoughts" contain no proper analysis of the conditions which gave him the unexpected victory, and he still thinks it was due only to Spartan virtues and correct ideology. Unthinkingly he applies this "lesson" to a task which is much more difficult; he did not win the civil war, he was able to outlast an enemy about to collapse. But today he must provide administration and constructive ideas, and here his revolutionary romanticism must fail. Faith may move mountains, but it does not build factories. Hence, Mao may win many temporary victories, but in the end, the forces which already are giving China the woof and web of administration, order, technological advance, and economic security seem likely to prevail. Unless Mao succeeds in provoking a famine he will ultimately be beaten.

P.S. February 15—In the beginning of February, an uneasy truce seems to have been arranged, probably with Chou En-lai acting as a mediator. The Red Guards are to go home; schools are to be reopened; rebel armies are to return to their posts; the authority of the Central Committee is to be restored; minor leaders who had opposed Mao will be permitted to recant. But it is not clear yet what positions will be assigned to Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping, Tao Chu, Chu Teh, and others whose fall has been reported. Nor can we tell today what the power structure will be in the future. The army obviously has been given a new responsibility in securing internal order; but it also has been told to consider defense its first duty. For indeed, the whole settlement has been served up with a sauce of patriotic gore and to the accompaniment of a war scare. I do not think this means army rule, for we do not know who rules the army. But it seems that Mao had to call a halt before he had reached all the aims of his cultural revolution.

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Vera Rony

HEARTBREAK IN TENNESSEE

Poor Whites and the Unions*

You don't have to come South to see the face of Lawrenceburg, Tennessee. You can see it—the concave cheeks, the deep-set pale blue eyes, the blowy, sandy hair—in the meaner streets of Chicago and Detroit and Cleveland. These are the yeoman farmers, the backbone of the South, thrown off the land by technology. They are the waste products of the relentless process which has wiped out 2,400,000 farms in the last 25 years and, as Secretary of Agriculture Freeman warned in Lawrenceburg, may destroy another million in the next five.

What of those farmers who reject the hectic anonymity of Northern cities and the ministrations of their social workers, who fight to stay on the land and retain a meaningful heritage by finding supplementary jobs in the industries now flocking South? They have produced no latter-day Tom Watson, no white Martin Luther King, nor have they organized marches or demonstrations. Yet in the view of "Preacher" Townsend, a Missionary Baptist leader in Lawrenceburg, they are not strangers to bondage. "Little Egypt" is what he and several thousand citizens of Lawrenceburg have dubbed the Murray Ohio Company, the largest bicycle-producing factory in the world. Struggling toward the Promised Land, these people have confronted the might of Lawrenceburg, the might of Lawrence County, the might of the governor of Tennessee, and the might of that durable Pharaoh, Jimmy Hoffa. And the Red Sea has not parted for them yet.

Murray Ohio, which employs about 2,000 people, was attracted to Lawrenceburg by the gift of free land, free construction of utility lines, and the floating of 20-year municipal bonds to finance plant construction. All the company needed to bring was its machinery and managerial personnel. These are the means by which the South is transforming itself from a traditional agrarian to a modern industrial society—a domestic Operation Bootstrap of awesome proportions. Yet too much of Southward-

* This article is adapted from Vera Rony's forthcoming book on the labor situation in the South, to be published by Quadrangle Books.

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winging industry is seeking not rivers or forests or skilled artisans but a single commodity in short supply up North: non-union labor. Murray Ohio, a Cleveland corporation unionized by the United Automobile Workers in 1936, made no secret of this motivation nor did the Lawrenceburg Chamber of Commerce find it anything but admirable.

Ray Blair, for 12 years a member of the Board of Magistrates (city council), says: "When Murray moved here in '55, they invited all the magistrates to supper at the plant, except me. They knew I was labor-minded and what they were talkin' about was how to keep the unions out." As a first step, job applicants were to be screened by trusted farmers and businessmen who would inquire into their social philosophy. In addition, company president William A. Hannon recruited his supervisors from the leadership of the UAW local in the Cleveland plant and obtained as a member of his board of directors Mr. Frank Costangy, generally considered the most effective union-busting attorney in the South. By the spring of 1956, Mr. Hannon was in business in the new location. And right on his heels came the UAW.

II

Hoyt Wright, the UAW standard-bearer, was by all accounts an affable personality. Even the town haberdasher, one of those smiling merchants who pales at the mention of controversy, has a good word for Wright. "He always bought his shirts here, and he was just as nice as he could be. Never talked about the union." (As legendary Southern organizer Franz Daniel says: "In those little Southern towns, you don't just go after the workers, you go after everybody.") But in the rural South, skill and charm alone do not produce union members.

"It was never just the money," says rank-and-file leader George O'Rear, "but who's gonna be happy with $3300 or $3800? Maybe he's given three nickel- or dime-an-hour raises over a period of years. A lot of our people are qualifying for the poverty program—what more can I say? Hannon just figured it was a lot more money than these people seen before and he counted on that." He also counted on their ignorance about how they should be treated, according to Mary "Tiny" McDougal, who while earning $1.50 an hour could not apply for a $2.50 job in the next department. "My uncle had a better job than most," says Paul Violet. "He was making $5500 on polishing when they automated the job. The company wouldn't use his seniority—they just cut him back to a $2900-a-year job, and he's in his fifties."

Dissatisfaction with the job evaluation system, the key to promotions and discharges, came to a boil in 1959, when the company excused its

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failure to rehire 22 union sympathizers after a seasonal lay-off by citing their low job ratings. The National Labor Relations Board found that "the evaluation system was adopted as a device to eliminate union adherents and is therefore lawless in its inception." This decision was, however, overturned by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.

The first Murray Ohio employee encountered by this reporter had lost a finger in the factory. "That's nothing," he replied to an expression of sympathy. "A guy working near me had all his fingers chopped off by a machine. You think they even stopped the damn thing? They just brushed the fingers right off and put somebody else on the machine. And you know who they put on—the man's own father-in-law!" In the steel shed, which employs 17 men, one was killed, two permanently disabled, and many injured, yet no safety system has been installed.

There is a widespread feeling that the company is far more interested in minimizing its insurance premiums than in providing fair compensation for such injuries. William Taylor, a 29-year-old father of four, fell on spilled grease while cleaning a flue stack and hurt his back so badly that an ambulance was called to take him to the hospital. In an NLRB affidavit, Taylor describes his visit to the insurance doctor:

> They took me to Dr. Meirowsky's office. The company safety director, Mr. Combs, stayed with me and the doctor talked to Mr. Hood [Combs's assistant] back in his office before he talked to me or done anything for me. . . . Three days later, I get a letter from Murray Ohio to be in the office tomorrow. Combs and Personnel Director Smotherman was there with a statement from the doctor and told me to throw away my crutches and come on back to work. I wouldn't sign this paper [which] was a medical release, to pay the doctor or the hospital. Part of it said you are able to return to work. A man there fell and broke his back in three places and Combs told him to get back to work. He signed the paper and he never got any money for being off.

In the first attempt to lasso the run-away shop, the election of September, 1957, the UAW polled an impressive 558 votes to the company's 624. Hoyt Wright immediately requested the NLRB to void the election, claiming that the company had corrupted the atmosphere of free choice by coercing and intimidating its employees. After investigation, the Board's regional office issued a complaint against Murray Ohio, charging 16 separate unfair labor practices.

The company then undertook its first appeal, to the NLRB Trial Examiner, who upheld the union. The second appeal was to the full Board, which affirmed the Trial Examiner's decision in February, 1959, almost a year and a half after the union's complaint. The Board then

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levied the sole penalty provided by law for coercing and intimidating workers—Murray Ohio was ordered to post a notice saying it would cease and desist from such activities in the future. The company thereupon took the case before the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, which sustained the Board and the UAW in June, 1960. Still, no meaningful penalties were imposed. For that, yet another legal action was required —a contempt proceeding—which the Board did not initiate until April, 1965. By that time, seven sets of union complaints had been filed and upheld by the Board, and the situation at Murray Ohio was no longer susceptible to legal solutions.

III

These events seemed to baffle some new members of what is hailed as the world's most pampered proletariat. "I wouldn't mind so much it bein' an employer law if they wouldn't call it a labor law," said Paul Odom to Hoyt Wright, who kept on doggedly organizing. But the company was pulling ahead of him; in September, 1960, it won the second election by 1,066 to 640. "Before the election we got what we call the UAW raise," says "Preacher" Townsend, "mostly a nickel, but sometimes a dime, and they was just as sweet as pie to us." Gerald Heatherly recalls: "They'd have these little meetings with the foremen; my foreman said, 'We'll be gettin' together like this often. Call me Shug.' We ain't got together and I ain't called him Shug, before or since."

Despite these skeptics, it is possible that Murray Ohio did at that time command the freely-tendered allegiance of the majority of its employees—but given the pressure of its anti-union activities, who could be certain? Failing that certainty, neither the UAW nor Hoyt Wright nor the union men of Lawrenceburg were prepared to call it quits. Yet Wright's latest organizing drive was deflated by the company's sixth set of intimidations in the summer of 1964. At that point, the UAW decided that nine dauntless years were enough. Giving Wright barely time to file his last NLRB complaint, the UAW folded its tents and quietly stole away. The organizer was not around to collect his last NLRB trophy; he died a few months after leaving Lawrenceburg, at the age of 53. "Wright had a history of heart trouble," says "Boss" Hollander, the local Tiresias who owns the Colonial Café, "but he died of a broken heart."

With labor as with civil rights, the stand-pat Southerner contends that but for the "foreigners," there would be no excursions and alarms. He would be hard put to explain a little excursion taken by Paul Odom and Jim Schaffer the day after "foreigner" Wright left Lawrenceburg. They dropped over to Nashville to find themselves some Teamsters.

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"We heard the Teamsters were tough," says Odom, "By that time, we didn't think no union was tough enough."

Given that criterion, everybody in mid-Tennessee would agree that Don Vestal's Local 327 was just the place to go. A buoyant, handsome man of 50, Vestal came up from a 25¢-an-hour truck driver in Texas through John L. Lewis's Mine Workers and Harry Bridges's Longshoremen to the presidency of Nashville's 1,000-member Teamster local in 1950. He became a household word in Tennessee in 1957 when the Senate Labor Rackets (McClellan) Committee accused the local of punching strikebreakers, "syruping" their trucks, breaking windows, etc., and Vestal lieutenant "Hard-hearing Smitty" took the Fifth Amendment 102 times in 20 minutes. But this reputation was to undergo a metamorphosis. Vestal, always pro-Hoffa, was defeated for office in 1961 and deserted by his leader. When he made his comeback in 1963 as the clean, anti-Hoffa candidate pledged to a new day, even the vehemently anti-Vestal *Nashville Tennessean* editorialized: "No one will deny his union the right to another chance to make a worthwhile contribution to community progress . . ." A year later, when he accepted the invitation from Lawrenceburg, his membership was up to 5,000 and he had every earmark of the up-and-coming labor crusader.

By September, 1964, 600 to 800 employees were coming to union meetings, and two months later the Teamsters called for an election.

> It was the third of December and mighty cold [recalls Teamster organizer James Craighead], but people came from miles around, like it was a football game; could the Teamsters beat Bill Hannon? There must've been a thousand of 'em milling around watching the voting. Old Hannon ran true to form: anti-Vestal signs up all over the polling places and blow-ups of Teamsters throwing bricks at scab trucks side by side with pictures of the happy Hannon way of life. They beat us by *21* votes —1,115 to 1,094. What a night! By 8:00 P.M. a whole bunch of people who'd carried company signs during the voting came and signed up with us—more than 21 votes right there. Everybody hopped into their cars and we had a parade—333 cars riding up and down through town, horns blowing, people shouting. We went and hung a funeral wreath on the company entrance, just like they always hung on the UAW. After losing so bad in the last election, these people were *excited.*

But for the powerless, a miss is worse than a mile. The next morning they woke up to discover that in plain fact nothing had changed. "It was a crazy atmosphere in the plant," recalls Paul Violet. "The people couldn't stop hoping, yet they were kind of desperate." This emotion was put to good use by the Teamsters, who correctly predicted that the company's conduct would lead the NLRB to set the election aside. In

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that event, an alternative path to recognition was open to the union. For the law provides that where an election is voided on these grounds and the union then produces valid authorization cards for 51 per cent of the work force, the Board can without further ado recognize the union. In the plant, the agitated atmosphere was producing union cards like a dry summer produces cotton.

The company was not unaware of this development. As tension increased, relations between management and workers deteriorated. "The supervisors kept saying there would never be a union at Murray Ohio and the people began to talk strike. Then the supervisors would dare 'em to strike, kid 'em about it," says George O'Rear. On February 25, the NLRB regional office found Murray Ohio guilty of 35 unfair labor practices against the Teamsters, including repeated threats that the plant would be closed if it were organized, and recommended that the election be set aside. The company appealed at once on March 8, the union informed Murray Ohio that it was prepared to submit authorization cards for 51 per cent of the work force and demanded recognition. When the company refused, the union appealed to the NLRB, which scheduled April hearings. But by that time, events had galloped beyond the Board's control. On March 3, the Teamsters struck Murray Ohio.

IV

It was a snowy, soggy day. Pickets slow-walked in front of cars entering the plant—taunting, boisterous, but harmless—until a white-collar worker whose new Mustang was scraped by a picket sign rushed up to the picket line waving a gun and shouting, "Who did it?" That's all it takes in Davy Crockett country. Within minutes car windows were smashed, tires punctured, cars overturned. By the time reporters arrived, the man with the gun was gone, but the battered cars were clearly in evidence. Less than 24 hours after the strike began, its image was indelibly established—and so was its strategy. Craighead had made no effort to restrain the pickets or to develop a non-violent response to provocation, and he would make none in the future.

The next day the company, expressing fear for the safety of the non-strikers, closed the plant—Round One for the union. Jubilantly the strikers erected their "tent city" near Murray Ohio's main gate, held staggering chicken suppers, square danced, and predicted early victory. Hannon, who made no predictions, obtained a Chancery Court injunction limiting the picketing to two people, 3,000 feet from the company gates, 20 feet apart, and moving at all times.

On March 18, Murray Ohio opened its doors, but only 300 workers nosed their cars through the sauntering pickets. Claiming that the

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resultant delays interfered with production, Hannon closed down again. What had, of course, interfered with production was the refusal of the majority of his employees to run the gauntlet of that cat-calling, license-jotting, reprisal-hinting picket line. The company's dilemma brought into play the second staple of Southern small-town labor relations: by April 1, the local police had arrested 266 strikers, athough both the sheriff and police chief testified in court that, the first day apart, picketing had been entirely peaceful. As strikers milled around the courthouse, trading jeers with company personnel, the Chancery Court judge charged the pickets with contempt of injunction and set their trial for April 21.

With these arrests, the public atmosphere began to darken. In a civic club speech Hannon described Vestal and Craighead as gangsters, the Teamsters threw a picket line around the hostile *Columbia Daily Herald,* Craighead's car was set on fire, striker David Lindsey was arrested for tossing a smoke bomb into another local plant being struck by the Teamsters, and deputy sheriff W. B. MacDonald announced in front of the courthouse that he intended to kill Jim Craighead.

> About this time [recalls Jim Crawford, co-publisher of the *Lawrenceburg Democrat Union*], the president of the Chamber of Commerce, Delton Truitt, brought me a full-page ad, signed by the Chamber and other law-abiding citizens of Lawrence County. It called the Teamsters outsiders and foreigners and said they were ruining our community and dividing our people with threats, intimidations and coercion.

According to Crawford's brother, Nathan, who is quite critical of the strike, "The company was determined to make everybody in town take sides. The ad made the strikers so mad they began to boycott the merchants, and from there it went from bad to worse."

The ad appeared on Friday, April 10, and on the following Monday production was resumed at Murray Ohio. The scene now took on the excitement of a public contest. Local and county police were strung alongside the road in front of the main gate, locked arm in arm to contain the strikers. As hundreds of their supporters cheered, the pickets scooted under the human barrier and marched into the stream of oncoming cars. As soon as one was arrested, another grabbed his sign and took his place. 124 pickets were arrested that Monday, some as often as six times; and 1300 employees, more than half the work force, made it to their machines. The aggressive police methods were proving effective; at this rate the strike could hardly sustain momentum. The next afternoon Craighead retaliated: 200 pickets sat down in front of the main gate.

According to a local reporter, the company made skillful use of the

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sit-down. At the end of the first shift, supervisors went around telling people they were trapped and could use the company phones to call home. By 5:15 P.M., a whole flock of their relatives were in front of Murray Ohio and they weren't too happy about the pickets. Among them was Bill Thompson, an insurance man whose relative was not an employee but a member of the board of directors. An argument developed between him and Craighead, he pulled a knife, and Craighead slugged him. Thereupon the police arrested Craighead, but pickets surrounded the police car, immobilizing it, until Craighead asked them to stand aside and let the law take its course. That ended the sit-down, but it was 8:00 P.M. before Sheriff Brown was satisfied that order was sufficiently restored to permit the first shift to go home.

By that time, Hannon, the vice mayor, and the sheriff had all wired Governor Frank G. Clement for assistance, claiming a breakdown of law and order. The next morning, Hannon closed the plant for the third time: "Fifteen hundred employees begged us to open this morning, but we could not see anything but bloodshed." The company also filed a $16 million damage suit against the Teamsters—a ploy which would have strategic importance later on.

For the next four days, Tennessee headlines were usurped by Frank Clement's Hamlet-like ponderings—to intervene or not to intervene. The more scholarly sheets mentioned that the Governor's first election in 1952 owed something to labor's resentment of his opponent, Governor Browning, for dispatching state police to the American Enka strike in Morristown. No one mentioned that Clement was supported by the Tennessee AFL–CIO council in his two subsequent elections, only to lose the endorsement in his unsuccessful Senate race against Ross Bass, when he retreated ignominiously on the race issue. Clement figured he wasn't going to get anything from labor anyway, so he might as well cash in on all the anti-labor sentiment that's always around in the South.

On April 17, having made no attempts at mediation or conciliation, Clement ordered the state highway patrol to Lawrenceburg: "Our investigation shows that the sale of firearms and ammunition has been abnormally high in the past several days. The atmosphere of the community is fraught with danger." Jim Crawford of the *Democrat Union* first heard about the rise in the sale of firearms from Mr. Hannon. Checking the information, he was told by local dealers that sales were normal for the season. When he revisited them after the governor's press conference, they refused to talk.

On the same day, the Chancery Court tightened its injunction: pickets were prohibited from approaching within six feet of strike-

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breakers' cars and from engaging in "carnival type demonstrations with dancing, singing, or gyrations of the body."

V

That Monday, all of the 1500 employees who entered Murray Ohio between the cordons of state police planned to put in a good day's work . . . But the best laid plans may be shot full of holes in Crockett country, where Davy set the style in marksmanship The productive souls sat idle all day while repairs were made on a section of the power plant knocked out by 13 bullets.

Seven pickets were arrested that day, including big, blonde "Country Boy" Lindsay, a local favorite. Says Ray Blair:

> Country Boy is half man and half polar bear. It took six of those green giants to get him into the police car and they're pushin' and haulin' at him and he's just kind of pullin' against 'em and lookin' puzzled, like a big wooly polar bear that's bein' annoyed but hasn't got his dander up. They stomped his foot so bad he had to get crutches.

By the end of the second day, 30 pickets had been arrested plus a strikebreaker whose car contained a gun and knife like a machete. All in all, some 200 patrolmen had enabled 1800 employees, more than two-thirds of the work force, to drive through the picket line.

The strikers responded to their eroding situation with a kind of incredulous, strangled outrage. "I don't get it—I must be stupid or somethin'," said Paul Odom. "Here's a company that's gone against the law time after time. They say the Labor Board is even gettin' ready to take 'em to court for ignoring all their decisions. Yet when we try to do something about it after all these years, we get every kind of cop in the state jumpin' on us."

On the third day, 25 gallons of axle grease were stashed away in the bushes near the picket line and at 4:00 P.M., one hundred strikers sat down in the path of the departing first shift. When they refused Chief O'Rear's request to leave, a wild struggle broke out. Troopers, covering their hands with sand, grappled with the slithery, shouting pickets. O'Rear's brother George, a strike leader, was among those sitting. "If he won't get up, treat him like anybody else," ordered the chief. For a moment, as he was being dragged to the police car George, a hefty six-footer, confronted his 6'8 brother: "You've gotten yours," he said "now I'm getting mine."

This was the account by a reporter for the *Florence* (Ala.) *Times:*

> I was standing about four feet from [Gerald] Heatherly when he was jerked off his feet astraddle a trooper's club hoisted by two officers. It

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> was a needlessly brutal act. When the man toppled forward, no attempt was made to break his fall, although he was handcuffed and could not aid himself. His head hit the ground with a resounding thud and he scooted about a foot on his forehead . . .

That Sunday, the *Nashville Tennessean* ran a full-page story about the strike, which began:

> What started out as a simple labor dispute at the Murray Ohio plant here has mushroomed into a social, political, and economic revolution that has shaken the stability of Lawrence County. The strike has grown into a virtual small scale civil war—pitting father against son, splitting and reshaping the county's political factions and setting off a revolt against police powers. . . . Lawrence County will never be the same again.

The repercussions of these events included the condemnation of the Governor by the AFL–CIO, the issuance of a federal show cause order against his intervention, and some fast backtracking by Clement himself, who now denied that the troopers had assumed responsibility for policing Murray Ohio, except to keep open the public streets near the plant.

Although he was clearly feeling the heat, the Governor managed to extract three major concessions from a worried Vestal before pulling out his troops: Tent City was to be disbanded and there would be no more mass picketing or delaying of cars.

"That cut it," said a veteran newsman. "When they took down that tent where there'd been all those chicken suppers and square dancing, the Teamos were lowering their flag. But if those people out there ever knew when to quit . . . " (Why should poor white Southerners know when to quit? If they didn't learn at Antietan and Chancellorsville, nor at Gastonia and Gadsden, where in the Thirties strikers fought state troops until they were clubbed down or killed, nor at Henderson, North Carolina, where strikers held out for 2½ years—if they didn't learn quitting there, why should they be such expert quitters in Lawrenceburg?)

A week after the state patrol withdrew, they were back at the gates en masse, ambling between the cars as if all the tumult and anger had never happened. But they had, as a rash of tire slashings and a gun duel attested. And now the NLRB finally petitioned the U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals to hold Murray Ohio in contempt for violating the court orders of 1960 and '64 to cease interfering with its employees' right to organize. As evidence, the Board cited chapter and verse of the company's massive campaign against the Teamsters.

Had Sheriff Harold Brown, considered a decent man, been more experienced than his 26 years warranted, he might have sensed that it was a time to walk on cat feet. But Lawrenceburg had no such luck.

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When the plant manager reported that 50 pickets were delaying incoming cars, Brown rushed over and waded in, selecting "Country Boy" for the first arrest. Lindsey, whose popularity seemed to make him a favorite police target, had been arrested several times before, but the charges were never sustained in court. As Brown grabbed him, Lindsey, his dander up at last, smashed his huge fist into the sheriff's eye. The sheriff tried to hit back, but seeing himself surrounded by pickets hoisting wooden staves, he reached for his gun. Police chief Scoggins was already sprawled on the ground. Holding the gun with barrel down, Brown made his way through the pickets to the police car and then to the hospital. Craighead, who was on the scene, had made no effort to restrain the pickets. Now there was no disputing the breakdown in law and order. The state patrol was back in Lawrenceburg the next day and the company's picture of the strikers as a violent, anarchic force was, for the general public, vindicated.

Clement's announcement that the troops would be withdrawn when enough local citizens were deputized to keep the peace introduced the last and sorriest chapter of the strike. Many of the new deputies were strikebreakers paid by the company while on police duty. When the *Democrat Union* requested a list of deputies for publication, the city refused; to its credit, the paper obtained and published the list anyway.

The last major engagement between strikers and police occurred last July 12, when some 300 Teamsters held a rally in a hollow near the plant. The police called upon the hymn-singing strikers to disperse and fired warning shots over their heads. In the ensuing panic, the police grabbed Edward Henson and clubbed him, while the other strikers covered their scramble uphill by hurling rocks at them. As the strikers' cars pulled out, the cops systematically battered and broke windows and windshields. They also tried to drag George O'Rear out of his car—"Let's git him!"—but Mrs. O'Rear held on to him for dear life and they made their getaway.

VI

In the same month, the NLRB shattered the union's last, best hope. While its Trial Examiner found the company guilty of 33 unfair labor practices and voided the December election, he ruled that the Teamsters failed to present sufficient authorization cards for automatic recognition. Again, it was a hairsbreadth defeat: the union submitted cards fo 48 per cent instead of the required 51 per cent of the bargaining unit.

Thus, in the fourth test of strength in an eight-year period the union again failed to demonstrate the allegiance of the majority of workers at Murray Ohio. Is it possible that more than half of these

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workers genuinely reject organization? "I'll tell you who don't think so—the company," says articulate strike leader Paul Violet. "If they did, they might just once let us alone, just let us campaign and vote in peace, or collect cards without raisin' hell in the plant like they did before we struck. We'd go along with the results, like it or not. But they won't do that, and we won't quit."

It was becoming a hard resolution to follow. The failure to win NLRB recognition and the effectiveness of the reinforced police in restricting picketing (which enabled the company to achieve normal production, quantitatively if not qualitatively) were enough to cut the heart out of any strike. In the sixth month of their vigil, the cheering, jeering pickets began to melt away. The Teamsters found jobs for more than a hundred in Nashville, others were hired by local enterprises, still others found work in Alabama, Mississippi, and Detroit. Several of these contribute support to those manning the token picket line today, a year later. The majority have been separated from their families during this time, having left their small farms in the care of their wives. They still hope that eventually everything will straighten out at Murray Ohio.

This will take a lot of doing, for in addition to their other problems, the strikers have now been beset by Jimmy Hoffa. That merciless strategist has proposed an agreement which will simultaneously end the strike, extricate the Teamsters from the company's $16 million lawsuit, and smite his enemy, Don Vestal. In return for the company's withdrawal of the suit, Vestal would have to cancel all union complaints before the NLRB and relinquish the strikers' right to return to their jobs with seniority intact, which was assured by the NLRB's finding of company culpability. Instead, those strikers without too many arrests were to be placed on a preferential hiring list for a year. Since the agreement states that the plant is already fully staffed, this is like saying: Here is nothing, hold it tight. Vestal was also to stipulate that neither the company nor the union bore any responsibility for the strike-connected violence; this was placed solely and squarely on the shoulders of the workers.

Vestal, undeceived about the impact of such an agreement on his conscience and his status as a rising labor leader, and already badly dented by his conduct of the strike, searched avidly for escape—only to come each time to the same dead end: the Teamsters' constitution empowers Hoffa, when backed by the Executive Board, to settle all local strikes and lawsuits. If Vestal refused to sign, Hoffa could and gleefully would place Local 327 under trusteeship. In mid-May, 1966, Vestal and Craighead (who was said to have wept) signed the agreement.

For the astounded strikers perhaps the unkindest, although the

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smallest, cut was the stipulation to disband the token picket line. But remember the Alamo and Davy Crockett! On June 14, Mr. Frank McCulloch, chairman of NLRB, received a petition from Lawrenceburg:

> We feel and ask that if after all the Unfair Labor Practices Murray Ohio has committed and been found *guilty* of we should be certified. We ask that if this Honorable Branch of the U.S. Government does not grant the above, then at least we should be granted back pay and given our jobs back. We again state that we do not wish to abide by the Agreement that Teamsters Local 327 was *forced* to sign against their wishes. We filed the Unfair Labor Practices *through* the Teamsters and *We Won Them*. . . . We asked and voted for Teamsters Local 327 to bargain for us . . . but not to sign anything giving our jobs and back pay away.

To his credit Jim Craighead unburdened himself of the full story of the agreement to NLRB officials. However, the strikers received no reply to their letter, and on June 24, the Board informed Local 327 that the agreement was approved and accepted. Although the agreement has been filed in the local court, no one has yet told the lonely picket in front of Murray Ohio's main gate that at last he's got to go home.

These events, occurring in a Southern border state—one with a "liberal" governor and the most liberal Congressional delegation below the Mason-Dixon line—bring to mind a statement of a distinguished authority on Southern history. When asked by the *New York Times* in 1962 about the new wave of industrialization sweeping the South, Professor C. Vann Woodward of Yale said:

> It means caste and segregation and paternalism. It means juleps for the few and pellagra for the crew. It means a facade of Greek columns and a backyard full of slums. It means the Compsons going to work for the Snopeses. It means a New South fraud papered over by an Old South myth. It is as up to the minute as Chester A. Arthur and Thomas Nelson Page, and by comparison it makes William McKinley and Queen Victoria and Rudyard Kipling seem avant garde.

DEEP THINKERS' DEPT.

OR

TRICK OF THE CENTURY

"Had TV occurred on a large scale during Hitler's reign, he would have vanished quickly."

MARSHALL MCLUHAN, author of *The Media As Message* and recently appointed Schweitzer Professor at Fordham University, quoted in *N.Y. Times Magazine*, Jan. 29, 1967

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Bayard Rustin

THE NEGROES, THE COPS, THE JEWS*

Let us recall the early days of our struggle when, in 1954, the Supreme Court made its historic decision. A great psychological ferment began to take place, which, as you know, was followed by a period of intense direct action.

It was a time of many sacrifices. People were killed. People were brutally mistreated and beaten. Girls had their hair chopped off and burning cigarettes put into their breasts and down their backs. There was a bombing in Birmingham. Millions of dollars are still tied up in fines and bail, some of which we will get back one day.

Although this was a period of great travail, it involved the simplest kind of social action. It was simple for a very good reason: the whole nation was stirred up about the least fundamental, though the highly important, issue of dignity. I say, least fundamental because dignity cannot spring from civil rights bills. They will help; but finally it is the economic and social nature of our institutions which determines how much dignity people have, how much money they can control, and whether or not they share equitably in the national wealth.

This period of direct action was simple also because attention was focused basically on the desegregation of public accommodations—swimming pools, restaurants, hotels, buses, libraries. And direct action was possible without a single penny being spent by the federal government. Without a single penny being spent, without an act of Congress, it was possible to create sufficient dislocation around these institutions, and a few Negroes demonstrating could both destroy the old institutions and create new ones overnight.

If enough people rode and rode in the buses, finally the bus companies would capitulate. If enough people sat at counters and went back and were arrested again and again, then, finally, restaurants—long before the Civil Rights Bill was passed—would have to begin to integrate. Libraries were closed. So were swimming pools. Sooner or later the people—even white people in the South—became disgusted with not having

* This article is the text of a speech, slightly abbreviated, delivered at a forum of the Jewish Labor Committee in New York City.

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these institutions, and they were opened up. You will remember the irony of opening up the libraries, at first without chairs, so that everybody had to stand, and then, finally bringing in the chairs.

So it was possible to destroy the old institutions and public accommodations and to build up new ones simultaneously. In Birmingham, even Dr. King himself did not quite know what he was doing when he called for an across-the-board settlement in housing, schools, jobs, police behavior, etc. But after Birmingham we were thrust by the successes of the civil rights movement into an extremely difficult period.

About two and a half years ago, I wrote an article in *Commentary* called "From Protest to Politics." I meant to point out that the movement was now faced with totally different problems, problems we had never been faced with before. Where demonstrations had destroyed and created new institutions, demonstrations now could only do one thing. They could merely call attention to the fact that something is wrong. You cannot demonstrate yourself into a new school system, full employment, or the destruction of slums. That is a *political* job, requiring allies, priorities, and an educational job among the masses of the American people.

But in the new period, for a time, "frustration politics" was to be the order of the day. Now one can dislike this, but to rail against it is not the way to do away with it. Ever since 1954 the great masses of Negroes in the North have found that not all the legislation that was being passed was helpful to them; they discovered, rather, that as the legislation was piled up, their situation did not become fundamentally altered. Since 1954 Negro unemployment has doubled. Unemployment among Negro youth is now three times as high as that of white youth. Unemployment among Negro young women and teen-age girls is several times what it is among whites. The ghettos are larger, with more rats, more roaches, more despair. More people are being driven off the farms in the South by machinery, piling into Harlem and Bedford-Stuyvesant. And the educational system has increasingly failed to prepare poor Negroes, Puerto Ricans, and other minority people to make a living in a society where automation and cybernation affect most grievously the poor, the unskilled, and the uneducated—breeding disillusionment and hopelessness.

This hopelessness has led to a series of unfortunate conditions, all of which can be labeled "frustration politics." Now this is about the way it goes—and I want to be very graphic here, because if we don't understand this, we understand nothing about what is happening. The young Negro says, "Obviously, as Stokely Carmichael says, if I have been beaten fifteen times, if I have been jailed twenty-eight times, if my

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buddies were murdered in Mississippi, if I have paid fines of over $8,000, if I have bail on me of over $10,000, and we have made all these sacrifices, but the situation in housing, schools, and jobs gets worse and worse, then there is something wrong with our tactics. The hell with Dr. King and his nonviolence. It's wrong; it's not working."

And then he attacks these people *precisely in the order in which he depended upon them, in which he had faith in them.* To many young people, Dr. King is no longer the Moses. He is the man who promised, with whom they stood when they were treated brutally. And now they turn on him, because the objective situation gets worse.

Next, they say, "What's the matter with Phil Randolph? He's old now. Roy Wilkins is backward. Whitney Young is grabbing money." Who is right? Nobody can be right, because the objective situation is so bad. So they turn on the Jews. And that is precisely because they had faith that the Jews, who had known persecution, would continue to stand with them as they had from the beginning in this fight.

They say, "The Jews have power. They control the unions. They own the banks. They've got power. If they meant business, we wouldn't be in this condition. The hell with them too." Then they turn on the trade-union movement. "If they really meant business," they say, "conditions wouldn't be this way." And then come the white liberals.

II

But let's remember that all whites except the police and the Jews have deserted the Negro ghetto. What can you expect, when the general attitude is to say, "The hell with all the white people! These conditions get worse and worse and they do nothing about it. They have the power, we do not. We need power." And so Negroes end up with the eloquent frustration called Black Power. Meaningless? No doubt; yet it answers a need. Stokely Carmichael knows the advantage he enjoys, knows he doesn't have to offer a social, economic or political program to get applause. He need only give vent to the despairing anger of the ghetto, and "triumph" over those of us who see no value in anger except as it inspires mobilization for change.

Now when everybody's deserted the ghetto except the Jewish merchants and the police—even if the police behaved like angels and if the Jewish merchants behaved like angels—they would automatically be turned on, for the very simple reason that you can always turn on those who are near you and with whom you do business and about whom you care. The young Negroes are not jumping on Wallace. They don't care about him. But they have a relationship with the police and the Jewish merchants. And the Jews and the police, for the next few years, are

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going to take all the pressure, all the emotional confusion that many ghetto people feel about whites.

Is the answer, then, that Jews should desert the movement? Isaiah and Jeremiah made it very clear long ago that one is not a Jew because he declines to mix milk and meat in the same pot, or because he's circumcised, or because he follows the law of the Torah. One is a Jew because he stands for social righteousness, is opposed to injustice wherever it is, first of all in himself. That is what we blacks have learned from the Hebrew prophets.

Let's look at anti-Semitism in Russia, which I've discussed in several cities in this country. Even if every Jew in the country told me he didn't need my help, that he hated me, I would have to go on helping just the same. If I was told, "Get out of my way, roll over; this is the day of great Jewish power"—my answer would be simply, "You go straight to hell. I am not going to get out of the movement which I am dedicated to, the movement against injustice, just because right now you are behaving in a frustrated manner." And if every Jew told me to get out, I would still accept every invitation to go and speak about this. And if I didn't get invited, I would speak to people in buses and trains.

The frustration of the Negro community is almost impossible to describe. If we had a graph comparing and measuring the Negroes' aspirations in 1936 and 1966, you would discover that in 1936 Negroes wanted *this* much and the society was prepared to give them *that* much. In 1936 the distance between what Negroes wanted and what society was giving was very non-revolutionary—because there was a very short distance between aspirations and conditions.

Now I know that what this society, in 1966, is prepared to give has risen. And there *has* been great progress over the last thirty years. But that progress is meaningless to those who are trapped in the ghettos, simply because their aspirations have risen higher, up to the ceiling, making the gulf between real conditions and aspirations so vast as to be extremely radical, extremely dangerous.

To the question, "Has there been progress?" my answer is, "Yes, much progress." But this progress has absolutely no meaning for people who in their day-to-day lives are still overwhelmed by enormous problems, who find unemployment doubling and tripling, find the ghettos growing, the educational system not able to meet the needs of their children. That is the basic social and psychological problem we face.

Our society today aids and abets the frustration of a Stokely Carmichael and his followers. And these are not really radical young Negroes. Basically, to judge by their behavior, they belong to the most

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conservative elements in this country. Because of their despair over not playing a role in real politics, they end up making an unconscious alliance with some of the worst elements in the country, those which helped elect Ronald Reagan governor of California.

Their position in Chicago was, "Negroes, stay away from the polls. Senators Douglas and Percy both stink. Don't vote for either." They did not know they were forming political alliances with the forces that wanted to destroy the man who has done more than any other American to enact social legislation; but that's what they did. They went into California wearing "Boycott, Baby, Boycott" buttons all over the state, with hundreds of young Negroes dissuading people from getting to the polls. If I had turned to Stokely Carmichael and said to him, "What are you doing in alliance with these forces that represent the Birch Society and the conservative wing of the Republican party?" he would have said, "I am not in alliance with them. I detest them." But by keeping Negroes from the polls—out of his desperation and absence of hope that there can be movement in this society—he was in fact cooperating with the right-wing movie star and helping to elect him.

In Maryland, the same thing happened. There we were fighting against a man whose slogan was, "Your home is your castle," by which he meant, "Your home is your castle which Negroes are about to storm. Live in fear." In this situation we have a compounding factor to Negro frustration, and that is white economic fear.

The Freedom Budget is aware of both these phenomena. It is addressed not merely to the Negro community, but equally to Negro frustration and white fear. In the United States any strategy and tactic that is not addressed both to Negroes and whites in their most desperate as well as in their most creative areas is a useless strategy, for we Negroes are only one tenth of the population.

Let us, therefore, examine the benighted people who attack King, who threw urine on nuns and called them "whores for niggers" as they marched in Chicago. Who are these people? It would be very simple to describe them as bigots and let it go at that. But it should be more profitable to analyze what I call white economic fear.

These people are buying homes in Cicero that cost $25,000 but are only one-third paid for. Yesterday, they were Poles, Hungarians, and Italians who were in ghettos themselves. Now they are trying to leapfrog out. They are saving money to send two children to college, but the burden is great, and therefore the wife goes to work. The minute the wife goes to work, they find themselves not economically better off but worse, because now she must buy a car. So they are paying for two

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cars. And they fear—if the husband were out of work for a few weeks, the whole economic structure they have built up would be laid waste. And with this fear, you get *the socialization and politicalization of prejudice.*

We will not get rid of prejudice by being nice or by merely passing legislation—but by re-organizing the social and economic order so that we reduce to an irreducible minimum both black frustration and white fear. For this we need an economic program. It is not enough to put up posters telling people to be nice. People will not be nice in situations that encourage being unnice. All of God's children would be charming people if we could contain them within a social order that would make it possible for the best to be brought out of them.

But our economic order makes it possible for the worst to be brought out of people. I'll give you two illustrations. Three days ago, a Negro boy with no talent whatever came to see me for a job. I called one of my friends at the ILGWU who almost always will try to find work for these boys.

Now this young fellow came in and he said to me, "Mr. Rustin, what kind of work is this you're getting me?" I told him, "I don't know; but you are just going to have to go to work. You don't have any skills, and if you stay there for three or four months, maybe I can get you something later where there's some possibility of being upgraded." The teacher's union has taken in about eight or ten boys; they've given them skills to run office machines and once one is graduated, I try to put another one in his place.

I told the boy about this. He looked at me and he said, "No. I will not take a nigger job. I would rather shoot pool in the poolroom and sell numbers on the street before ever again I'll take a nigger job." Now you may say to me, "That's a terrible situation." But part of the revolt of the Negro masses has been the rejection of jobs which this society has for 250 years said are jobs for Negroes only—cleaning toilets, waiting on table, pushing carts through the garment district. More and more, these youngsters will not do that kind of work.

Now if somebody wanted to give me a million dollars to set up classes for these boys, I wouldn't do it, because it would be wasting their money. We have to find young Negroes, who are in the throes of discovering who they are, work that is well paid, and work that has a future. Otherwise many of them will do nothing.

The Freedom Budget attempts to do for the poor today what this society did in the past for the poor who came from Europe to America. That the Jews and the Hungarians and the poor Irish and the Italians

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lifted themselves up by their bootstraps is sheer mythology. God knows, they had to work long, hard hours in sweatshops, and under terrible conditions. But since the dawn of American history this society has provided steps along which the poor could move, if they wanted to move. But now most of those steps no longer exist and are not accessible to the American Negro. What the Freedom Budget does is to try to establish a new series of steps for our time.

III

Once there was free land, and millions of poor got a start in this country because this society provided them with free land. It will never do that for the poor today. Once this society provided for the poor, no matter how bestially it treated them, because it was prepared and eager to buy their muscle power. I maintain that an East European Jew who came here in 1900 was not half so prepared to make it in this society as the average uneducated, illiterate Negro out of Mississippi. This Negro, after all, knows something of American culture, and the language of the land is his own.

Then what is the difference? The difference is, the minute that East European Jew got off Ellis Island, this society was ready to buy his muscle power. No head start was needed for him, no special training, no talk of upgrading. Society just bought his muscle power. Today the situation is different for the great masses of Negroes and poor whites. This society is buying less and less muscle power, and people must have a high degree of skill to find work.

Once society was prepared to help the great masses of poor immigrants if only by purchasing their muscle power. And the trade union movement was growing and developing. It therefore could act as an umbrella against extreme capitalism and government, protecting the rights of the workers and uplifting them economically. Today, the trade union movement is not growing at a comparable rate in this country.

The trade unions today cannot afford economically to organize many of the people who need most to be organized. In the old days, it was not merely that Jews were intelligent and had a family life. I maintain that many Jews got from the lower East Side to West End Avenue precisely because the Hatters were being formed and the Amalgamated and the ILGWU, and that the union movement offered the immigrants tremendous protection and possibility of growth.

Another step is no longer available. Somebody's always telling me about how his grandfather had a little shop, and he sold candy and cigars, and the kids lived with the mother in the back. Then, a few

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years later, he moved upstairs, and then he could have the shop downstairs and the two rooms for the family upstairs; and this goes on and on until he owns Macy's!

But today the failure rate of small businesses is astronomical. Small family retail stores are being squeezed out by the big chain stores, by big business. The corner grocer cannot compete, in the quality or prices of his goods, with A & P. He ends up, ironically, exploiting the people in his own neighborhood. And to get into the larger establishments, you must already have managerial or sales skills.

Today Mr. Randolph is asking this country to provide a series of steps over which people can move out of poverty. It is all there for you to see in the Freedom Budget: full employment, a $2.00 minimum wage, redefinition of work, guaranteed income for those who cannot or should not work, and a new kind of public work—in the building of things that are needed for us all.

The Budget suggests the examination and expansion of the whole area of public services and redefinition of our concept of "work." The Freedom Budget wants to make very clear, we are not taking the position which some people have taken. We call for a guaranteed annual income as a supplement to full employment, not as a substitute for it. We do not see the abolition of work on the immediate horizon. Indeed, we believe that if this nation seriously undertakes to meet our vast unmet social needs, we will find that there is plenty of work to be done. Millions of new jobs would be created. Instead of sending the unemployed slum dweller a check every month, why not give him a job rebuilding his neighborhood?

In Western society a man's dignity springs, fundamentally, from his part in the production of goods and services. Man's work must relate him to the production of goods and services, and therefore we need a redefinition of the concept of work, to make full employment possible.

The Freedom Budget will affect us all, because it calls for putting millions of people back to work, for cleaning up the rivers which are filthy, and cleaning the air which is filthy. There is a need for new schools, new homes. People can be put to work tearing down slums and building new homes. Men could be put to work, without great skills, doing these things. And these things would not merely benefit the poor but would benefit all of us.

These economic steps will alleviate both white fear and Negro frustration. They will make this nation a more beautiful place to live in, with justice in our streets.

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Gunnar Myrdal

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE BACKWARD COUNTRIES*

The first question I want to raise is that of the priority to be given to industry and agriculture in the underdeveloped countries' present situation. Intellectuals in underdeveloped countries largely pin their hopes on industrialization; and I want to emphasize from the start that this article should not be construed as implying that underdeveloped countries must not do their utmost to build up industry as fast as possible.†

The need for this is particularly pressing in countries with a high population land ratio. A country like India, whose population will double before the turn of the century, cannot in the long run hope to raise the dismally low living standard of its masses, or even retain the present one, unless a very much higher proportion of its labor force is employed in industry. This is true regardless of whatever progress is made in Indian agriculture. More generally, without the underdeveloped countries' progressive industrialization, it will be impossible to prevent the ever-widening income gap between rich and poor countries from continuing to grow as it has done for a century.

This long-term trend is reason enough for the underdeveloped countries to give prominence to industrialization in their development plans. But, for many future decades, even a much more rapid process of industrialization than that achieved by most underdeveloped countries will not

* Mr. Myrdal originally presented this paper before the Italian Society for International Organizations.

† I also want to make clear that in an article dealing with so vast a subject, my remarks are necessarily limited to a few bare essentials; even these had to be simplified, as there is no space here for substantiation, differentiation, or qualification. I had to exclude from my analysis those small areas of the world where underdeveloped countries have oil and other resources, for which the demand is rapidly rising because of the advanced nations' development. I omit these not because their problems are uninteresting or unimportant, but because the vast majority of people in the underdeveloped world have no access to such resources. I should add that most of my detailed knowledge is of South Asia.

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provide sufficient employment for the underutilized labor force in these countries. This is so because the additional labor demand, created by industrialization, is a function not only of the speed of industrial growth but of the low level from which it starts.

If, as is often obviously rational, investment capital and human resources (both of which will always be limited, even if the developed countries provide far more assistance than at present) are to a large extent put into fully modern, fairly large-scale industries, the additional labor demand will be small. Furthermore, when industrialization implies rationalization of earlier, more labor-intensive industries, or when these can no longer compete with the new industries, the net effect on labor demand may be negative: in this case industrialization releases more labor than it employs. From this point of view industrial development for export and for import-substitution has an advantage in addition to those usually recognized. But no underdeveloped country can industrialize exclusively along these lines. This implies that in the early stages of industrialization "backwash" effects decrease, wipe out, or even reverse the efforts to create new employment.

In a study of development in the Central Asian Republic of the Soviet Union, undertaken by the Secretariat of the Economic Commission for Europe, it was found that, despite heavy industrialization, the labor force employed in manufacturing decreased for more than two decades until the industrial base became so large that its continued rapid advance brought about a correspondingly large increase in demand for labor. Similarly in India—a country which not only promoted industrialization but steered it into import-substitution while protecting its traditional manufacturing—a comparison of the census figures for 1950 and 1960 shows that industrialization had hardly any effect on the proportion of the labor force earning its livelihood from agriculture.

The Population Explosion

The fact that for many future decades industrialization will not create much additional net employment in underdeveloped countries, starting from a small industrial base, must now be considered in conjunction with the fact that, over the same period, the labor force in all underdeveloped countries will increase by more than 2 per cent a year, and in some countries by very much more. It should be noted that a decrease in the birthrate, especially a gradual one, will have no effect on the size of the labor force for 15 years, and only a very minor effect for at least three decades.

At this point it is worth noting that there will be no spontaneous

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decrease in fertility in the underdeveloped countries, but that such a decrease could be brought about only by a policy of government-sponsored family planning; in no major underdeveloped country has such a policy as yet been pursued with sufficient effectiveness to bring substantial results.

Moreover, the high percentage of youth in the underdeveloped countries' populations implies a tremendous momentum toward high birth-rates. Even if a policy to spread birth control can have little effect on the size of the labor force for three decades, it has nonetheless immediate and beneficial effects on age distribution and, consequently, on the level of *per capita* income, savings potential, and labor productivity. To press for such a policy is therefore of the utmost importance and urgency. But it is beside the point to relate, as is only too often done, the problem of population increase to the problem of "finding employment" for the increasing labor force; the latter is a given quantity for decades ahead, almost entirely independent of what happens to fertility.

The conclusion is evident: if, for several decades, little or no new employment can be generated by industrialization, while the certainty remains that the labor force will increase by between 2–4 per cent annually, then the greater part of this increase must remain outside industry, mainly in agriculture. At this point I may be excused for expressing my surprise that these simple facts have not been recognized by economists who constantly refer to industrialization as the means by which the increased labor force in underdeveloped countries can be employed outside agriculture; indeed, they often talk about decreasing the labor force presently employed in agriculture. Industrialization is the dynamic force in an underdeveloped country's economy operating by raising the level of technical interest and knowledge, mobility, readiness for experiment and change, enterprise, and rationality even outside industry. Unfortunately, these spread-effects are again a function of the levels already reached. The experience of many underdeveloped countries in the colonial era, in which great spurts of industrialization produced strange and isolated enclaves, should be warning enough that these effects are likely to be small. There is a danger that, in their efforts to pursue industrialization, many underdeveloped countries are achieving the same result of building small enclaves within a much bigger economy that remains backward and stagnant.

Agricultural Development

I want to repeat that these remarks are not an argument against industrializing as rapidly as possible. If anything, they are meant as an argument for starting as soon as possible and proceeding as fast as

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possible, the sooner to reach the end of the transitional period—that long period during which industrialization does not significantly serve to create employment and its spread-effects remain minimal.

But, at the same time, awareness of the facts should encourage serious efforts in other directions. This is particularly necessary in the present conditions of underdevelopment, when everything must be done to prevent industrial development being frustrated and finally aborted. Indeed, in the absence of such development plans on a wider front, even the most strenuous attempts to industrialize will most probably not prevent increasing misery, particularly in the poorer countries. Agriculture is by far the largest sector in the economies of all underdeveloped countries. Always more than half—and in some underdeveloped countries anything up to 80 per cent—of the total population earn their living from the land. The immediate cause of poverty, and thus of underdevelopment, in these countries, is the extremely low productivity of labor in agriculture. It is a dangerous illusion to believe that there can be any significant economic development in these countries without radically raising the productivity of agricultural labor.

Given the two facts of an increase in the labor force—which we can safely predict will continue to the end of this century—and of an unchanging, if not actually decreasing demand for labor caused by industrialization, we cannot avoid coming to an important policy conclusion: any realistic agricultural policy must reckon on a tremendous increase in the agricultural labor force. During the considerable period in which industrialization creates only insignificant new employment, that part of the agricultural labor surplus which takes refuge from agrarian poverty and oppression by moving to the cities will be characterized by the same underutilization of labor as in agriculture: it will go mostly into petty trading and services of various sorts, or will swell the number of odd-job seekers, unemployed, and beggars. Urbanization on any scale in underdeveloped countries unfortunately does not, and cannot, equal industrialization.

The conclusion that planning must take into account a very rapid increase of the agrarian labor force becomes a more serious challenge in face of the fact that the present labor force is underutilized on a vast scale—a situation that is popularly termed "underemployment." Rational agricultural policy must therefore be directed toward more intensive utilization of an underemployed labor force that is constantly and rapidly increasing. We must note in passing that this is a necessity which for various reasons none of the now highly developed countries faces or ever faced during their development. Again, I am surprised that this obvious conclusion is so seldom stressed.

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Land Reform

In a short article I cannot examine the implications of this conclusion for agricultural planning, except to point out that successful agricultural development requires an entirely new technology in the underdeveloped countries.

As yet no scientific basis, founded on intensive, localized research and taking into account the climatic conditions in the tropical and subtropical zones of most underdeveloped countries, has been elaborated. These countries, and the rest of humanity with them, cannot afford to fail in the task of achieving a more intensive use of a rapidly increasing underemployed agrarian labor force. There is, however, one ray of hope: the present productivity of land in the underdeveloped countries is exceedingly low. There must, therefore, be means by which a very great increase in labor input and efficiency can raise yields per acre very substantially.

When we reach this point in awareness, we have to face that the main blockage to such an advance is political and institutional. In many underdeveloped countries power is in the hands of reactionaries who have, or believe they have, an interest in preventing those changes in landownership and tenancy that would give the peasants both incentives and possibilities to exert themselves for reaching higher productivity. Even in countries who have enlightened national leaders, the landlords, money-lenders and other middlemen frequently use their power locally to subvert legislative reforms. And the peasants, sunk in apathy, ignorance and superstition which their poverty not only causes but maintains, do not protest because of their very apathy.

About this there is general agreement. The FAO has studied the problem, and resolutions for land reform and similar measures are constantly being passed by the Economic and Social Council and the U.N.'s General Assembly. But in practice little is accomplished in most underdeveloped countries. With the steady increase in the agrarian labor force—which, without rapid economic development, is itself causing increased inequality—an extremely dangerous situation is developing. The reluctance among many agricultural experts to press the issue, and their tendency to evade it by taking refuge in technological questions is equally dangerous. This is another practice which stems from colonial traditions. The FAO Freedom from Hunger Campaign has underlined the extremely low productivity of labor and land in the underdeveloped countries. Countries with populations of hundreds of millions, such as India and Pakistan—both of which have more than two-thirds of their labor force employed in agriculture—are on a suboptimal level of nutrition and are increasingly dependent on American

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charity to feed themselves. Food production in South Asia as a whole has, in recent decades, swung from surplus to deficit. The tragic experiences in Latin America in the postwar period, its major inflations and its retarded development, are not unrelated to the fact that vested interests have so far blocked most of the major agrarian reforms on which agricultural development—and also industrial development—depends.

The FAO has calculated that close to one-half of the world's population suffers from hunger or crippling malnutrition or both—and this half lives in the underdeveloped countries. Within these countries the masses of the undernourished are peasants. Taking into account future increases in population, the FAO calculates that total food supplies must be doubled by 1980 and trebled by 2000 to provide a reasonable level of nutrition for the world's population. My own studies lead me to believe that this is an underestimate rather than the contrary.

Two things are clear. First, most of this increase in food production must take place in the underdeveloped countries, which implies a sharp swing against the present curve of their agrarian development. Second, failure to reach this goal implies a world catastrophe whose import is terrifying.

Superficial Planning

It is in this light that we can see the danger of considering industrialization as a cure-all for the problems of underdevelopment. The danger is all the greater because this belief serves vested interests (and many wishful thinkers) with an excuse for not facing up to the real and difficult problems involved. If the image of industrialization can be put forward as the essential requirement for what wishful thinking calls the "take-off" to "self-sustaining" growth, then these interests need not concern themselves either with the failure to change economic and social conditions on the land, or with the failure to increase agrarian productivity. It is much easier to construct factories, often with foreign aid in capital and technicians, than to change social and economic agrarian conditions and the attitudes to life and work of millions of poverty-stricken peasants. And since no one can be against industrialization, this reinforces the arguments of those in positions of influence in the underdeveloped world who often have direct personal interests in industrialization.

This mode of thought is encouraged by the tendency to superficial planning which can be observed in the prejudiced and careless reasoning about priorities. The facts I have pointed to, and the conclusions I have reached, move me, in any discussion about priorities in these terms, to give first priority to agriculture. But this mode of reasoning assumes that

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there is a choice in which the answers are mutually exclusive. This assumption is on the whole false or, at least, only partly true.

First, the necessary institutional reforms are costly neither in scarce capital resources nor in foreign exchange. Many of the necessary investments in agriculture are, moreover, highly labor-intensive which would mobilize underutilized labor for all sorts of permanent improvements of the land. There has been much talk about this but little action. Similarly, efforts to raise the levels of education, health, and hygiene do not require heavy expenditure of capital or foreign exchange. These efforts, in most underdeveloped countries, have bordered on the feeble, even when considered exclusively from the point of view of productivity, in their potential effectiveness of relieving the peasantry of its apathy and traditional irrationality. To the extent that these and other reforms require the investment of capital and foreign exchange, such investment serves industrialization—the construction of factories producing fertilizers and agricultural machinery—as well as any rational and productive development plan.

For those few underdeveloped countries that have reached more advanced forms of planning and have emphasized the need for industrialization, the conclusion of my analysis is, *not* that they should have chosen otherwise, but that they should direct this emphasis to maximal advantage for agricultural development, which is of paramount importance for the success or failure of their economic development. My main conclusion, however, is that industrialization alone is insufficient. Even more important is that the problem of raising—rapidly and radically—the productivity of labor and land be squarely faced. If this issue is relegated, if it is given no more than second "priority," then this type of planning is inviting its own defeat, however successful it is temporarily in constructing a few factories. I am thus asking for a larger plan—a plan designed to encompass effective agricultural reforms.

The Necessary "Double Standard"

Up to this point I have considered the issue of underdevelopment as a problem of internal, national policy. This viewpoint is essential, for the destiny of these countries will be determined principally by their own efforts of consolidating themselves as effective political units prepared to bring about the radical social and economic changes necessary for development. But much will depend on whether the advanced industrial nations are prepared to reshape their policies in such a way as to facilitate this development. Since the First World War, the underdeveloped countries' trading position has steadily worsened; while demand for their exports has lagged, their import needs have increased.

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Their resulting balance of payments gap has until now been made up by foreign grants and credits which—with the exception of relatively limited direct private investments—have not been on strictly commercial terms. The causes for the deterioration of the underdeveloped countries' trading position are permanent and will continue to dominate the development of international trade, perhaps increasingly so, as the studies made by the secretariats of the regional economic commissions have shown.

Autarchic economic development has been forced on the underdeveloped countries by the restricted scale of grants and credits; their struggle to industrialize has focused on import substitution and on applying ever stricter exchange and import controls in order to preserve their scarce foreign exchange resources for essential consumption and development. As their trading balance worsens and their planning improves, we can expect this trend to develop still further. Without enlarging on this subject, I want here only to stress again the principal conclusions I have drawn from these facts. The first is that the advanced industrial countries must now be prepared to accept what I have called *a double standard of morality in regard to commercial and financial policies*—one which, for once, gives license to the weaker instead of the stronger. If they are not to lose every chance of developing, the underdeveloped countries cannot afford to relinquish their protectionist and autarchic policies. These, in particular their import and exchange controls, are in fact less due to their own choice than forced upon them by the harsh necessities of their internal development and deteriorating international trade position.

The advanced countries can have few rational reasons for failing to recognize this necessity, since the underdeveloped countries will always use whatever foreign exchange resources they can acquire to keep their imports as high as possible. Their import restrictions, unlike those of the advanced countries, can never cause the volume of international trade to shrink.

A second conclusion is that the advanced nations must cooperate sympathetically with every attempt of the underdeveloped countries *to combine to enlarge their internal base for agricultural and industrial development* whether on a regional or world scale. Underdeveloped countries have far better reasons for joining together than the six West European countries in what they euphemistically call a "Common Market." Nonetheless the difficulties facing such policies are very great. A third conclusion is that the advanced countries must be prepared to give the underdeveloped countries preferential treatment in international trade. This means, in effect, expanding on an international scale

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the sort of solidarity which the advanced nations now afford to their own lagging regions and industries.

If the advanced nations were willing to accept higher price levels than the forecast averages, this would make the problem of stabilizing the prices of underdeveloped countries' traditional exports much easier to solve by commodity agreements. As the advanced nations are becoming increasingly willing to give aid, this would be both a convenient and cheap way of providing this aid in a form that directly strengthens the underdeveloped countries' economies.

If the range of the advanced nations' imports were extended not only to the underdeveloped countries' traditional exports but—within certain quotas—to new industrial goods free of tariffs and import restrictions, this would be welcomed by the underdeveloped countries which are trying to diversify their production and exports. It would be of little consequence to the advanced industrial nations, as only a few underdeveloped countries would be in a position to build up new export industries, standardize and raise their production, and develop an efficient marketing organization. Even with such preference, underdeveloped countries would face difficulties in competing with the industrialized nations which already benefit from the internal and external markets they have developed, as well as from their powerful research resources.

In most cases, moreover, it would not involve competing in those sectors where industrialized nations should be eager to expand—the sectors where technology is highly advanced and capital input particularly heavy. In the long run it would bring about an acceleration of an international division of labor that would be of advantage even to the advanced countries.

For all this, and however beneficial the results, the quantitative effects of opening up more favorable export outlets for new industries should not be exaggerated. Many underdeveloped countries, indeed probably the majority, would not be in an immediate position to make use of such preferences; this would come only later when they have achieved a higher degree of success in over-all development. In any case, they would not be able to avail themselves of such preferences on any major scale. Patterns of world trade are glutinous, rooted as they are in conditions of production that are not changed overnight.

It must not be forgotten that the overwhelming bulk of underdeveloped countries' exports is of traditional exports, and that the greater part of these consists of agricultural products which make up about 70 per cent of their total exports. It is an illusion to believe that any substantial improvement can be made in the underdeveloped countries'

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international trading position without tackling the problem of *defending their markets for traditional exports* which, for years and probably decades, will constitute the bulk of what they have to sell.

The main cause of the underdeveloped countries' worsening international trade position lies in a falling-off in the growth of demand for their traditional exports, and in particular for agricultural products. To the extent that this has been due to low income-elasticity of demand and technological change, the trend is irreversible. But in some part it is caused by fiscal levies which keep down consumption even of such tropical products as coffee whose imports do not compete with domestic production, and by other forms of protection which directly or indirectly are detrimental to these exports.

Two things can be asked of the advanced industrial nations which are themselves in the process of rapid development and therefore should be able to take them in their stride. First, that they be prepared to eliminate all purely fiscal duties and taxes on the underdeveloped countries' exports. Second, that they lower and finally eliminate the protective trade barriers they have erected which, directly or indirectly, limit demand for imports from the underdeveloped countries. It must be recognized that the advanced nations may need a transitional period to meet this latter demand—though not in the former—as it implies a shrinkage of domestic production. In the long run, such structural adjustments for the use of their own labor force and productive capacity would accord with their rational interests, since it is not generally to their advantage to tie up resources in these sectors of production.

A further point I wish to stress is the extreme importance of increasing multilateralization—at least to the degree of the FAO's aid in food and other agricultural products to the underdeveloped countries—so that present or potential surplus countries are *protected, indeed encouraged, to produce agricultural products for this type of export.* Their productive potentialities may otherwise remain unutilized, particularly when their natural customers are other underdeveloped countries which are short of foreign exchange. Aid in agricultural products from the U.S. and other rich countries inevitably tends to destroy their markets. They are not in a position to give away their exports. The rational solution would be to give the new experimental agency for agricultural surplus disposal, created by the FAO, the funds to pay such countries for their exports, even if these are in turn given away as aid to other underdeveloped countries.

Although the policies I have briefly recommended are in the interests of the advanced nations—interests which can only be reinforced by the international tensions created by the continual frustration of the under-

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developed countries' efforts to develop—the advanced nations cannot be expected to carry out these policies because of rationality and idealism. Pressure from the underdeveloped countries themselves is necessary. As this pressure becomes increasingly vocal, rationality will come to play a part in the policy-making of the advanced nations. But the pressure must be reasoned and accurately directed at all the important issues. Only then will new and effective policies be formulated to end the underdeveloped countries' struggle for development.

With this collection of provocative essays, Irving Howe, teacher, editor, author and critic scrutinizes some of the dilemmas of our time. The experiences examined range from the McCarthy years through the crisis in Vietnam and include portraits of Trotsky, Pasternak, Stevenson, Kennedy and Johnson—the result is a brilliant and challenging book which clarifies the radical position.

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Asoka Mehta

INDIA: POVERTY AND CHANGE

Notes on the Problems of Modernization

What follows are observations taken from a speech delivered in 1966 to a gathering of Indian students and from an essay published in an Indian journal during the same year. The reader should bear in mind that Mehta's main concern here is not with a rounded theory of social change in an underdeveloped country, but rather with the inner dialogue which occurs among those who must face the immediate problems of Indian society.

Asoka Mehta, Minister of Planning and Social Welfare in the cabinet of Mrs. Gandhi, is the main author of India's recently launched Fourth Five-Year Plan, and a leading figure in his country's democratic and socialist Left.—Ed.

1) *The Heritage of Traditional Society*

India has been a traditional society for centuries. Writing of the country as it was after the death of Akbar the Great, in 1605 A.D., W. H. Moreland, the distinguished historian of India, observes that there were hardly any middle classes—very few lawyers, professional teachers, journalists, or politicians. There were no men of science investigating peasant problems, no skilled engineers designing implements to meet their needs, and no financial talents devoted to organizing their market or supplying capital to them. Coal was not mined, and the production of copper and iron was limited by the availability of wood. The standard of living was extremely low, and the country was subjected to recurrent famines. Although there were some improvements by the time the British left, these did not affect the overwhelmingly traditional character of our society. This is what we have been struggling to change all these years since independence.

It might be argued that the politics of a poor country is simple—the quest for bread. But in our conditions we either do not get bread at all or we get bread and other things too. Bread, to use a convenient symbol, is plentiful only when agriculture is bountiful. Yet, within the tradi-

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tional confines of agricultural production, the possibilities of growth are limited, and a considerable part of them has already been exhausted. The possibilities for further agricultural development can emerge only when traditional bounds are overcome; that is, when new tools and techniques, new skills and scientific understanding are brought to bear.

Every Indian cannot be assured of the simple bread and rough cloth, with which he seeks to appease his hunger and cover his nakedness, unless we can help bring to him a modicum of education, a deepening of industrialization, and a host of associated changes in transport, credit, and marketing. If it is foolish to juxtapose bread against freedom, it is equally futile to counterpose a basket of bread against a basket of wider achievements. We shall either gain both or neither.

Even where the politics of the poor focuses on food alone, it will be still necessary to produce enough food grain and to provide employment and earnings to the hungry to enable them to secure their share of food. These twin requirements demand, first, a greater developmental effort and, second, the transfer of resources from the better-off to the underprivileged and needy. And this, in turn, requires complicated social policies.

In India today our population increases at almost 2.5 per cent per year. The rate of saving in our economy is now 10.5 per cent. This means that we are still hovering at the edge of stagnation. We have to lower our birth rate—shall we attempt to halve it in a little over a decade? On the other side, we have to step up our savings and investment to 20 per cent in a decade or so. Such a two-pronged attack would open up possibilities wherein the people would experience the glow of change.

These simple objectives demand, however, far-reaching developmental efforts and social changes. A recent survey has confirmed that the pattern of distribution of income in the rural households is such that the bottom 30 per cent have an income which is only a little more than the top 1 per cent. Half the rural households have an income that is almost the same as that of the top 5 per cent. Even when agricultural production goes up, the marketable surpluses are apt to accrue to the larger holders of land. If these surpluses are to be made available to the poorer sections of the villages, they must be assured of earnings. Those earnings—arising from investments—have to be balanced by savings, if inflation is to be avoided. Our rural sector is large and almost half of our national income comes from it. Experience the world over shows that economic transformation does involve imposts on the rural people; hence the outlays will have to be balanced by savings from the

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top layers of agricultural households. Half the agricultural income flows to 20 per cent of the rural households. Surely the rest—80 per cent—cannot experience significant change unless the burdens are more equitably adjusted—whether through a grain tax or other imposts on the better-placed.

In the urban-industrial sector inequalities are even sharper. The managerial elite insists upon having standards comparable to those in the West. But unless we accept austere standards for this elite, our consumption claims will eat into savings, erode investments, and multiply the miseries of the poor. There is nothing more unsettling for the submerged people as they seek openings to progress than the "demonstration effect" of ostentatious living. Non-basic consumption, which embraces in our country not only the frivolities of the rich but also the comforts of the middle classes, retards economic growth and slackens the efficiency of those whom we want to draw into more productive pursuits. If we cannot, for a variety of rational reasons, seek a flat sharing of poverty, we do have to work for the priority of investment over non-basic consumption while yet providing basic consumption to the millions. Economic growth is the ultimate solvent of our gross misery. But that growth, in our conditions, must remain impeded unless we have widening social changes.

The greatest curse of a traditional society is its frustrating denial of the scientific attitude. Where such an attitude prevails, decisions more readily become objective and rational. In a traditional society it is sadly missing. In such a society decisions tend to be based on custom rather than an objective examination of possibilities. Positions in such a society are inherited rather than achieved. The organization of social life is hierarchical. Finally, geared to a low level of economic productivity, such a society is perpetually in the grip of a sad fatalism.

One sure way of breaking the closed circuit of such a society is the injection of science in ample measure. It is precisely this—large injections of science together with large injections of democratic practice—that we have sought to administer into the social body of our country over the last two decades. Depending on their background and predispositions, different people describe the outcome in different ways: disappointing, encouraging, dismaying, devastating. Whatever the description, I am sure there is unanimity on one point: *the rigors of traditional existence have been broken in India once and for all.*

Based on universal adult franchise, our young republic of over 475 million people is the world's largest democracy. Three general elections (a fourth will have taken place in February, 1967) at inter-

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vals of five years, while imparting a measure of political stability, have also generated a socio-cultural tension which has far-reaching implications for our future development. Indian society is in a state of political, economic, and social transition. Its full transformation is only a matter of time.

2) *What India Has Achieved Since Independence*

Under British rule the rate of increase in national income was, for decades, hardly more than 1 per cent *per annum*. Between 1950–51 and 1964–65, India's national income increased by about 69 per cent, or at a compound rate of 3.8 per cent yearly: the rate of increase during the first five years was 3.4 per cent; during the second five years, 4 per cent; *and during the past four years, 4.4 per cent*. At the time of independence (1947), barely 5 per cent of our national income was saved and invested. The proportion of domestic savings and investment to national income at present is respectively 11 and 14 per cent. Regarding infrastructural facilities, installed electric power capacity rose from 2.3 million kw. to over 10 million kw. between 1950–51 and the present; freight-carrying capacity of our railways rose from 93 million tons on originating traffic to over 200 million tons.

Let us look at the condition of agriculture. If we are suffering from a severe food crisis now—as we are indeed—it is *not* because there has been no progress in agriculture, but because the progress is not commensurate with our large population increase at the same time. Between 1950–51 and 1964–65, production of rice increased from 22.1 million tons to 38.7 million tons; wheat production from 6.8 million tons to 12.7 million tons; cotton from 552,000 tons to 960,000 tons and jute from 631,000 tons to 1,080,000 tons. Over this period, land under irrigation from major and medium projects increased from 23.8 million acres to 37.5 million acres. Fertilizer consumption went up from a value of 70 million rupees to 825 million rupees, while consumption of pesticides increased from 20 million rupees to 120 million rupees in value. Consumption of electricity for agriculture increased from 20 to 140 million rupees in value, while that of fuel oil jumped from 45 million to 251 million rupees.

What of industry? The index of industrial production went up from 74 to 175 over the same period (1956 = 100). More specifically, production of coal increased from 32.6 million tons in 1950–51 to 64.3 million tons in 1964–65; iron ore from 3 million tons to 15 million tons; crude oil from .25 million tons to 2.13 million tons, and that of bauxite from 65,000 tons to 613,000 tons. Production of sulphuric acid went up

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from under 104,000 tons to 695,000 tons, caustic soda from 11,000 tons to 191,000 tons, and drugs and medicines from 150 million rupees to 1,350 million rupees in value. Production of finished steel increased from one million to 4.4 million tons and aluminium from 3,700 tons to 56,000 tons. Production of machinery over the same period rose from a rupee value of 106 million to 2,310 million.

Such are the signs of economic transition. In respect to social matters, one sure index is literacy—which increased from about 16 per cent in 1950–51 to 24 per cent in 1960–61, and is estimated to be over 30 per cent now. Enrollment in primary schools, which was 19 million and covered only 43 per cent of the age group of six- to eleven-year-olds, increased to nearly 52 million, covering nearly 79 per cent of the same age group by 1965–66. The enrollment in middle schools increased from 3.12 million to 11 million and in high schools from 1.22 million to 5.24 million over the same period. Enrollment in art, science, and commercial courses at the university level increased from 300,000 to 1.10 million, while admission capacity in technical education increased from 5,900 and 4,120 respectively for diploma and degree courses to 51,450 and 27,850 respectively. The death rate fell from 26 per thousand in 1950–51 to 16 per thousand at present; the infant mortality rate fell from 154 to 109. Life expectancy increased from 33 in 1950–51 to 45 years at present. The number of medical colleges increased from 30 in 1950–51 to 35 at present, with annual admissions increasing from about 2,500 to 11,500.

And all this, let it be stressed, occurred within a democratic society, which neither could nor wished to employ the methods of authoritarianism and which had to balance off, as best it could, the claims of an enormous variety of competing social, linguistic, and regional groups.

3) *Technology and the Process of Change*

It would be a mistake to think that the economic and social features of the transition just outlined belong to separate compartments. For example, the process by which we seek to expand our technical education is really parallel to that, let us say, of industrial development. The process by which we seek to lower the birth rate is coupled with expanding medical and social education. Behind all these interacting social and economic features is the factor of science, applied to Indian conditions primarily in the form of technology.

Science means not only those operations by which we gain systematic and objective knowledge of the world around and within us, but those by which we apply this knowledge to controlling that world. It is the large-scale introduction of science in the form of technology

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which has provided the most important dynamic in India during the past twenty years. Not only has technology opened up the viaducts of economic growth; it is taking an increasing share in social transformation. In the last analysis, our planning is nothing but an ordered and sequential application of a complex of higher forms of technology to all departments of life.

In the economic field, we made a beginning by introducing, on an unprecedented scale, different forms of infrastructural technology; specifically, those relating to the development of power, irrigation, and transport. Much of this work was done during the first two Plan periods when we took up integrated, multi-purpose river valley projects. Once the power base was secured, we had little difficulty in introducing industrial technology of a diverse kind. This was initiated during the Second Plan and involved the introduction of metallurgical, chemical, mechanical, and electrical technology. With the development of a metallurgical base, it became possible for us to introduce the technology of heavy machine building. We sought to do this during the Third Plan and will continue our effort during the Fourth Plan. Simultaneously, we are introducing higher forms of chemical technology in the form of petroleum refineries. Finally, the development of our chemical base makes it possible for us to introduce far-reaching changes in agricultural technology. This is going to be our principal task in the Fourth Plan which began on April 1, 1966. We realize that without the introduction of higher technology into the field of agriculture, a total transformation of our still preponderantly agricultural economy is impossible. But advanced agricultural techniques become really effective only after the infrastructural, industrial, and chemical technology have been fully developed. *We have thus entered, this last year, the most critical phase of our economic development.*

A parallel advance is the introduction of facilities for pure and applied research and development. During the First Five-Year Plan, we completed work on the establishment of national laboratories for physics, chemistry, metallurgy, fuel, glass and ceramics, food technology, drugs, electro-chemistry, road research, etc. At the beginning of the Second Plan, apart from research at 33 universities, we had 16 national laboratories, and 54 associations of scientific and technological research. By the end of the Second Plan period, we had 26 national laboratories and research institutes. Excluding research personnel employed in the regular collection of data in standardizing lines such as metereological and hydrological observations, etc., a recent estimate puts the number of research scientists in our country who work more or less on a full-time

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basis, at roughly 12,000 in 1962–63. Of this number, about 3,700 work at universities. Our research ratio, or the proportion of expenditure on research and development expressed as a percentage of our GNP, would be a little less than one-fourth of one per cent. We are conscious that this ratio is much less than that in more industrialized countries. (The ratio is about 3 per cent in the United States, 2.5 per cent in the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R., and about 1.5 per cent in Japan. In China, it is probably one-half of 1 per cent.)

Introduction of higher forms of technology and techniques in the social field has also engaged our attention. In health, our principal objective during the first three plan periods was the application of techniques relating life sciences and medicine to the reduction of mortality. Now that the mortality rate is coming down, our major aim in the next three plan periods is the reduction of the birth rate. Here, new techniques are underway. Finally, the most sophisticated techniques of social science, including psychology, sociology, and anthropology, will be required to bring up the psycho-social level of the people, including nearly one-fourth of the population who are listed as scheduled castes and tribals. Perhaps this is the most difficult area in the whole field of economic and social development because here techniques cannot be copies but must be fashioned from our own experience. And our research here is still in a rudimentary stage.

4) *The Rich Countries and the Poor*

We have been depending on external assistance for reaching a 13 per cent rate of investment in our economy even when our savings account for only 10.5 per cent of the national income. I believe that as the poor have a claim upon the resources of the rich, so also poor nations can seek aid from rich nations, if the concept of world community has any meaning and world peace is to abide. There is another reason also, which we cannot emphasize but cannot ignore. The reason is crisply stated by William McCord in his book, *The Springtime of Freedom:*

> In essence, the developing nations of today subsidized Europe as it began its economic advance (through the Colonial Drain); surely, this fact alone indicates that Western aid today should be regarded not as a sentimental gift, but a just return on investment.

International peace cannot survive if rich nations ignore the needs of the poor ones. So also, within our country, if the upper levels of the society resent the demands of development on their earnings, they will

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ultimately have to find greater resources to maintain civil peace. By resisting the worthwhile, one often succumbs to the worthless.

It is the logic of development that those that have tend to get more. The rich nations will be able to use new technology and augment their resources faster than poorer countries. In the developing countries, regions that have moved forward will progress faster than the sluggish and the stagnant. The existing industrial corporate concerns in our country, for instance, will have about 10,500 million rupees of depreciation fund and 9 billion rupees of retained profits, etc., during the Fourth Plan period.

They will thus expand and proliferate. It is this characteristic of growth that validates the principle of redistribution, of transfer of resources, from the better placed to the badly set. This is the *raison d'être* of welfare economics everywhere. In a country such as India, even the elementary needs of the people—food and work—require stringent transfers of resources. *Even when one reduces the content of welfare to the bare minimum, and consciously links it with economic growth, the need for transfers remains massive, because the humanity to be reclaimed from utter want is staggering in its numbers.*

Elsewhere it was possible to choose between economic growth and social change, and even to arrange them in some sequential relationship. But in India, if economic growth is pursued simply by and for itself, it will never gather strength. For a short while *enclaves* of development and prosperity will emerge, but lacking spread-effect, they will remain insecure. The modern sector of the economy will soon reach limits of expansion if the traditional sectors do not expand and modernize. For economic growth to achieve sustained momentum, it will have to be stoked by social change. It is not ideology that leads us to accent social change—it is stubborn demographic and sociological facts.

5) *The Politics of Class and Nation*

What has this "hocus-pocus" of planning to do with politics, whose substance we know is drawn from caste and community, from local grievances and regional peculiarities, from personal frustrations and group antipathies? Politics always operates in its peculiar penumbra. Intransigence and the intractability of limited loyalties are among facts of political action; and this is true the world over. Lord Buddha had to expel a close disciple from his nascent Sangh; Jesus Christ was betrayed with a kiss to the Roman legions by his immediate associate; Socrates was given hemlock by his fellow citizens.

Group interests will always operate in politics. But they have to

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be suffused with understanding, endowed with purpose and direction. That is the real essence of politics. A voter votes on a myriad differing considerations; but when the votes are counted, a certain pattern of opinion is revealed. It is that pattern of opinion and understanding one has to influence and shape, though none can organize the wayward impulses behind every vote. India's is a politics "of scarcity," as Myron Weiner has aptly described it; and a politics of scarcity can easily degenerate into a politics of scramble. Such a politics can only damage the poor.

To sum up: Indian traditional society is rapidly breaking up. This has come about through the introduction of science, chiefly in the application of a higher technology. The fast development of infrastructural, industrial, and chemical technologies in our economy has opened the door enlarging the scale of agricultural technology. On the social plane, the stage is set to borrow from the behavioral sciences in order to change our attitudes and motivation. It is clear that what development needs is neither consensus alone nor pure coercion, but a continuum of consensus and coercion: a widespread consensus that does not hesitate to coerce the intransigent when necessary.

The poor have continuously to precipitate the crisis—of conscience and of politics. Once Gandhiji made it impossible for us to acquiesce in subjection. The meaningful politics of today has to make it impossible to acquiesce in mass poverty and gross inequalities. It took nearly thirty years of determination and dedication to achieve political freedom; given the same determination, it should not take more than twenty years to ensure for us economic freedom.

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ON THE KENNEDY ASSASSINATION

The following two comments were written independently; neither author saw the article of the other before writing his own.—ED.

Léo Sauvage

A Few Questions for the Warren Commission

Many arguments, good and not so good, poor and spurious, have been invoked in the controversy about the Warren Commission; that is, about the more or less voluntary confusion shrouding the investigation of the murder of President Kennedy.

Compared to the atmosphere of smug complacency which prevailed in the U.S. not so long ago, especially in "liberal" and even "radical" circles, the fact that a controversy is now raging represents, in itself, tremendous progress. For the critics can today be read and heard, and when some cynical gentleman denounces them as "scavenging journalists," the public at least has the possibility of wondering whether even "scavenging," in this case, is not better than pushing evidence under rugs and burying corpses in closets, archives, or Fort Worth cemeteries.

I confess, however, that I am rather skeptical about the chances of a new investigation either by private committees or—as proposed by Representative Theodore Kupferman—by a Congressional body. I cannot imagine, for example, Congress deciding upon an investigation of its own, since the very decision would imply lack of confidence in a commission in which members of Congress from both houses and both parties formed a majority.

But the pressure of public opinion could and should obtain one major result: force the Warren Commission to meet again in order simply to set its own record straight. Even Professor Alexander Bickel, who is very hostile to critics of the Warren Report, has stated categorically: "We know now that the Commission did not satisfactorily investigate the assassination." I shall not ask Professor Bickel how he could have found out, after two years of abetting silence as well as of "rhapsodic relief," if it had not been for the critics. The point which matters here is that no governmental body or fact-finding committee, in a democracy, has the right to consider itself above criticism, scornfully refusing to answer questions under the pretext that its work is done and that it does not have to defend it. The Commission is accused of having done its work badly, it is confronted with precise questions pertaining to grave errors, omissions, or distortions. It has the absolute duty to answer each question, either correcting the critics or admitting its inability to do so.

Meanwhile, any defender of the "so-

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lution" presented by the Warren Commission, that is, of the version of the assassination which "identifies Lee Harvey Oswald as the assassin of President Kennedy and indicates that he acted alone in that event," *must* do two things: he must explain and refute the evidence showing that the Warren Commission's investigation has been prejudiced from the start and systematically one-sided in all its steps; he must establish that all of the affirmations on which the Warren Commission bases its conclusion are proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

As far as the second point is concerned, the Commission has facilitated the discussion by publishing on page 195 of its Report (edition of the U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.) a summary of its "findings." It's a 14-line paragraph which pinpoints the major factual issues as emphasized by the Commission itself. It thus perfectly delimitates a valid field to which the discussion can be held, and on which the critics have the right to ask that it be fought out, the Commission having had the choice of weapons. I have made this paragraph the object of the key chapter of my book *The Oswald Affair,* and I believe that no one defending the Warren Commission's version of the assassination should be allowed to skip any of its eight "proofs." Here they are:

> The Commission has found that Lee Harvey Oswald
>
> (1) owned and possessed the rifle used to kill President Kennedy and wound Governor Connally,
>
> (2) brought this rifle into the Depository Building on the morning of the assassination,
>
> (3) was present, at the time of the assassination, at the window from which the shots were fired,
>
> (4) killed Dallas Police Officer J. D. Tippit in an apparent attempt to escape,
>
> (5) resisted arrest by drawing a fully loaded pistol and attempting to shoot another police officer,
>
> (6) lied to the police after his arrest concerning important substantive matters,
>
> (7) attempted, in April 1963, to kill Maj. Gen. Edwin A. Walker,
>
> (8) possessed the capability with a rifle which would have enabled him to commit the assassination.
>
> On the basis of these findings the Commission has concluded that Lee Harvey Oswald was the assassin of President Kennedy.

When confronted with the demonstration that none of these "findings" is supported entirely by the available evidence and that some of them are contradicted by it and irrelevant in addition, the ultimate argument of the defenders of the Commission is that each becomes persuasive because of the existence of the others. Thus, during a discussion, last September, at the Theatre for Ideas, with two lawyers of the Commission, Wesley J. Liebeler and Burt W. Griffin, the lawyers had to defend the legal validity of "finding" number 1, as phrased in the Report. They did it by invoking "findings" number 2 and 3. When asked about the obviously and even glaringly unsubstantiated affirmation of "finding" number 3, they admitted there was not much substance in it but added that it should be considered in relation with "findings" 1 and 2.

Though Mr. Irving Howe, that evening, haughtily dismissed the critics of the Commission as "inept," it was quite an achievement for them to have brought two former staff members of the Commission to publicly reject the testimony of Howard Brennan, one of

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the Commission's three star witnesses. The two lawyers did not show any willingness, either, to vouch for another star witness, Helen Markham, whom the Report expressly calls "reliable," nor did they appear to share Chief Justice Earl Warren's faith in the most shining star of the Commission's constellation: Marina Oswald.

But let's confine ourselves to "finding" number 3. If Brennan's "identification" is dismissed, on what basis does the Commission declare that Oswald "was present, at the time of the assassination, at the window from which the shots were fired"? The Report states that "finger print and palmprint evidence establishes that Oswald handled two of the four cartons next to the window and also handled a paper bag which was found near the cartons." But the Report then reveals that when called upon to determine the maximum age of the prints, two experts gave estimates of a day and a half and three days. Since Oswald's work led him to handle the cartons every day, including several hours that very morning, how could the prints prove that he was at the window "at the time of the assassination"?

The Report also mentions, in support of "finding" number 3, that "Oswald was seen in the vicinity of the southeast corner of the sixth floor approximately 35 minutes before the assassination." If one were to adopt the Commission's way of reasoning, one would note here that the witness who gave the Commission that precious information added that when he last saw him, Oswald was "walking from the southeast corner of the sixth floor toward the elevator," that is, *away* from the window. Once again, however, and without splitting hairs with the Commission, how does Oswald's presence, "approximately 35 minutes before the assassination," at a place where he was normally working prove that he was there, rifle in hand, "at the time of the assassination"?

It is obvious that "finding" number 3 rests entirely on Brennan's "eyewitness identification," yet when faced with the no less obvious fact that Brennan's testimony does not withstand a five-minute scrutiny, Liebeler and Griffin were able to reject this testimony while claiming not to contradict the Report. For the Report, in the last line of page 145, starts explaining that the Commission "does not base its conclusion concerning the identity of the assassin on Brennan's subsequent certain identification of Lee Harvey Oswald as the man he saw fire the rifle." But that was nothing more than a built-in subterfuge meant precisely to furnish a saving quote to the Liebelers and Griffins in a limited discussion. The whole world, meanwhile, had been led to believe that there was an eyewitness named Brennan who actually saw Oswald shooting the President.

There is not the slightest doubt, moreover, that this was exactly the impression the Warren Commission intended to create. Brennan's name is waved under the eyes of the readers of the Report—including the thousands of news commentators and managing editors who gave him the lead in their stories—at every other occasion, without reference to the little sentence starting on the bottom of page 145. On page 250, for instance, it is stated that Brennan "made a positive iden-

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tification of Oswald as being the person at the window." The conclusion leading to "finding" number 3 again openly stresses Brennan's testimony: "An eyewitness to the shooting immediately provided a description of the man in the window which was similar to Oswald's actual appearance. This witness identified Oswald in a lineup as the man most nearly resembling the man he saw and later identified Oswald as the man he observed."

Is it too much to ask the Warren Commission to choose once and for all between what some of its lawyers now are replying to its critics and what the Report itself has tried to tell the world for two years? Is it too much to ask the Commission to decide officially—and to declare publicly—whether or not Oswald was *identified* as the man at the window? And if the Commission resigns itself, as several of its lawyers have already done individually, to dismissing Brennan's testimony, is it too much to ask the Warren Commission to announce that one of its major "findings" has to be dismissed too?

It would be something new, of course, in the Commission's conception of impartial fact-finding. Which brings us back to the other aspect of what was fundamentally wrong with the Warren Commission: its prejudiced approach and selected methods in finding facts.

I am still waiting for someone to explain to me why the Commission thought that contradictory examination of witnesses and documents would hamper the establishment of truth. The Commission, having so decided, and Chief Justice Warren having so informed Mrs. Marguerite Oswald when she pleaded before him, on February 10, 1964, to have her dead son represented by counsel, I would also like to know why the same Chief Justice appointed on February 25 Mr. Walter E. Craig, president of the American Bar Association, to "participate in the investigation." Apparently, he was to act as a kind of defense lawyer, since the appointment, Warren said, was made "in fairness to the alleged assassin and his family." Most of all, however, I would like to know what Craig or his associates actually did, after February 25, in *fairness* to Oswald, for there is no further mention of Craig or his associates in the Report, and none of the few interventions mentioned in the volumes of hearings appears related to any kind of defense for the "alleged assassin."

And yet, on December 23, 1966, a member of the Commission's staff, Mr. Albert E. Jenner, Jr., made the sensational revelation, during a TV interview, that indeed there was a Santa Claus.

Mr. Jenner was still expressing his indignation about the "irresponsible" books published against the Warren Report (he was being very polite, for his colleague Joseph Ball, in Los Angeles, had called the books "scurrious"), when one of the interviewers asked him the following question: "Did you have the kind of devil's advocacy that these people are representing, within the Commission itself? Was there anyone who was charged with the responsibility for tearing your theories apart?" Jenner said he was pleased by the question for "the answer is yes." And without giving a name, he said that a man "was given absolute carte blanche," that "he sat

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through every session of the Commission," and that "he would act as a devil's advocate against conclusions we'd reached, say, after several weeks of study; and as a result of his criticisms or his suggestions, we frequently started over again or made additional investigations." Jenner then concludes this eerie dream sequence by triumphently reaffirming: "So we did have a devil's advocate."

Did they, indeed? Perhaps Warren Commission staff member Albert E. Jenner, Jr., will consent, one day, to mention *one* example where what he so eloquently describes has really happened. In the absence of any trace of any such examples in the Report, in the Hearings, in the Exhibits, or in the private statements of the various staff members including Mr. Jenner, it seems obvious that his description is pure fiction. Once again, is it too much to ask the Warren Commission to step down from the pedestal where it keeps itself wrapped in a shroud of disdain, pretending that it would be below its dignity to answer questions requesting facts, while slyly benefiting from Mr. Nizer's ignorance or from Mr. Jenner's vivid imagination?

I do not have the space to enumerate the full list of questions which the Commission should be *obliged* to answer. It is absolutely indispensable, however, to emphasize one major aspect of the Commission's investigative attitude because it represents the technical demonstration of the Commission's prejudice. I am alluding here to the manner in which the Commission's lawyers chose the witnesses, "prepared" them privately for their official appearance, and then, in addition, used all the tricks of their trade in order to have the witnesses say only what the Commission wanted to hear, and nothing else. Reading the stenographic transcript of the interrogation of certain witnesses by certain lawyers is really a traumatic experience: dozens of times, there is an absolutely obvious question which could solve an obscure point and which any first-year law student would feel impelled to ask, but which the Commission's distinguished lawyers carefully refrain from asking.

When one adds to this the Commission's literally monstrous indifference to the most elementary rules of eyewitness identification, one has the right to demand, before examining the possibilities of a new investigation, that the Warren Commission either justify its attitude or retract the affirmations based on it. Or is the Commission, presided over by the Chief Justice of the United States, willing to maintain that when a so-called witness —sometimes a reticent one who has to be prodded by his interrogators— "identifies" two months after the event a man whose every feature is known to everyone but the blind, this is a valid identification? Is the Commission willing to maintain that there is a valid identification when the witness who "identifies" the man in a police lineup admits that he has seen him before on television?

By the way, the Report says those lineups were "conducted fairly" while the transcript shows that they were grossly unfair to the suspect. Is Chief Justice Warren willing to recommend the procedure used in the Dallas police lineups as setting new standards for the U.S. Supreme Court? Or may defense lawyers in the U.S. still retain

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some hope that the Supreme Court will not admit, in ordinary criminal cases, identification based on the type of police lineups the Chief Justice has approved of in the Oswald case?

After that, I would also like to ask the Commission why, if its mind was not made up in advance as to Lee Harvey Oswald's guilt, it spent the first month of its hearings listening to Marina Oswald, to Marguerite Oswald, to Robert Oswald. The Commission was pressed for time, so pressed for time that later on, in March and April, it had to deal wholesale, hearing four or five of them the same day, with essential witnesses to the events: policeman Baker, for example, who saw Oswald in the second floor lunchroom immediately after the shooting and may have provided him with an alibi; or policeman McDonald who arrested Oswald at the "Texas Theatre" and provided several contradictory descriptions of the arrest. Why then waste a full month with the widow, the mother, the brother of a suspect about whose actual involvment in the crime the Commission had not started yet collecting information?

If, in its later fact-finding, the Commission were to establish Oswald's innocence in the shooting of the President, the mass of documentation collected during the month of February about Oswald's childhood, youth, social behavior, sexual complexes, etc. would have been of no use to the Commission. Would the Commission have wasted its time and the taxpayers' money if, at any moment before starting its investigation, it had considered the possibility that this investigation might *not* conclude with the affirmation that "Lee Harvey Oswald was the assassin of President Kennedy"?

Henri Rabasseire

Let's Talk Sense About Oswald

Three years after President Kennedy's assassination, we still don't know much more than on the day after it. Nor are we ever likely to know more. The Warren Commission and its critics have not produced conclusive evidence of either Oswald's guilt or his innocence. And unless new evidence comes to light, there is no point in setting up a new commission: the witnesses whose memories have been proved inaccurate are not going to change their testimony; members of any new commission are not likely to disagree with the first one on fundamentals; even if a second investigation could be conducted more leisurely and more carefully, even if it were to follow the hundreds of minor tracks which some have suggested it should explore, it would hardly arrive at more solid and substantial conclusions. Critics of the Warren Report would still shout "whitewash," though their crit-

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icism will still have to be based on the Commission's 26 volumes.

For we must give this much credit to the Warren Report: though in places it may read like an indictment of Oswald, it has provided much evidence that runs counter to its main contentions. With a single exception—the discovery of two witnesses who reported the Tippit murder to the police, and these had not actually seen the shooting—the case for Oswald has been built exclusively on material contained in the Warren Report.

One may quarrel with the Commission's conclusions, but it is both unfair and erroneous to quarrel with its method. Contrary to wide-spread misconceptions, the Warren Report is not a one-sided brief for the prosecution. If it were, its critics might properly ask for a contradictory procedure where defense lawyers can cross-examine and introduce their own witnesses. But imagine for a moment what might have happened if Mark Lane had been allowed to cross-examine. The worst is not that he might have turned the Commission hearing into the kind of circus he has staged on television: in response the Commission staff would have done precisely what he accuses them of doing. They would have stressed evidence that supported their own theory and suppressed evidence that tended to contradict their case. But this is precisely what they have not done. They have stated their own opinion; but they also have presented other evidence that casts doubt on their view, and in most cases they have stated why they gave preference to one witness rather than the other. But this is as it should be. The assignment of a commission is to submit all evidence that has come to its attention, and to leave judgment to the public.

By contrast, Mr. Lane feels no obligation to present the full truth as he knows it. Here is his own admission: In order to establish that shots came from the "grassy knoll" ahead of Kennedy's motorcade, he shows on film a witness who claims that he saw "puffs of smoke." Allegedly, this witness tried to tell the Commission that this drew his attention to the spot, but the interrogator "cut him short," obviously to prevent such testimony from getting into the record. The Commission record, however, shows that this witness was asked twice, "What drew your attention to this place?" and has answered twice, "Some milling around." When he tried to say once more that his attention was drawn to the spot, the interrogator indeed went on to other matters. In a courtroom, the prosecuting attorney would expose Mr. Lane's misrepresentations at once in rebuttal. The TV audience, however, had to wait until Mr. Liebeler could ask Mr. Lane on a subsequent program: "Why did you show this misleading film?" and Lane answered that he was only the attorney for the defense! Mr. Lane's business is to discredit the Warren Commission, and there seems to be a national prize contest on who can dig a wider credibility gap. Ten books and a play vie for attention, and a sensation-hungry public will not be satisfied unless someone finds "the conspirators."

In the following paragraph I would like to enter my own contribution to the conspiracy hunt, based exclusively

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on the Warren Report, consistent with all its findings, and no more far-fetched than others now in existence. We all know that the facts about Oswald's military record, his dealings with the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, and the Soviet government's file on his activities in Russia have not been fully published. But we know that Marina's uncle was a high Soviet intelligence officer and that both governments showed unusual consideration in facilitating the family's coming to the United States. It is not far-fetched to assume that (if Oswald was a CIA agent) Marina had turned him into a "double agent." It also is well known that the MVD was a stronghold of unreconstructed Stalinists who considered Khrushchev's dealings with Kennedy as a danger to themselves and the socialist fatherland. Since they could not get at Khrushchev, they decided to liquidate his partner-in-crime, and thus to revive the Cold War. Of course, the MVD would also welcome a chance to pin the blame on a "Trotskyite." Everything fits.

But where, under this theory, is the connection with Ruby? The beauty of it is that we don't need any such connection. For all I know and from what I have gathered from the critics, Ruby may have thought that he did not kill Oswald but Crafard—his employee who mysteriously disappeared on November 23 and who, according to the critics, "resembled Oswald" and may have "impersonated" him at the rifle range and at the furniture store. Apparently Crafard knew too much about Ruby's dealings with the police; and since he was a shady character, such as Ruby would employ, the latter may have thought that Crafard used the aliases of Oswald and Lee. However, if you think this far-fetched, we have Joachim Joesten's word (though no witness) that Oswald was in Ruby's pay and that Tippit was the man at the window on the sixth floor of the Texas Book Deposit Building.

To tell the truth, I am rather dissatisfied with the Tippit story, which many others too have called the Warren Report's weakest point. I think it altogether possible, or even probable, that the Tippit murder was not connected with the Kennedy murder at all. We have Mr. Lane's word (though again no witness) that Ruby and Tippit knew each other. What their business was is not difficult to guess; any night club owner in the world will tell you. Who actually shot Tippit we don't need to know; but we can imagine Ruby's shock when he hears that Oswald (or Crafard) has been arrested for murdering Tippit. He may not care about the President; but he is afraid that Oswald's lawyer will find out all about Ruby's dealings with the Dallas police. The policemen, too, may not care about Kennedy; but they, too, are afraid that Oswald will spill the beans about their dealings with the Dallas underworld. Fortunately, the very thing that causes the embarrassment also offers the escape hatch: let Ruby pose as an outraged patriot who summarily executes the President's assassin. They assure Ruby that he will be a national hero the next morning. (They also may secretly hope that he will be accidentally killed right after the killing.) Ruby shoots and the police cover up all other traces—not to save Kennedy's murderer but Tippit's.

The beauty of this theory is manifold. It is consistent with all the facts

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of the Warren Report plus the observations of its critics: the laxity of the police, its slovenly procedure, its confusion and contradictory statements, its possible connections with the conspirators, especially Ruby and Oswald. Really everything fits, and in addition, the theory does away with the implausible assumption that Oswald killed Tippit after killing the President.

Moreover, as a historian I have learned to look for explanations that are a bit more complex than in Western movies or whodunits. I do not believe that there is always one cause, one bad guy, one evil planner, or at worst one gang of conspirators who are responsible for all we know. Only in novels must all subsidiary actions be related to the main action. In real life, in history and in politics, many things happen side by side without necessarily being connected. History deals in small change, and it is one of its ironies that Oswald was first arrested for a crime he may not have committed, then indicted for a crime he probably did commit, and then again shot for a suspicion that had only a tenuous connection with either crime. In a nutshell—I can see the Dallas police getting busy to obliterate the traces of their little larcenies, bribery, moonshining as pimps and whatnot, and thereby incidentally obliterating also some clues to the Kennedy murder. After all, first things come first: since there was to be an investigation of the Dallas police, its greatest collective worry must have been to conceal its petty wrongdoing. But I cannot see a large police force cooperating with a crazy killer.

Here may be my greatest difficulty with the critics of the Warren Report. They all assume a conspiracy so far-flung that it seems impossible to believe no one has talked yet. Apart from the entire Dallas police, the conspiracy must have involved the doctors of the Bethesda Hospital, the FBI, the Secret Service, the staff and members of the Warren Commission. One critic even includes Kennedy's friend and assistant, Kenneth O'Donnell, who had picked the fateful route of the President's motorcade in Dallas. These critics refuse to believe that one man was so crazy as to shoot the President; so they must believe in hundreds who were even crazier—to believe that such a conspiracy could be kept secret. The number of assumptions they have to make to prove the conspiracy theory is multiplying every time one seriously looks at such a theory.

Bertrand Russell (who also intervened in this case) cites a principle famous in philosophy under the name of "Occam's Razor," which says: "It is vain to do with many that which can be done with fewer." Why does he not apply this maxim to the present case? The Warren Report requires us to make a few assumptions which it frankly states it cannot prove conclusively. All other theories require us to make innumerable assumptions which not only are implausible but impossible, and they do not even admit that these are assumptions; they require us to take their assumptions on faith.

Frankly, the critics of the Warren Report put a greater strain on my credulity than its defenders. As a true believer of the Left I am expected to doubt the Commission's good faith, or even to charge it with deliberate fraud, falsification, suborning of witnesses, and suppressing the truth. And I am

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asked to believe the most far-fetched, impossible fantasies—all because on the Left you are supposed to have a Pavlovian reaction to official reports. And instead of reading the Report, you make a facile show of your "critical mind"—and for that purpose you just have to agree that Oswald cannot be the assassin if the FBI says he is. Automatic responses take the place of criticism. In truth there is nothing especially virtuous in holding Oswald innocent; this is neither the Dreyfus nor the Sacco and Vanzetti case.

Let us try to talk sense. I see a limited number of possible theories:

1) Oswald was guilty of both the Kennedy and the Tippit murders.

2) Oswald was guilty of the Kennedy murder, but the Tippit murder was unconnected with this crime.

3) In addition to Oswald, a second person was implicated in either crime, or in both.

4) Oswald was not the Kennedy assassin, but the Tippit murder was connected with the Kennedy murder.

5) Oswald was the instrument of a larger conspiracy and had accomplices in the assassination.

6) Oswald was "framed," or there was a "second Oswald."

The case against Theory (1) has been aptly presented by the critics. The main stumbling blocks of this theory are, in my opinion, Oswald's extraordinary "luck" as a marksman, and our inability to account for the "bullet on the stretcher."

Theories (2) and (3) allow for the possibility that the Dallas police has been all too eager to convict Oswald and therefore may have tampered with the evidence; but they still admit that the overwhelming weight of hard-core, incontrovertible evidence points to Oswald.

Theories (4), (5), and (6) fail to account for much of the available evidence and have to resort to constructions that are contradictory. For instance, to prove that Oswald was framed, we are told that someone "looking like Oswald" drew attention to himself on a rifle range and in a furniture store. On neither occasion did he mention or sign any name; but on the second occasion he not only knew the birthday of Oswald's baby but even had procured a wife who "looked like Marina." Astute, I must say, and as compelling as any paranoid's world machine: everything that happened in the month of November, 1963 had been well planned by an infernal omnipotent, almost universal conspiracy.

The trouble with all these theories is that they need Oswald's cooperation on the sixth floor of the Book Depository Building. He had no alibi; and even if another person was involved, that person could have been there only with Oswald's knowledge and help.

But suppose Oswald had "conspired" with another nut. The Dallas police would not have the slightest interest in covering up such a "conspiracy." What the critics wish to prove is a conspiracy of quite a different sort—one that involves at least the Dallas police, but if possible high officials in the FBI and CIA or their connections with the John Birch Society or the Ku Klux Klan, something that would really prove a crisis of government or the kind of collusion that existed in the

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Dreyfus case. The critics have to prove that the gaps in the Warren Report point to a conspiracy of this kind, but it is unlikely that a new commission can find such proofs. Nor could it prove the absence of such a conspiracy, because negatives are not susceptible of conclusive proof. (Just remember how people had to prove to the late Senator McCarthy where they had *not* been!)

It is unfortunate that we have to accept the contingency—the coinciding of accidental factors that may not fit our craving for logical order. Moreover, we must beware of assumptions that seem natural but may not be warranted. For instance, Oswald may have been implausibly "lucky" if he really wanted to hit the President; but if he wished to hit the Governor, he scored only once in three or four shots. Speaking of the number of shots, the critics have concluded that more than one assassin must have been at work because Oswald could not have fired as many shots as some people seem to have heard. But here is what I mean by "assumptions": Would several killers have fired only four shots?

I am not asking the critics to provide a perfect theory and to prove it. I am merely asking them to consider what else must be true if their theories are true. I am asking them to circumscribe exactly the area where honest men can honestly disagree with the Report, its methods, or its findings. I don't challenge them to prove Oswald innocent; but I ask them not to pronounce the anathema on anybody who feels that the evidence weighs rather on the guilty side.

Finally, it should be made clear that Oswald was not found guilty by a court of law and that the Commission does not say that a court would have found him guilty. On the contrary, since its principal witness, Marina, could not be heard in a court of law, it is doubtful whether Oswald could be pronounced guilty "beyond a reasonable doubt." I am afraid the doubt will remain, and even the eventual release of the X-rays will not resolve it. Those who ask for a "new commission" do not know what they want. The government would appoint such a commission only to do what the critics charge the Warren Commission had been assigned to do—to quiet anxiety. But it could not discharge such an assignment very satisfactorily. Unable to prove anything, it might end up doing no more than providing a platform for crackpots. My plea is that the Left should divorce itself from the disseminators of anxiety and return to its proper political business.

A Statement

Since Mr. Sauvage invokes my name, let me briefly—before rumors start multiplying—state that I favor reopening the Oswald case because enough doubt has been cast on the competence and accuracy of the Warren Report to make desirable a full-scale review of its work. At the public symposium to which Mr. Sauvage refers, I described as "inept" the presentations which several critics of the Report, among them Mr. Sauvage, made at that occasion. It ought to be possible to take seriously the more consequential criticisms of the Warren Commission without believing that all of its critics are competent, or that all are competent at all times.

IRVING HOWE

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NOTEBOOK

Jack Rader

McNamara, Carmichael, and the GI Bill

Defense Secretary McNamara recently announced to the Convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars a "salvage" operation aimed at bringing tens of thousands of "Sub-Standard" youths into the armed forces—for their own good, of course.

He proposed—and has since instituted—a revision of standards for military admissions, so as to render acceptable many who now are rejected for educational or physical deficiencies. This would move 40,000 young men into the military in the first year, and 100,000 in subsequent years, none of whom would have qualified under existing norms.

Eligibility revisions are routine and seldom announced except in form circulars to draft boards. It is a rarity indeed for the head of the military establishment to take this upon himself. McNamara's particular twist here was the tie-in with the War on Poverty. Society's rejects, black and white, are to be embraced by the armed forces where they will find a welcome not elsewhere available. They will be given special consideration and saved ("rehabilitated") educationally, occupationally, and socially (and, of course, rendered useful for army service). The aging delegates at the convention probably didn't care one way or the other, but McNamara's thrust should have shaken the educational establishment:

> There is now ample evidence that many aptitude evaluations have less to do with how well students can learn than with the cultural value-system of the educator. Too many instructors look at a reticent or apathetic or even hostile student and conclude: He is a low aptitude learner. In most cases, it would be more realistic for the instructor to take a hard, honest look in the mirror and conclude: I am a low aptitude teacher. . . . Too many teachers end by causing them [students] to retreat into a mental fog of boredom, confusion, and non-comprehension.

Thus spoke McNamara, and who can question the essential truth of this statement? The educators, however, were more foil than target. There is criticism here, but no threat to the traditional jurisdiction of the schools. The targets are the Job Corps, the Manpower Training Development Services, and other aspects of the War on Poverty. McNamara has, in effect, posited the military as the social alternative to the War on Poverty; hence the particular relevance for Negro youth.

Thirty per cent of the 40,000 draft rejects and substandard volunteers are Negro. McNamara would rather have them enlist in the war in Vietnam than in the War on Poverty, and he offers the lure of the world's most "efficient educator" (his description) to do the

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job. He even offers assurance that most of them will not be killed, at least not in combat, "since only 14 per cent of the more than 3,000,000 men in our armed forces fire weapons as their primary duty. A full 50 per cent must be trained in technical skills."

Political, moral, and even military considerations of the Vietnam War apart, why compound the blows already inflicted on the poor by militarizing them? McNamara's proposals intensify the injustice of the whole recruitment system, with its collegiate exemption privileges, with the sanctuaries afforded to National Guard units, etc. He offers the military as the utopia of the poor, where at least they will be made into acceptable men. And it is in this militarization as a substitute for social policy that the danger lies, omitting for the moment the serious question of whether the army's achievement in educating the poor is quite as valuable as the claims made for it.

II

Stokely Carmichael has also been having his say about the Negro recruit. On various platforms he has declared Negro soldiers in Vietnam to be "nothing but mercenaries." Even within the framework of his call for Black Power, it is cruel and factually inaccurate to pin a "mercenary" label on Negro soldiers. Carmichael is apparently not interested now in opposition to this inane and hopeless war on all the grounds that have been argued; he is interested solely in Negro opposition. Any Negro who gets caught out there fighting—not primarily a wrong or bad or stupid war, but a white man's war—is a hireling of the white world, therefore a mercenary.

As with so many other ambiguous SNCC postures today, its attitude toward the Negro soldier in Vietnam rejects present realities along with the history of Negro aspirations. Since the Revolutionary War, Negroes have fought to gain equal admission to the armed forces and to obtain equality of advancement and conditions. The virtual exclusion of Negroes, following the Brownsville riot in 1906, except for the most menial chores, restored the commanding authority of the Southern officer corps, which had collapsed with the Civil War. It flowed from the triumph of Jim Crow and segregation after the Compromise of 1876 and the extension of these policies to all national institutions. Carmichael, by implication at least, would welcome this ignoble victory.

Between 1906 and 1940, Negroes in the military were pretty much excluded from fighting units. During World War I, Southern officers spread canards about the cowardice of the Negro soldier under fire, which became the credo of the whole armed establishment and the basis for limitations and exclusions that lasted for decades. This impugning of Negro manhood was corrosive to his self-image. The segregationists made it a fixed feature of their stereotype. W. E. B. Dubois conducted the most scrupulous investigation to disprove the charges, but to no avail. The right to serve in all levels of the armed forces became a major commitment of the Negro struggle. Not until 1940 were the bars lowered and then only for the formation of segregated units. Who is there who took part in World War II and did not hear time and again rumors about this or that Negro unit having acquitted itself with

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shame in battle, unable to stand up to the fighting, and the other little scurrilities that were the common currency of military scuttlebut.

Not until Truman's executive order of July 26, 1948 did it become the official policy of the U.S. to grant "equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons within the Armed Forces without regard to race." What effort and struggle it took to get that far!

It is sad, but true that the armed forces are probably the most integrated institutions in American life. (Moynihan: "The U.S. Armed Forces is the *only* [emphasis in original] experience open to the Negro American in which he is truly treated as an equal: not as a Negro equal to a white, but as an equal to any other man in the world where the categories 'Negro' and 'white' do not exist.") But McNamara's assertion that there is equal opportunity for advancement is not borne out by the evidence. Few Negroes—somewhat over 1,200 in all—have achieved officer status; little upward mobility is visible. In this respect, equality is still more talk than reality.

The main trend is indisputable, though. Whether Carmichael is aware of it or cares is beside the point. It is part of a record of achievement won through struggle; and it is sheer irresponsibility to talk as if it does not matter. None of which implies advocating more Negro soldiers for Vietnam or anywhere else; it merely asserts their right to the same treatment accorded others.

For example, there is growing concern about the composition of draft boards. The natural biases of a segregated society, reinforced by deliberate exclusions, have resulted in lily-white draft boards virtually everywhere. Now, this is probably of little concern to Carmichael, but it is, vitally so, to the Negro community.

The large number of Negro combat troops in Vietnam only partially reflect discrimination and a policy of militarizing the poor. The disproportionate number of Negroes in the Marines, Paratroopers, and other special forces got there by volunteering, volunteering twice in many cases, first for the military and then for the picked unit. The rate of Negro voluntary enlistment substantially exceeds that of whites. The rate of Negro re-enlistment after a first hitch is growing. That is why over 17 per cent of army sergeants are Negroes.

The reasons for this are not hard to find: better pay, in many cases, than could be earned in civilian life; better housing and living conditions; a chance to do something regarded within the prevailing scale of values as socially useful; a measure of equality; aid to dependents—the small matter that one's family may not be evicted from its home while one of its members is in the armed forces—and other advantages rarely acquired by ghetto dwellers. That too many ghetto youth take this way out is a damning indictment of America, but it hardly makes the Negro soldiers "mercenaries." They are simply availing themselves of an escape hatch from an otherwise airtight cage.

III

There are some 300,000 Negroes in the armed forces. There will be many more before this damnable war is over. A few may decide to make a career of soldiering, but the great majority will

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be discharged at the end of their enlistment terms. They will no longer be Carmichael's "mercenaries" or McNamara's salvaged, though militarized, poor. Just what will they be? Will they simply go back to the cage? The question is vital for the future of the American Negro and American society as a whole.

I don't pretend to have *the* answer —*the whole course of American social* policy and economy will determine that. But I would like to call attention to a limited possibility that is worth consideration, and action.

American miserliness toward its downtrodden—the flimsy sums alotted to the poverty programs, for example —is completely reversed in the treatment of veterans. Here there is unmatched largesse. Like everyone else who has been a soldier, the demobilized Negro is entitled to his share, not because he is a Negro or because he is poor, but simply as a matter of right.

The terms of these benefits were written into law in the "Cold War GI Bill," which became effective in March of this year. Its features are essentially the same as those of previous GI bills: monthly allotments during up to three years of schooling (any kind of education from literacy to occupational to college); job counseling and placement; loans for the purchase of homes up to $17,500; free care in Veterans Administration hospitals for both service and non-service medical problems; GI insurance; point allowances on examinations for government jobs; etc.

On January 31, in a special message to Congress, President Johnson proposed the amplification of benefits to veterans, with specific reference to those in Vietnam. Monthly allowances for ex-GI's going to school would be raised. Provision is made for the estimated one in five demobilized soldiers who have not had a high school education to get one while receiving government stipends, and then to be able to continue to college. The message refers to the McNamara plan to induct former ineligibles, said to number 140,000, as a program already in operation. While many of LBJ's legislative proposals seem in for tough sledding, the history of Congressional action for veterans leaves little doubt that these broader benefits will be approved.

Will all Negro veterans who are entitled to these benefits use them? There is no Negro veterans' organization. Neither the American Legion nor the VFW is exactly attuned to servicing the Negro ex-soldier. Nor can the law be relied upon to be self-enforcing.

Segregationist authority will operate in some areas to deprive the Negro veteran of his rights. But there are more difficult problems. *GI Bill benefits are given only to those who apply for them, and that is not as simple as it sounds.* It requires knowing what you have a right to, how to select what is right for you, where to go for it, and how to tread your way through the bureaucratic maze and papers. Many Negro veterans will manage somehow, but there is no certainty of this. There is, furthermore, a gap between the point of discharge, at which time everything is "explained," and the veteran's return home, and the steps he must take to obtain his rights. This is a referral system, and it has long been noted that many of the poor get lost between agencies during the process of referral.

The heart of the problem is how to

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minimize the successive hurdles so that the discharged Negro soldier knows, really knows, what he can apply for, what makes sense to him as an individual, and that he is helped to span the gaps along the way. A casework approach to assist the Negro GI from the point of discharge to his return home and through the Veterans Administration proceedings would develop such individual plans. Most important is a direct link all the way through, a link strong enough to stay with the Negro veteran during his first months after demobilization.

There is ample precedent—such services have been established by veterans' organizations, situated within the discharge centers and in the local Veterans Administration offices. The kinds of services required could, for example, be discharged by the Urban League, through the medium of a veterans' department. Financing should present no overwhelming difficulty.

There is nothing "radical" in this proposal? Correct. It is modest to the extreme. It requires no special legislation, no civil rights bills, not even a demonstration of strength. It simply requires doing. And there is nothing shameful, from whatever political perspective, in assuring several hundred thousand Negro men a chance to elevate themselves in occupation, education, and housing. The proposal is merely an attempt to turn this one aspect of the American reality into a lever for social improvement.

Robert M. Greenstein

The McNamara Incident at Harvard

Last November, 800 Harvard students blocked the path of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, demanding that he consent to a public debate on Vietnam. The demonstrators thereby touched off a controversy on the tactics of confrontation, a controversy which continues to plague the student anti-war movement. The issue has assumed particularly serious proportions at Harvard, as a result of the strong reaction of both the traditionally lenient university administration and a large section of the student body. While taking no action against any of the students involved, the Administrative Board has declared that such an incident must never be repeated. The hint has been dropped that in case of a recurrence, the organizers might be expelled. Immediately following the incident, Dean John Monro dispatched an apology to McNamara for "the discourteous and unruly confrontation forced upon you." And 2700 Harvard students disassociated themselves from the demonstrators by apologizing for "the unruly behavior of a small group."

Secretary McNamara had arrived in Cambridge November 5 as the first honorary associate of the Kennedy In-

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stitute of Politics. McNamara was to speak at two off-the-record seminars, of 60 undergraduates each, chosen randomly from the more than 1200 who had expressed interest. The Harvard SDS chapter (Students for a Democratic Society) had repeatedly attempted to get Institute director Richard Neustadt to present McNamara in some public setting and had circulated a petition signed by 1600 students, 93 teaching fellows, and 52 faculty members calling for a debate with Robert Scheer. The Institute issued a firm refusal. When McNamara arrived for the first seminar, members of SDS attempted to present him with a sheet of questions about the war. Critics of SDS material, who often complain of its simplistic moralism, were surprised by the sophistication of the questions. An official of the Kennedy Institute, accompanying McNamara, intercepted the questions before SDS could reach the Secretary.

With all channels of public communication seemingly closed, SDS planned to confront McNamara as he left the second and final seminar, and to question him about the war. If he refused to debate or to answer questions, students would sit down around his car and seek to force a confrontation. Kennedy Institute officials attempted to forestall this by staging a faked exit, complete with a fake get-away car, to draw demonstrators to the wrong side of the building. SDS leaders had informed Institute officials that if McNamara left by the front entrance, all would be kept under control by marshals. If demonstrators had to run to meet McNamara, they warned, control might give way. Nevertheless, the faked exit resulted in a mass of several hundred running students. Given these circumstances, what was perhaps most amazing was the underlying orderliness of the ensuing confrontation. Never was the Secretary in the slightest danger of physical harm. The basic moderation of the demonstration became apparent when the demonstrators agreed to accept, in place of a debate or question-and-answer period, McNamara's offer to remain five minutes and answer two questions.

II

In these five minutes, heckling simply was not as great as edited television tapes seemed to indicate. McNamara could be heard. To be sure, there was some heckling by scattered individuals, but what appeared in newsreels as mass heckling by an angry mob was largely roars of disapproval to the Secretary's statements. But then it should be stressed that possibility of rebuttal in debate or a legitimate questioning session had been foreclosed. Students felt the least they could do was to make vocal their refusal to accept McNamara's answers to the two questions addressed to him—his answer that Phillipe Devillers' account of the origins of the war was mistaken, as it really started in 1954 when Vietcong infiltrated the South along with the Catholic refugees from the North; and his statement that he did not know the number of civilian casualties. The greatest expression of discontent, deliberately provoked by the Secretary, came after he compared himself in his student days to the demonstrators by declaring, "I was tougher then, and I'm tougher now."

Where then lies the distressing "discourtesy"? The university, to its credit,

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has never made an issue of heckling. The sole issue to Dean Monro and the Administrative Board was that

> an organization assumed the right to restrain physically and force its will on an individual. It was McNamara but that doesn't make any difference. The issue comes down to exercising physical force on one person because you don't believe in his politics.

To bolster their case, members of the administration pointed out that as an honorary associate of the Kennedy Institute, McNamara was at the time a member of the university. To allow university officials to be forcibly made to speak against their wishes, it was claimed, would set a dangerous precedent threatening academic freedom.

Such an association with the Kennedy Institute becomes irrelevant, however, when the following morning the same man will be back at his desk as a major architect of the Vietnam War. The university is correct in feeling it could not tolerate such harassment of a faculty member. The difference between Robert McNamara and regular officers of Harvard should have been clear to Dean Monro. For "the fact that it was McNamara" is precisely what *does* matter. When a man is one of the handful of most powerful persons in the world, one of the inner circle whose policy, whether right or wrong, leads to the death of thousands in the name of the American public, then he is no longer just any private individual. For the university to react with threats of serious action in the future, after students who have been refused a public dialogue accept a five-minute question period, is quite out of place, especially when these same students may soon themselves be drafted to fight in Vietnam. The reasoning of the deans might become valid if adequate channels of communication had remained open. Instead, the refusal to debate or to meet publicly with students seemed but another manifestation of the government's closing the lines of access to critics of the war, especially student critics.

Perhaps more important, this refusal also represented the persistent refusal of the government to inform the public as to many unpleasant facts of the Vietnam War, and as to the real course of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia. The refusal seemed another example of the Johnson Administration's failure to meet its critics on even ground. As a result, students felt exploited by McNamara's entire visit—he was to gain the prestige and publicity by having come to Harvard to engage in discussion on Vietnam, but without ever having been confronted with a real show of opposition, without ever having publicly to defend his position against the sort of criticism that can be found in an institution such as Harvard.

The students, then, saw the demonstration as the only alternative remaining open for public dialogue with McNamara the policy-maker, and for public opposition to McNamara the symbol of a vicious war. When in such circumstances students take action that poses no physical threat to McNamara (though it did to themselves), a "courtesy backlash" is a most inappropriate response.

III

A final criticism made of the demonstration has been that to allow this sort of confrontation by one group in

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Cambridge legitimizes its use by another group, perhaps in the South. "... I have known or corresponded with too many equally idealistic and dedicated Southern segregationist students," one eminently liberal Harvard professor remarked, "who feel that against the power of the federal government they can only protest in a similarly aggressive way." Yet the essential moderation of the Harvard demonstration was such, that given the same circumstances, no repetition anywhere should pose a serious threat. If the Attorney General were to visit a Southern university to discuss integration but refused to defend it publicly, what complain could one have if a group of segregationist students nonviolently restrained him so that he had to debate such an issue for several minutes?

To raise the issue of courtesy is, as philosophy professor Hilary Putnam put it, "to miss what the opposition to this war is all about." That the incident may, however, have been a tactical error remains an open question. The gap at Harvard between demonstrators and more cautious critics of the war may have widened seriously because of the incident. The 2700 signatures on the letter of apology suggest that many of a large group of Harvard students—those who are generally critical of American policy in Vietnam but equally critical and often derisive of most student protests —were pushed closer to the war supporters than to its more vociferous opponents. When these student moderates come to view those working against the war as irresponsible radicals, their own cynicism toward the anti-war effort is only enhanced. If the student anti-war movement is to become more effective, it must win over rather than alienate such potential supporters.

At the same time, one of the most striking aspects of the demonstration was its mobilization of several hundred previously passive opponents of the war into their first public protest. Since this represents more than twice the membership of all anti-war groups on campus, and far more than had participated in any previous Vietnam

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demonstration, some have seen the incident as a tactical success. Most of those more cautious war critics who signed the apology may continue to be disdainful toward any activism and may never be motivated to protest against the war. It is quite possible that the demonstration only brought to the surface already existing divisions in student attitudes toward any form of Vietnam protest at all.

However the tactical results are viewed, there remains one aspect of the incident which could clearly have been handled in a different manner. It is unfortunate that the proposed debate should have been with Robert Scheer instead of someone such as Harvard international relations expert Stanley Hoffmann.

Many at Harvard believe that in such a debate, Hoffmann, who only two weeks earlier had publicly outlined the necessity for American disengagement, would not come out second best. Any points Scheer might have scored would have been undercut by the uneasiness that many feel toward his politics. The prestige Hoffmann enjoys at Harvard would have operated in precisely the opposite manner. A debate between McNamara and Hoffmann might have had a tremendous impact on those same moderates alienated by the confrontation. In any case, to have refused a debate with Hoffmann would have caused McNamara and the Kennedy Institute far greater embarrassment in the Harvard community

In the months between November 7 and the present, tempers have abated somewhat. Dean Monro met several times with SDS members (although the administration has reaffirmed its determination to take strong action if such an incident should be repeated), and McNamara replied to Monro that no apology was necessary. He excused the action of his student foes by attributing it to their allowing "zeal to exceed judgment." In his report to the Harvard faculty on the affair, Dean Monro adopted the same tone—the demonstration was the result of this peculiar "excess of zeal." If anything, by attempting to explain "discourtesy" by an "excess of zeal," Monro and McNamara have only strayed further from understanding what the confrontation was about. And several months after it all happened, reading Harrison Salisbury's reports on the destruction of civilian villages in the North, one waits for a clarification as to what the proper level of zeal should be.

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François Furet

A REPORT ON THE FRENCH LEFT:

From Marxism to "Structuralism"[1]

The "end of the ideologies," diagnosed by Raymond Aron, among others, refers generally to the developed societies of America and Western Europe.[2] It connects prosperity, economic growth, and social integration on the one hand with the progressive decline of political extremisms on the other; the car, the refrigerator, and television are said to have killed the revolution. This type of analysis has already inspired endless comment on neo-capitalism, the Gaullist regime, and the kind of political torpor that has characterized France since the end of the Algerian war; as if one of the functions of Gaullist nationalism were now to counterbalance an objective process of French "Americanization."

But does the end of ideologies mean the end of ideologues? If it is true that present-day France tends in its social depths to be dozing off into a society of abundance and social integration, is the diagnosis true also of the groups and the men whose profession is thinking and writing? It will perhaps be objected that this question implies a certain modification of our initial proposition, for the relations of intellectuals to ideologies differ in nature from those of the general public, or are at any rate more complicated (even if they are apparently simple or deliberately simplified). But the problems and choices of French intellectuals, because of the authority they have enjoyed since the period of the Enlightenment, have often been indicative of those of society as a whole. There can be no greater historical oversimplification than deifying the intelligentsia's purely protesting role; claiming a long line of great but damned ancestors is a cheap way of entering into an exceptional heritage. But Voltaire was the most acclaimed hero of the eighteenth century, the Revolution put Rousseau into the Pantheon, and Victor Hugo's coffin was followed by an enormous crowd. The intellectual Left has rarely governed the France of its time, but it has supplied

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[1] Reprinted, with permission, from the British magazine *Survey*.

[2] Raymond Aron, *Trois essais sur l'âge industriel.*

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its universal values. Neither the Dreyfus case, nor the Popular Front, nor the postwar spread of Communism are intelligible if the part played by the intellectuals and their ideological elaboration is left out of account.

That is why ideology is far from consisting exclusively of a theory of history, though in the France of yesterday Marxism-Leninism was the most widespread and extreme form it took. Ideology is born of the feeling that a great historical problem can and must be solved by individual commitment. Hence the passion inseparable from it, the proselytism, the condemnation of the enemy and even of the indifferent, the identification of personal morality with historical necessity. The class struggle has different aims according to Guizot or Marx. The former hails the triumph of the bourgeoisie and the second the advent of the proletariat, but both, even if this is denied, as it is by Marx, imply a moral view of politics, distinction between good and evil, and commitment to the side of the good.

Thus the French Left has no monopoly of ideology; on the contrary, for nearly two hundred years the conflict between Right and Left has been the warp on which ideologies have been woven. The Frenchman of the Right, armed with Barrès *v.* Zola, Maurras *v.* Romain Rolland, and Drieu de la Rochelle *v.* Aragon, also has his cultural pedigree whose assumptions and political hypocrisy the Left has frequently denounced. The national masochism of the Pétainist bourgeoisie or fifteen years later the nationalist enthusiasm for *l'Algérie française,* refer back to the same system of intellectual and moral arguments, only its terms vary with the event. Why, then, the privileged position enjoyed today by the ideology of the Left and by the left-wing intellectual? The answer is that the last great battle of right-wing ideology was fought by fascism—and lost. Since the end of the war ideological elaboration has consequently been a quasi-monopoly of the Left.

How the celebrated Hegelian tribunal, which had become the "opium of the intellectuals," was wildly misused by the victorious Left after it had been "proved right" by history was described by Raymond Aron even before the politico-moral tribunal of Stalinism broke down with the death of Stalin. Up to that moment historical certainty and moral judgment had combined and reinforced each other; now both factors in the apogee of the ideological age were simultaneously punctured by developments in the contemporary world.

De-Stalinization raised the issue of justice and truth in the Communist world. There turned out to be other enemies besides the bourgeoisie, and it came to be seen that the Soviet Union was not always necessarily and inherently in the advance guard of human history. This

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led to a new diaspora of Communist and progressive intellectuals; a whole world collapsed, as I well remember, because I was part of it. Warsaw, Budapest, the Chinese schism have only accentuated the process, providing the last rites for a Marxism-Leninism that had been both incarnate and universal. But during those very years a new universalist mirage, an *ersatz* Messianism, presented itself to the revolutionary intellectuals, namely, the struggle for the independence of the Third World or, in the French context, support for the FLN in the Algerian war. This additional experiment in ideological extremism was the more characteristic of left-wing intellectual circles in that it was experienced in social isolation, disclaimed by the Communist party, and not understood by the working class. The Western intellectual looked overseas for his (mythical) tie with the oppressed and the agents of world revolution, in the ranks of an enemy who was assumed by definition to be socialist and internationalist. The Muslim fellah celebrated by Fanon had become the latest ally of revolutionary defeatism of the Leninist type. The outcome is familiar. The left-wing intellectual had invested his liquid revolutionary capital in religious nationalism; in seeking the Bolshevik party of 1917 it found Islam, and instead of Lenin it found Boumédienne.

The disconcerting outcome in Algeria and the very victories of the colonial peoples have slowed down left-wing intellectual investment in the Third World, for the difficulties in the way of economic "take-off" are often too technical in nature to nourish passion, and the love affair between FLN's French wartime friends and the Algeria of Colonel Boumédienne has ended in disappointment. Nevertheless, the economic setbacks that have taken place in most of the recently decolonized countries have in a way restored to honor the idea of a Leninist—or Maoist—dictatorship. For lack of suitable soil for experimentation of this type at home, some Western intellectuals proclaim its necessity in the underdeveloped countries as the only way of demolishing the obstacles in the path of the mobilization of labor and national saving for capital formation. A few years ago, it was chiefly the romantic and antibureaucratic character of the Cuban revolution (which contrasted so sharply with socialism of the Soviet type) that roused enthusiasm, but the Chinese model now seems to be restoring priority to economic rationality, and this classic slant may again enable it to be used in the defense of totalitarianism. But it is too obviously inapplicable to European conditions, its culture being too "exotic" and its antecedents too well known, and so it is unlikely to rally a great deal of support; and finally, the hostility of the French Communist party deprives it of a great deal of influence.

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The irruption into history of the nations of the Third World, instead of promoting a "Chinese" version of Marxism, has in fact contributed to hastening the end of ideologies in contemporary French culture. Superficially and for a brief moment, it seemed to lend a new lease of life to great universal visions of social transformation, but in reality it served to discredit lastingly and in depth the philosophies of history of the nineteenth century. The phenomenon could be crudely summed up by saying that the place occupied by Marxism twenty years ago in French intellectual life, which is so sensitive to fashions, has been taken by structuralism.

It is probably no chance, nor is it the mere result of an incidentally only too obvious cultural chauvinism, that structuralism, which has dominated European linguistic research since the first postwar period, was popularized in France not by linguistics but by the progress of anthropology; anthropology and the anthropological approach appeared at the right moment to meet a historical situation, fulfill a social expectation. For decolonization revealed to all the secrets of the anthropologists, those pioneers of anti-colonialism: namely, that cultures are multiple, are all equally worthy of respect, and manifest themselves in terms of permanence rather than of change. French colonization (which it must not be forgotten, was often "Left" in origin) claimed to place them in Western "time," putting them through European stages of progress whether they liked it or not. Now, however, there is perhaps a trace of expiatory masochism in the revaluation of these extra-European worlds.

Above all, a profound overnight change has taken place in the French intellectual's idea of the world and the part played in it by his country. The transference of his revolutionary hopes to the Soviet Union and then to the Third World was in itself an implicit confession of impotence concerning the possibilities in his own country. But it also betrayed the survival of the Jacobin tradition, nostalgia for the France of 1793, a patriotism temporarily frustrated but nevertheless still optimistic; France would one day again pick up the torch of revolutionary history. But now even this dream is fading. Not only has the Soviet flame gone out and the Third World disconcerted or disappointed its friends of the heroic age, but France itself is no longer France. The French intellectual, heir to a prestige less fragile than power and unconsciously used to a universal radiation of his culture, is not yet reduced to the sad state of the Belgian: but he is increasingly aware of being a citizen of a country that, in spite of Gaullist rhetoric, no longer has the sense of making human history. Having been expelled from history, the France in which he lives consents the more willingly to expel history. It

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can look at the world with eyes no longer veiled by its own example and civilizing obsession; with eyes now skeptical about the "lessons" and "meaning" of history. Valéry admirably foresaw this phenomenon after the First World War in his *Regards sur le monde actuel.*

Thus the recent disappointments of the French intellectuals and the general political situation combine to cast doubt on history—for so long a tyrannical mistress before she became an unfaithful one.

II

It is without doubt this situation which explains the great impact of the kind of thinking of which Lévi-Strauss is both a model and a representative. It is, however, uncertain, even unlikely, that Lévi-Strauss, who has a passion for accuracy, would accept this vague and general attribution of paternity affixed to him under the label of "structuralism." But from the point of view of the social character of his audience, that matters little. It is, on the other hand, significant that a work as specific and as technical as his should have had so widespread an impact on men of letters, art critics, and philosophers. To enumerate its great themes and aspirations is not to evade the significance of the intellectual movement which reflects the scope of its influence, since that is precisely what has to be understood.

However abstract it may be, the effect of his work is to revive something like the great Rousseauist paradox that split the eighteenth century. One feels it to be suffused by love of nature, the countryside and flowers, a fondness for "primitive" man that inevitably stimulates nostalgia for a happiness lost by industrial societies. Lévi-Strauss writes of a world in which the eagle, the bear, and meadow-sage still exist, but he believes no more than Rousseau, who is one of his favorite authors, in a return to a primitive happiness that has disappeared forever. The heir to Boaz and Mauss knows that there is no such thing as a state of nature, but that there are many communities and cultures, which are so many ways of facing nature, and that there is no positive way of establishing any hierarchy between them. Thus the industrial society of Europe or America loses the privileged position to which it believes itself entitled in relation to tribes buried in the forests of the Amazon. "A great deal of egocentricity and naïveté is required if one is to believe that the whole of man has taken refuge in a single one of his historical or geographical modes of being, while the truth about man lies in the system of their differences and common properties" (*Pensée sauvage*, p. 329). Thus the "primitive" does not provide us with an image of man's childhood, as was believed in the eighteenth and nineteenth

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centuries in accordance with a naively European model of human history; he does not even provide us with one adequate image among others. As soon as it is granted that he has conceived very varied societies and uses a logic as profound—or simple—as that of modern science, he no longer exists as such, or as a "primitive." He merely offers us, as the so-called developed societies do, a multiplicity of cultural solutions of the eternal conflict between man and nature.

The role of the anthropologist is thus to classify cultural systems, to undertake for each of them an objective analysis of their systems of symbols and their articulation. The objectives of the psychoanalysts are implicitly transferred from the individual to the collective, from clinical analysis to the "decoding" of a social language like the myth. In his last years Freud was greatly attracted by the interpretation of anthropological data (which he had not completely mastered). Lévi-Strauss rejects the methodological confusion implied in this illicit anthropology-psychoanalysis relationship, based on the old idea that the savage reveals man in his infancy, which assumes that the individual and the social are of the same nature; he never extrapolates into his own field the procedures of psychoanalysis. But his ideas about myths extend to the collective, the objectives of individual psychoanalytic treatment; they are intended to bring to the surface the subconscious structure of social beliefs, the code underlying man's thinking, which finally determines what he does think of himself and of others. On this Lévi-Strauss agrees with Marx and Freud. Like that of the myth, the realm of ideologies is the realm of a false consciousness of reality, which must be explained at another level. But, unlike Marx, he sees no historical remedy for this false consciousness, no reconciliation of man and his true history.

Moreover, structural anthropology at long last promises an advance of the human sciences to a methodology as rigorous as that of the exact sciences. For in one sense the work of anthropological analysis resembles a laboratory experiment. In both cases the object under observation is treated as a natural object, is laid out in space, is amenable to any amount of experimentation, and there is awareness of the distance between the observer and the observed. In another sense, however, the methodological quarrels of the anthropologists threaten the assimilation of anthropology to the exact sciences. Lévi-Strauss is constantly aware both of the kinship and of the gap still to be filled in; hence the originality of his work, and no doubt also its wide range, which contrasts with the deliberately restricted nature of ethnological description. Working with a few societies into which history has not introduced its chaos and in which reduction to a few variables is relatively easy, he has

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been able to satisfy his concern for scientific rigor and his obsession with the linguistic "model" in the best possible conditions. It is true, as he often repeats, that he has never ventured beyond, though, as always happens whenever a book becomes fashionable, imprudent or over-zealous disciples tend to extend his method toward building up a general theory of societies. But frivolous or perhaps illusory though this anticipation may be, it underlines the methodological influence of his work. Is not this entomologist of human behavior, capable of the feat of emerging from his own cultural world, the reverse of Sartrian man, on whom engulfment in history and the emergence of a revolutionary practice imposes his celebrated commitment? The fact that he belongs to the same generation as Sartre and has lived through practically the same history and is also considered to belong to the "Left" is thus immaterial; to him these things belong to the domain of opinion and not to that of science. And in what way does he belong to the "Left"? The term hardly has meaning to a man who believes that in their state of babbling infancy the human sciences to which he has devoted his life and outside which he wishes to say nothing have for the time being nothing serious, still less useful, to offer to the *polis* and its struggles—except a relapse into ideology. In fact their chance of one day deserving their name specifically depends on their keeping silent. "One may legitimately ask the exact and natural sciences what they are. But the social and human sciences are not yet in a state to render accounts. If these are required of them, or if on political grounds it is considered clever to pretend to do so, it will not be surprising if all one gets is phony balance-sheets." (*Revue internationale des sciences sociales,* 1964.)

Is this scruple to be regarded as a real rupture with history? It would be highly significant for our argument if it were so. But Lévi-Strauss continually denies it, and pays explicit tribute to history, allowing it even to "reserve its rights" (*Inaugural lecture).* But until when? And what is the history to which he refers? Is it the meaning of history created by Sartre's dialectical reason? Evidently not, for, except at the price of unscrupulous falsification, looking back cannot demonstrate in the present the necessary outcome of the past. To Sartre a man can always draw logical conclusions; to Lévi-Strauss he can only think that he does so. A stubborn illusion grants the present the rather foolish privilege without seeing that it itself introduces into successive events a connecting link drawn from its own depths. Thus the assurance of a retrogressive movement of truth vanishes under the anthropologist's eye, and the philosophy of history becomes a myth, the necessity of which only empha-

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sizes its lack of substance. Lévi-Strauss, criticizing the fabrication of historical meaning by Sartre's dialectical reason, wrote this significant passage on the history of the French Revolution:

> Those described as men of the Left still cling to a period of contemporary history that granted them the privilege of consistency between practical imperatives and patterns of interpretation. Perhaps that golden age of the historical conscience has already passed; and the fact that one can at least imagine the possibility shows that this was merely a fortuitous situation, resembling the chance "focusing" on a heavenly body of an optical instrument with which it happened to be in a state of relative motion. We are still "focused" on the French Revolution; but if we had lived earlier we might have been focused on the Fronde. (*Pensée sauvage.*)

III

Having settled accounts with this pseudo-science, however, the fact remains that societies change and that there are histories—if not a single history—that are entitled to their observers. History, like Le Verrier's planet, thus becomes a perpetual "disturbing factor" introducing structural disequilibriums. Now, it is impossible to grasp everything at once; synchronism and diachronism cannot be taken in at the same glance. Increasing one's knowledge in one field proportionally diminishes one's chances of acquiring it in another. Thus structural anthropologists are needed to study order, and historians to study disorder. This division of labor is equal only in appearance, however. The study of structures has a double advantage, chronological and logical: chronological because the description of structures provides it with a starting-point, and this gives complete autonomy to the work of the structuralists, while the opposite is not true; the work of the historian is dependent, ornamental, or at all events relegated to a distant future. And logical because after the structures have been analyzed, the normal in the event has been pulverized and history can hardly be rationalized, and perhaps cannot be rationalized at all.

From this point of view, which is perhaps the most significant for our argument, Marx and Sartre are on the same side of the barricade, that of history, while Lévi-Strauss is on the other, that of structure. Like Hegel and Marx, Sartre still describes an advent, a history to be fulfilled by man, while Lévi-Strauss reduces multiple man to common mechanisms, dissolves him in a universal determinism, in the last resort displays him like a natural object. His books, written with a rather precious rigor, are a pitiless commentary on man's nothingness, marking a probably fundamental epistemological breach with the "ideological age." This is systematized in Foucault's latest book.

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I do not wish to relapse into over-facile identifications, unduly confusing books and authors, but from the point of view of this analysis it is permissible to compare the work of Barthes and Foucault with that of Lévi-Strauss. Their fields of work are very different, but the methodological inspiration is the same; it is to try to obtain an anthropological view of contemporary societies and cultures. Foucault, imitating the use of the anthropologist's cultural telescope and reversing it, tries to gain more light from it that way. Lévi-Strauss mingles the Jivaro world with his European outlook, while Foucault sets out to consider European culture from a Jivaro angle in order to turn it into a scientific object and make it examinable. He tries to describe, not individual patterns, which would result in a study of opinions, but the conceptual structures which in each period make those opinions possible; the present intellectual revolution consists in his view in the breach with historicism and the end of humanist anthropocentrism. This makes Sartre the last "nineteenth-century philosopher"—which cannot be pleasing to him. Foucault's methodological aggressiveness, which is probably one of the clues to the success of his book, has the interest of trying to systematize the general significance of structuralism in European culture of the present day; the analysts of man's "dissolution" have succeeded the prophets of his advent.

But, if what Foucault says is indeed true, and if structuralism confines Marx to a nineteenth-century tyrannized over by history, it is very curious and sociologically extremely interesting that structuralism should have developed in France so systematically and so late, and in the same left-wing intellectual circles that (in the broad sense of the term) had been Marxist since the liberation. This leaves us with the task of trying to describe and understand this paradoxical phenomenon, as well as the curious and, I think, specifically French mutual contamination that has taken place between Marxism and structuralism.

At a first level of analysis, it is evident that if Marxism continues to lie at the heart of the French intellectual debate it is less as a theory than as an ideal, less as an intellectual tool than as a political heritage. Twenty years have now passed since Sartre tried to reconcile the existentialist self with Marxist determinism, that is, his theory of personal liberty with his progressive opinions. It is this that forced him in his last philosophical book to substitute his dialectics of individual liberty for Marxist dialectical materialism while quoting as "evidence" and approving without the slightest critical analysis the sum total of the propositions put forward in *Das Kapital,* that is to say, the essentials of the Marxist

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philosophy of history.[3] By this subterfuge he reconciles his philosophic conscience with his political progressiveness, but at the same time illustrates the profound duality of his work and uneven quality of his intellectual rigor. What interests him is the establishment of new existential foundations for human history and the revision of what he considers the mark of "scientism" in Marx. The respectful and distant doffing of his hat to *Das Kapital* does not derive from the same level of analysis; it signifies merely his allegiance to the left-wing intelligentsia, the resistance of yesterday and the present-day struggles against imperialism. It is the historical symbol of an age, that is, the ideological age. Sartre speaks and will always speak as the big brother to all those who lived profoundly through the times of fascism and Communism. The genius of this professional philosopher resides, paradoxically perhaps, in the secret of his sensibility and art rather than in the clarity of his thought. In vain he refuses to be what he has become, for he is caught up in the pitiless history of literature. He has turned into a patriarchal figure, a big brother aging in glory, a Nobel prize winner in spite of himself, but a Nobel prize winner all the same. That is the last trick played on him by *Words*.

It is true that Lévi-Strauss has also emphasized his debt to Marxism. But his emphasis is different. Having deliberately abstained from postwar political struggles, shut in his student's and scholar's ivory tower, he has felt no need to state his position in relation to Communism or anti-Communism; the few interviews that—obviously without pleasure—he has given the press betray more than prudence—a professional desire to keep his distance from his own cultural world and the chaotic history that introduces its disorders into it. Nevertheless, he can perhaps be considered more faithful than Sartre to Marx's philosophic premises and materialist determinism. He has inherited from Marx the scientific ambition to interpret in intelligible terms the ideas that men form about the natural and social worlds by another system underlying them; he accepts the idea of a global society in which determining factors will in the last resort be the relations between men and nature. But he transforms it profoundly by drawing up a veritable theory of superstructures. One of the plainest symptoms of the end of the ideological age among French intellectuals is, incidentally, this passion for the study of superstructures, as if they desire to track down, unveil, and understand the intellectual products of men and groups from their most hidden motivations. But this is also the weakest point in Marx's analysis. To Lévi-Strauss, who made himself plain on the subject in *Pénsee sauvage*,

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[3] *Esprit*, November, 1963.

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the primacy of infrastructures is like a hand dealt at cards; what societies do with the hand imposed upon them depends on men's cultural inventiveness. But an unlimited number of variables are not open to this inventiveness. On the contrary, it betrays structures and logical systems whose appearance and mutations, far from being necessary and inevitable as so many stages in an identical human evolution, depend on a calculation of probabilities; this takes into account the concomitant multiplicity of societies and cultures. From other passages less materialist and less Marxist interpretations can be drawn, for one can never be sure whether the logical structure brought to light by the analysis is of the same nature as the material produced by it or whether it informs reality. In fact the problem whether it is materialist or Kantian (a Kantianism without transcendental subject, Paul Ricoeur has said) is of little interest to Lévi-Strauss, who seems to accept both hypotheses; that is to say, he takes little interest in his philosophical relations with Marxism.

Moreover, he has always refused all extrapolation of his analytic procedures to mythologies, beliefs, or "historical" societies; he did so explicitly in reply to Edmund Leach, the British anthropologist, who suggested a Lévi-Straussian "decoding" of the Book of Genesis—and the contrast between the theoretical ambition implicit in his ideas and the thinness of their field of application rouses the mistrust of many of his colleagues in the English-speaking world, who remain attached to the empirical accumulation of facts.[4] In France, however, it is this ambition, or rather its special contribution to South American anthropology, which has roused the enthusiasm of intellectuals and led rapidly to discussions at the most general level—existentialism, Marxism, and structuralism. The left-wing periodicals bear witness to this; the anthropologist has been consecrated a philosopher rather in spite of himself. Perhaps this should be regarded, as certain English-speaking anthropologists regard it, as a special feature of the French national tradition. But in this instance the fascination exercised by Lévi-Strauss over many Marxist or ex-Marxist intellectuals seems to me to require a more specific explanation. It is born neither of fraternity of political opinion—for Lévi-Strauss is the opposite of a "committed" man—nor of philosophical kinship—which is highly problematical if it exists at all, and is in any case a matter of indifference to Lévi-Strauss—but from an inverse relationship in which nostalgia for Marxism has been able to insert itself. Stated simply, the structural description of man as object has taken the place of the historical advent of the man-god.

4 E. Leach, "Genesis as Myth," *Discovery*, May 1962; *The Legitimacy of Solomon*, Archives Européennes de sociologie, 1966; C. Lévi-Strauss, "Anthropologie et philosophie," *New Left Review*, 1966.

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IV

But there is yet another and still more surprising aspect of the relationship between the Marxists and the structuralists. It is significant that a whole trend of Communist thought implicitly relies on structuralism, not to break with Marxism, but to renovate it. That is the meaning of the work of Althusser and his friends, who are trying to restore the theoretical value of the work of Marx and Lenin by rigorous analysis of their operative concepts in order to free it of the banally humanist ideology in which Garaudy diluted it. Instead of being concerned, like Sartre, with reconciling an epistemology with progressive ideas, their object is to marry structuralist method and Marxist theory. From this there emerges a Marxism purged of its Hegelian paternity and of all contamination by bourgeois humanism, and differing from Marx's own teaching, since the latter is redefined by the bringing to light of its fundamental conceptual structures. It is on this condition alone, in Althusser's view, that Marxism can again become what it really is—this having been masked by the huge amount of social and historical sedimentation that has taken place—that is to say, *the* theory, *the* science *par excellence* as opposed to the ideologies. This explains the curious path taken by Althusser. Trying as he is to "de-ideologize" Marxism, he nevertheless uses it both as an object of study and as his sole point of scientific reference. Structural analysis, which is an attempt to extend the methods of natural science to the "human sciences," is thus subtly diverted in the direction of Marxist dogmatism, which is assumed as a self-evident premise—for the Marxist model is assimilated from the outset to the scientific model. Hence the epistemological contradiction and political ambiguity of the works of Althusser and his friends, who are devoted to restoring life to Marx by rigorous analysis but are blocked by bigoted adherence to a conceptual apparatus which, brilliant though it may have been, dates from another age and another world.

But perhaps on another plane this ambiguity itself is significant of the development of some Communist intellectuals who have remained in the Party since the de-Stalinization crisis, and of younger ones who have since joined it in a climate that has become much more tolerant and much more critical than that of the fifties. Althusser simultaneously offers structuralism and Marxism, critical study and doctrinaire intransigence, loyalty to the French Communist party and reservations about it. There are many reasons to suppose that a sociological study of his present audience would disclose these factors, which are so characteristic of the present and the recent past of Communist intellectuals. No matter

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that they are contradictory; it is precisely because they are contradictory that a structuralist interpretation of Marx is able to offer them a temporary home. Intellectual and sociological contradiction mutually explain and reinforce each other; the structuralist "de-ideologizing" of Marxism undoubtedly offers a way of living through the end of the ideologies inside the Communist world.

If this analysis is as a whole correct, if there is indeed a link between a general phenomenon like the end of ideologies and the attractiveness of structuralism in the special environment of the French intellectuals, it will strike one as surprising that the disintegration of ideological certainties and of the "meaning" of history has not led to a return to favor of empirical research and the gathering of factual information on the pattern of the English-speaking world. Not that such research and the accumulation of factual information is not growing in France; on the contrary, there as elsewhere sociological investigations, public opinion polls, massive searches of documents are multiplying. But everything is more than ever subordinated, even more than it was yesterday, to the search for a general theory. Everything is happening as if the crisis of Marxism had cleared the ground for a methodology of another kind but at the same level, heir to the same ambition for global, systematic understanding. What for lack of a better term is called the Parisian "fashion" for structuralism, that is, its social success and its timing, would thus be explained by its deep relationship, both contradictory and homogeneous, to Marxism. The natural-sciences model has displaced the history model, man as object has taken the place of man as subject, structure has taken the place of process, concept that of practice. But all this lies within the same determinist ambition and derives from the same desire to decipher what underlies the apparent or merely conscious meaning of human behavior.

Thus it is probable that the end of the ideological age among the French intellectuals embraces two distinct phenomena differing in nature. De-Stalinization, the Sino-Soviet schism, the crisis of the Third World—and French and European prosperity—have punctured the progressivism of the fifties that was so characteristic of the ideological age. Hence, there was a readiness of intellectual opinion, a kind of expectation—rather as a century ago the inglorious check to the romantics of 1848 preceded and facilitated the formation of the realist and positivist generation. But it facilitated this, it did not create it; intellectual change does not itself call for sociological explanation. At the present time the political disappointments suffered by progressivism have weakened

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the influence of Marxism among the Left intellectuals, but it is Lévi-Strauss and not Raymond Aron who reigns in the void thus created. What prevails is not a liberal and empirical criticism of Marxism, but a hyper-intellectual, systematic way of thinking, aiming at a general theory of man. Not only have Marxists or ex-Marxists been able to invest their past in this without repudiating it; they have also rediscovered in it their ambition for an all-embracing science of man and their old all-embracing dream, freed from the naïvetés of commitment and of the meaning of history. To that extent, perhaps, the case of the French intellectuals deserves to become a classic; the end of the ideological age has found its doctrinaires.

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BOOKS

Paul Goodman

Missing the Point on LBJ

LYNDON B. JOHNSON: THE EXERCISE OF POWER, by Rowland Evans and Robert Novak. New York: New American Library. 597 pp. $7.95.

There is a positivist school of political science that devotes itself to the analysis of power. It is value-free about things like justice or commonwealth; and it pays as little mind as possible to causes like class interests or historical conditions. The tone of such writing is technical, superficially like Machiavelli in *The Prince—but* of course in Machiavelli, who was a lover of pristine Rome and the commune of Florence, this tone is a cry of passion for his suffering country, whereas in our technologists it is cool and hip, as if they were not patriots of anything.

In *Lyndon Johnson,* Evans and Novak have surprisingly given us a kind of monument of the positivist method. As they say, "We have attempted to show how the Public Person achieved and dispensed power. This is a study of political power and a political biography." I do not think their own purpose is methodological but rather that, as journalists, they find that techniques of power–jockeying for position, horse trading, mending fences, occasional knifing in the back (it is astonishing how many metaphors we have) —provide good daily columns. Nevertheless, until the last chapters of their book, they preserve their method quite pure. There is some mention of LBJ's "populist background," and rarer mention of his tie-ins with Texas millionaires and his making his own million, but such things are not allowed to become important to the analysis. Astonishingly his relations with armament industries, inevitable to a man whose specialty throughout most of his public career was in the Armed Forces committees and in aerospace, are not mentioned at all. (This is so astounding that I wonder whether the authors are devious on this point.) There are, of course, many jolly paragraphs on the hero's personal manners, but these are rigorously devalued as untechnical; LBJ and his advisers are praised when they concentrate on the Public Person; and best of all, if they can use some personal trait to enhance the Image.

Needless to say, in dealing with contemporary events, the Dominican intervention and the war in Vietnam, the authors panic and their analysis of technique gets swamped in their rhetoric of war—value-laden words suddenly appear, as that Senator Gruening is said to "pontificate." But such panic on existential issues is endemic among positivists. When the choice is for real, even austere methodologists

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like Seymour Martin Lipset and Daniel Bell come out with positions congenial to institutions like *Freedom House*. So a pair of popular reporters can be forgiven, and the earnest reader can close their book at page 500, which is already a lot of relatively objective pages.

What, then, is the effect on a reader of this long description of a man getting ahead and throwing his weight around? It is dismay that this is what the (apparent) history of my country has come to. But one's dismay does not deepen to rage and grief because the context is too trivial. I would use the words "full of sound and fury, signifying nothing," except that their connotation is too tragic; neither LBJ, as here portrayed, nor his adversaries in the arena that is here portrayed, are humanly meaningful enough for the waste of their lives to be deplorable. And the matters that *are* fearful and grievous, the destructiveness of my country's course and the degeneration of my fellow citizens, are not here on the scene.

The brute fact is that parallel to the events in this book there has been the allotment of the big social wealth, the money in scores of billions, never mentioned in this history; the big misdeeds and non-deeds of the Cold War and the abuse of technology are not mentioned. This strand of history has been uninfluenced by the events in this book, though it has strongly influenced them in ways not told by Evans and Novak.

On the other hand, parallel to the events in this book, and strongly influenced by them, have been the debauching, hoodwinking, hamstringing, and trivializing of the American people by the efforts for power and the exercise of power of this cast of characters. But this effect, the lapse of American democracy is not the concern of Evans and Novak.

What is valuable about this book is that it again reminds us that history is not wholly the effect of material and cultural forces, nor even of institutions, but is importantly moved by men and their manipulation of one another. What is lacking in the book is that no *men*—either the movers or the victims—ever appear in its pages.

The New Poor and the Old

LA VIDA, by Oscar Lewis. New York: Random House. 669 pp. $10.00.

THE POORHOUSE STATE, by Richard M. Elman. New York: Pantheon Books. 302 pp. $5.95.

For long stretches of history, no one but the poor has been interested in poverty; but at intervals—and we are in one such period now—it has become respectable to see it as a problem. Sociologists, economists, social workers, and politicians of all persuasions have issued numberless studies

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of poverty, and as a result have succeeded in establishing two entirely contradictory images of the poor: on the one hand, they are the salt of the earth, hard-working individuals victimized by our economic system; on the other hand, they are conniving chiselers, irresponsible, lazy, and sly. A stalemate of righteousness has resulted.

Almost all the writing on poverty has been done by researchers who were not themselves poor, or were poor only temporarily and by choice. Their books tend to be written with the innate bias of their political convictions.

In *La Vida,* Oscar Lewis has at one stroke vacated the old argument and provided a genuine entree into the life that poverty imposes on the poor. The book is divided into two major sections: a theoretical and methodological introduction, and a main text made up of the taped autobiographies of the members of a Puerto Rican slum family. The autobiographies are fascinating, inevitably revealing even to those who are professionally knowledgeable about the poor; but it is the introduction which, in the long run, may prove more important.

For here Lewis shows why the two images of poverty have been etched so deeply into our folklore, and why the conflict between their proponents is so specious. He distinguishes between mere impoverishment, with the retention of standard values, and the establishment of what he calls the culture (or sub-culture) of poverty. Those of the poor who manage to deal with their poverty according to the mores of the great world are perceived by that world as honest, thrifty, etc. These are the "worthy poor," as the old codes had it, and they are generally those who in all but monetary matters can identify closely with other members of their society. On the other hand

> The way of life which develops among some of the poor . . . is the culture of poverty. . . . The culture of poverty is both an adaptation and a reaction of the poor to their marginal position in a class-stratified, highly individuated, capitalistic society. It represents an effort to cope with feelings of hopelessness and despair which develop from the realization of the improbability of achieving success in terms of the values and goals of the larger society.

The obvious question then is: how can we do more than merely provide opportunities to those who are predisposed to grasp them? How can we bridge the gap between the dominant goals and those of an alien culture? How can we come to grips with the *real* problems presented by individuals among the poor who frustrate and infuriate those whose society-appointed task it is to "help" them? How can we deal with the *real* problems presented by institutions among the poor which are at variance with those of the larger society?

These are the questions we will have to answer, and the answers won't be easy precisely because we are dealing with a cultural phenomenon:

> The culture of poverty . . . once it comes into existence . . . tends to perpetuate itself from generation to generation because of its effect on the children. By the time slum children are age six or seven they have usually absorbed the basic attitudes and values of their sub-culture and are not psychologically geared to take full ad-

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> vantage of changing conditions or increased opportunities which may occur in their lifetime.

Lewis takes exception, however, to the view that the values of the subculture are to be seen as entirely negative. He describes some of the advantages that derive to the slum poor from the very limitations of their outlook, and the strengths they gain which enable them to survive in conditions that could not be mastered by the values of the larger society. Nevertheless, there is none of the currently fashionable romanticizing of poverty, and Lewis concludes rather grimly,

> . . . on the whole it seems to me . . . a rather thin culture. There is a great deal of pathos, suffering and emptiness among those who live in the culture of poverty. It does not provide much support or long-range satisfaction, and its encouragement of mistrust tends to magnify helplessness and isolation.

Lewis devotes a great deal of care to a description of the planning and accomplishment of his research. There is always an element of uneasiness in the notion that all the crucial factors in the life of an individual—much less a family—can be captured by the techniques of scientific observation. But it is hard to imagine a research method which would come closer to the ideal than that presented in *La Vida*. Lewis lists in meticulous detail the multiple facets of daily life that were analyzed for each member of the family studied, and then goes on to describe the major techniques of the research: the intensive, taped autobiographies, and the recording of a typical day in the life of each of the family members. Much must remain open to subjective variation, but great efforts were made to neutralize this effect:

> The intensive studies of families involved the establishment of deep personal ties without which we could never have obtained the intimate data presented in this volume. . . . The tape recordings of the life histories were begun only after we knew the family well. In some cases we visited the families regularly for a few months and learned a great deal about their lives in casual conversations. . . . The independent versions of similar incidents in family life serve to check the validity and reliability of the data.

The main text of the book clearly indicates the success of this technique. Each of the men and women of the pseudonymous Ríos family comes through with impressive directness. They are obviously comfortable in the presentation of themselves; where they lie, it is to deceive not the interviewer but themselves.

The lives they describe are something more than shocking; they go beyond that, they are in some respects quite foreign. It is inevitable, I suppose, that some leaders of the New York Puerto Rican community should object to *La Vida* on the grounds that it lends support to an ugly stereotype. Some of the attitudes and actions of the protagonists are unlovely indeed, and those who choose to seek out elements of viciousness will succeed. But for those who read the book as a corrective to incomprehension, the surprising thing is that *La Vida* provides an increased respect for the totality of the Ríos' lives. There is an avidity for experience in the face of repeated disillusionment, an absence of pomposity, a survival of intelligence despite the most limiting ignorance, that more than counterbalances the violence, greed, and rather pathetic

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self-deception that are so prevalent in their lives. Perhaps something of the flavor of this unique family biography comes through in this anecdote from a day spent with the eldest daughter, Soledad:

> The television set was still turned on and they all watched a scene in which a young girl was contemplating suicide . . .
>
> "Dope! Idiot!" Soledad said, switching off the set impatiently. "How can she think of killing herself? She shouldn't be such a coward. You have to face whatever life brings. Hell, some people shit on themselves over every little thing that happens to them. I say put a good face on bad times. No trouble lasts a hundred years."

•

Richard Elman's *The Poorhouse State* is a muckraking assault on America's public assistance system. It is particularly frustrating that in this area, so in need of imaginative criticism, the insight and fervor Elman displays should be lost in a welter of illogic, half-truth, and blithering ideology.

The book begins by itemizing the by now familiar—and noxious—details of the administration of Welfare: the minimal provision of funds, the endless humiliating investigations, the fantastic bureaucratization. The bulk of the text, however, consists of a series of interviews and reports of casual. first-person encounters; and here one becomes uneasy.

Elman structures his many portraits with an evident fidelity and a good deal of sensitivity: he shows the reader an ADC mother who has just been cut off the relief rolls, without money enough for a pretense of decency, and wholly beyond hope or rationality; or again, a tubercular bartender, half a victim of bureaucracy, half a con-man. People are perceived as caught up in a tangle of poverty, bureaucratic inertia, and social pathology.

However, the author's simplistic ideology belies the complexity of his presentations. Elman has one single answer for the problems of all the people he describes: money. Enough money so that those on welfare may enter the American consumer-culture without a struggle. Money that is given freely, with the idea that dependency is a permanent and value-neutral factor in the American economy.

But the pathology of the poor that Elman himself has illustrated can't be so easily dismissed. Yes, obviously, money—much more money—must be found to allow the helpless to live decently. And perhaps—I am no economist—it will prove necessary to permanently pension off a part of our population.

But the typical welfare recipient today is dependent not only because the skills he has to offer are obsolescent—if that were all, retraining programs might work a lot better than they do—but because he is incapacitated by real pathology. I recall, for instance, a young Hungarian refugee, a skilled wig-maker who could have earned a very high wage. But she had eaten herself into an obesity of such enormous proportions that shame and physical incapacity kept her trapped in her apartment. Or again, there was the Puerto Rican man who felt his manhood so undermined by his wife's factory earnings and her increased independence that his only recourse was to illness and a place on the welfare rolls as a certified invalid.

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While it is no doubt true that a large proportion of the pathology found in the poor is created by poverty itself, the reverse proposition—that money will create health—does not hold. As Oscar Lewis points out, such pathology is rooted in a true culture, and as such is passed on from generation to generation. The alleviation of financial stress, while plainly a good thing in itself, is not a cure for cultural pathology.

Despite some overstatement, Elman by and large is in the right when he sticks to protesting Welfare abuses. I think he is dead wrong—and, despite his pessimism, underestimates the problem—when he proposes to change the lives of the dependent poor by making dependency respectable.

Sincere as he is in his concern for the poor, Elman isn't a serious enough writer or analyst to realize the pitfalls of his reportorial style and his research techniques. A good many of his interviews were recorded in return for payment, and Elman seems quite unaware that this might fault his data:

> In the early summer of 1965, I stood outside the Welfare Center on 28th Street, stopping people when they left to ask whether they would submit to a brief interview about their life on public assistance in return for five dollars. I got good value for my money.

I doubt it. You can't buy that sort of information, not even from the poor.

SUSAN LARNER

Paths to Industrial Modernity

SOCIAL ORIGINS OF DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY: LORD AND PEASANT IN THE MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD, by Barrington Moore, Jr. Boston: The Beacon Press. 556 pp. $10.00.

Barrington Moore's *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* is one of the finest books ever written by an American social scientist. With relentless intellectual honesty and range, Moore manages to shed new light on some of the central questions of our time: the origins of democracy, fascism and communism, and the over-all nature of industrial modernization. All of us who are concerned with modern historical developments are happily in Moore's debt.

Moore tells us that his study will try

> to understand the role of the landed upper classes and the peasants in the bourgeois revolutions leading to capitalist democracy, the abortive bourgeois revolutions leading to fascism, and the peasant revolutions leading to communism.

In order to fulfill such an ambitious program, Moore moves through a series of studies of the modernization process in England, France, the United States, China, Japan, and India. There are no separate sections on Germany and Russia, but Moore makes use of his broad knowledge of both these societies. Finally, he concludes with a group of essays utilizing the comparative method to arrive at the larger gen-

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eralizations implicit in the earlier treatment of particular nations. The method throughout, therefore, is one of comparative historical sociology. And the theoretical conclusions arrived at are empirical in the best sense, in that they remain ultimately historical, avoiding ahistorical sociological abstraction, without, however, allowing a concern for the details of history to stifle the need to generalize.

Moore's method avoids both the position (defended by some historians) of anti-theoretical empirical nominalism, and the opposite extreme (defended by some sociologists) which sees history as only a collection of facts to be pulled out of context in order to but tress abstract and largely ahistorical grand theories about the nature of man and society. Instead, Moore chooses to explore comparatively a broad range of historically rooted middle-level questions concerning the social basis of the politics of modernization. And in doing so, he provides us with his own example of that type of generalized yet historically rooted social science for which he called ten years ago in his *Political Power and Social Theory*.

In the course of over 500 pages, Moore explores such problems as:

- the differences between the French and English revolutionary paths to essentially bourgeois societies (here Moore utilizes all the available modern scholarship on the English Civil War and the French Revolution to argue that the progressive-capitalist quality of the English aristocracy made the real difference between the English and the French methods of defeating landed reaction);

- the relationship of the American Civil War to the French and English experiences of revolutionary capitalism (a brilliant essay in which Moore, if he perhaps underestimates somewhat the inherent differences between the social structure of nineteenth-century America and those of seventeenth-century England and eighteenth-century France, nonetheless updates the argument of Charles Beard in the *Rise of American Civilization* and contributes in his own right probably the best and most sympathetic treatment of the triumph of Northern democratic capitalism over the plantation-slave South which we have in the literature);

- the role of the peasantry and landed upper classes in the diverse historical development of China, Japan, and India (a series of essays in which Moore seeks to find the social origins of Communist revolution, reactionary modernization, and democratic stagnation in the complex interrelationships between the peasant villagers, the landed elites, the urban bourgeoisie, and the national authorities which evolved in China, Japan, and India, respectively).

In Moore's analysis, then, democracy, fascism, and Communism emerge not simply as the political choices of modern man, though they remain this in part, but rather as the results of the varied ways in which the agrarian question was worked out in different national histories. Moore is largely concerned with the social basis in agrarian relationships among the peasantry, landed elites, and national authorities, which relationships largely predetermine whether a society will be ripe for the bourgeois, reactionary, or

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Communist paths to modernity. Perhaps we best gain an insight into Moore's over-all approach, however, if we attempt to follow him in more detail into the specific treatment of two of the analytic problems he poses for himself, namely: the questions of the social origins of fascism and of Communism.

In his introduction Moore seeks to distinguish between the democratic capitalist and the reactionary capitalist paths to an industrial modernity:

> The first and earlier route through the great revolutions and civil wars led to the combination of capitalism and Western democracy. The second route [to industrial modernity] has also been capitalist, but culminated during the twentieth century in fascism. Germany and Japan are the obvious cases, though only the latter receives detailed treatment in this study for reasons given above. I shall call this the capitalist and reactionary form. It amounts to a form of revolution from above. In those countries the bourgeois impulse was much weaker. If it took a revolutionary form at all, the revolution was defeated. Afterward sections of a relatively weak commercial and industrial class relied on dissident elements in the older and still dominant ruling classes, mainly recruited from the land, to put through the political and economic changes required for a modern industrial society, under the auspices of a semi-parliamentary regime. Industrial development may proceed rapidly under such auspices. But the outcome, after a brief unstable period of democracy, has been fascism.

Fascism emerges then, contrary to the traditional Marxist view, not as the last stage of a dying and threatened monopoly capitalism, but rather as the defensive maneuver of a capitalism which has never really been triumphant in a society where pre-bourgeois elites have retained their landed and military prerogatives well into the twentieth century. To put the matter another way, fascist movements are efforts to align mass support behind essentially atavistic and pre-bourgeois ideologies (for which Moore develops the generic term of Catonism after Cato) in a quasi-democratic society which has been dominated by a reactionary capitalist alliance and which finds itself suddenly threatened by economic disruption and/or revolutionary upheaval from below.

In any event, the existence of a powerful fascist movement is more evidence of bourgeois failure, i.e. the failure of a bourgeoisie to take control of its society on the English model, than it is evidence of the last stage of a triumphant capitalism.

The last stage of capitalism, if the post-1945 histories of Japan and West Germany may be taken as examples, would seem to be more a situation of industrial-capitalist stability and working-class integration into a Swedish-like atmosphere of progressive democratic state-capitalism in a society in which a triumphant bourgeoisie has either banished or finally tamed pre-bourgeois elements. Furthermore, if the defeats and occupations of 1945 may be seen as providing in some sense the bourgeois revolutions which Germany and Japan both missed, then their post-1945 capitalist stability, although not discussed by Moore, would seem to bear out his general theory.

In Moore's view, Communism is the result of an even more decisive variety of bourgeois failure than the situation of partial bourgeois failure which

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forms the social basis for a fascist development:

> The third route [into the world of industrial modernity] is of course communism, as exemplified in Russia and China. The great agrarian bureaucracies of these countries served to inhibit the commercial and later industrial impulses even more than in the preceding [i.e. reactionary-capitalist] instances. The results were two-fold. In the first place these urban classes were too weak to constitute even a junior partner in the form of modernization taken by Germany and Japan, though there were attempts in this direction [i.e. by the Kuomintang in China]. And in the absence of more than the most feeble steps toward modernization a huge peasantry remained. This stratum, subject to new strains and stresses as the modern world encroached upon it, provided the main destructive revolutionary force that overthrew the old order and propelled these countries into the modern era under communist leadership that made the peasants its primary victims.

Thus, if fascism is the result largely of an unstable alliance between a modernizing bourgeoisie and strong prebourgeois elements in a situation of formal democracy, Communism emerges as the product of a social situation in which formal democracy is lacking and neither the bourgeoisie nor the traditional elements are able to act as modernizing agents with any real degree of success.

Moore's statement above, concerning the peasants as the primary victims of the Communist triumph which they help to bring about, is symptomatic of the deep ambivalence toward revolutionary methods which pervades the entire book. (While on a substantive level I would wish to contest Moore here and insist that the peasantry was victimized by Russian Communism but not by Chinese Communism, I would prefer to concentrate on the question of Moore's over-all approach to revolution.)

On the one hand, Moore is well aware, as we have seen, of the extent to which Western democratic capitalism, despite its present animus toward revolutionary violence, itself rests on revolutionary roots. Moreover, in a brilliant section on India, entitled "The Price of Peaceful Change," Moore explores the human cost involved for the peasant masses in grafting a Western democratic political structure onto an Indian socio-economic foundation of traditional agrarian ignorance and stagnation. (Moore is especially insightful in his treatment of the inherently conservative bias of Gandhi's ideology.)

Yet, with all his awareness of the hidden human cost exacted by the avoidance of revolution, Moore is not prepared unconditionally to endorse the revolutionary path. Could he be sure that a contemporary peasant revolution would move a society in the direction taken by the bourgeois-dominated peasant revolution in eighteenth-century France, Moore would unhesitatingly opt for revolution. In our time, however, peasant revolution means Communism and perhaps Stalinism. Moore is too aware of the crimes and unfulfilled promises of Communism, as is evidenced by his earlier writings, to endorse revolution totally. He remains deeply troubled by the problem of revolution, but as usual he meets the issue head on and in full view of his readers:

> The ugly side of the Stalinist era

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had institutional roots. Communism as a set of ideas and institutions cannot escape responsibility for Stalinism. In general one of the most revolting features of revolutionary dictatorships has been their use of terror against little people who were as much victims of the old order as were the revolutionaries themselves, often more so. . . . Altogether the communist defense requires an act of faith about the future that involves too great a surrender of critical rationality.

In the place of such a surrender, I would urge the view that both Western liberalism and communism (especially the Russian version) have begun to display many symptoms of historical obsolescence. As successful doctrines they have started to turn into ideologies that justify and conceal numerous forms of repression. That there are huge differences between the two goes without saying. Communist repression has been and remains so far mainly directed against its own population. The repression by liberal society, both under earlier imperialism and again now in the armed struggle against revolutionary movements in the backward areas, has been directed very heavily outward, against others.

Nevertheless this common feature of repressive practice covered by talk of freedom may be the significant one. To the extent that such is the case, the task of honest thinking is to detach itself from both sets of preconceptions, to uncover the causes of oppressive tendencies in both systems in the hope of overcoming them. Whether they can actually be overcome is dubious in the extreme. As long as powerful vested interests oppose changes that lead toward a less oppressive world, no commitment to a free society can dispense with some conception of revolutionary coercion. That, however, is an ultimate necessity, a last resort in political action, whose rational justification in time and place varies too much for any attempt at consideration here. Whether the ancient Western dream of a free and rational society will always remain a chimera, no one can know for sure. But if the men of the future are ever to break the chains of the present, they will have to understand the forces that forged them.

It would be difficult, in either moral or analytical terms, for any vision of contemporary radical scholarship to transcend Moore here. Yet it is possible, nonetheless, that there may be a certain dated irrelevance to the entire debate among American radicals and academics as to the moral validity of revolutionary coercion in the modernization process. Indeed, present tendencies in world politics suggest that the future may lie with American-supported conservative modernizers in the underdeveloped areas (i.e. with various forms of the military-bourgeois alliance). Far more than the Vietnam War (which may best be seen as the last expression of the major wave of social and national revolution which swept a world destabilized by World War II, rather than as the forward edge of a new revolutionary wave), the

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recent events in Brazil and Indonesia may reflect better the dominant conservative drift of our times. In the long run, then, Moore's analysis of the pattern of conservative-modernization probably has more to say about the future than do his discussions of either the bourgeois or the Communist revolutionary paths to industrial modernity.

The irony in terms of Moore's analysis is that America, itself the purest form of the bourgeois revolutionary society, should have assumed, apparently successfully, the twentieth-century role of ensuring that any future breakthrough into industrial modernity should be accomplished by non-revolutionary means. It is possible, therefore, that Barrington Moore may, in the last analysis, have written even more as a historian than he intended. It may be that in his brilliant discussion of the social origins of the bourgeois and Communist revolutions Moore has described historical possibilities that have already passed us by.

N. Gordon Levin, Jr.

Writing off Fear

Papa Hemingway, by A. E. Hotchner. New York: Random House. pp. 304. $5.95.

The pseudo-folky, he-man dialogue that sounded so intellectually and humanly inadequate when reported by Lillian Ross is given here by Hotchner at full length, and still sounds just as inadequate. But we see now what we had only glimpses of before—that there is a cunning, crafty, full-blooded artist making up this dialogue, for a logical and consistent, though tragically misguided, reason.

Most writers try to use their writing as the medium through which they come to terms with the world around them. There is a certain kind of American, however, who is tempted to become a character instead of a novelist and to make of his own life a heroic novel.

In Hemingway's case, the Hero is the masculine adventurer who has, as quoted by Hotchner, "learned some things that have helped me write off fear as a personal problem." We have here the Hero's program: first, learn the right things; second, use them to *write off fear*. Luckily the Hero is not identical with the actual writer who gave us the delicate poetry of courage, isolation, and death which informs Hemingway's early work and the best of his later stories. There, thank God, the fear does not go away. The would-be Hero can write it, but he cannot write it off. His recipe doesn't work; it only produces good writing. The artist must go one step further. He conceives of a character named "Hemingway" whose bravery would be verified by everything around him, ultimately by the whole world. For until every person and event and even every memory return to the Hero the self-sent image of his Heroism, how can he be sure he is not merely kidding himself, because he is, at bottom, still afraid?

To look into the mirage of shifting

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styles, fashions, and personalities, and see reflected there the constant esteem of one's own self: that is the godly ambition of the American Celebrity-Hero, and it requires a godly effort at manipulation. Should the world be permitted to misunderstand for a moment, the reflection will come back coward, and the campaign is doomed. The Hero writes, as he grows older, to combat misunderstanding. Or, as Hemingway told the Swedish Academy: "He grows in public stature as he sheds his loneliness and often his work deteriorates. For he does his work alone, and if he is a good enough writer, he must face eternity or the lack of it each day."

With eternity in view the Hero raises horn to lips. Enter a good many reporters and critics, bent on tearing a man down, ignoring his very own explanations. Enter a band of loyal followers, bearing condiments and leeches, ready to shore a man up. Enter the faithful Hotchner, self-conscious about his tape-recorder—until the Hero urges him to turn it on!

Even as a young man, Hemingway was obsessed with taking things in and storing them. We read in *A Moveable Feast* how careful he was to "learn" from every place he went and every person he met. His vitality was programmatic, rather than generous; experience was a meal to be carefully consumed and given back to the world in tight little pellets of gut prose. Writing is always connected with eating and drinking, and the production of Hemingway's daily quota of numbered words is elaborately dovetailed with the consumption of specifically chosen delicacies. He keeps telling us he was "very poor," though he and his wife kept a maid and took extensive vacations. Anyway he *felt* poor, and in constant danger of letting out more than he took in. Hotchner reports that Hemingway pretended he had to live each year on that year's income, and was deeply anxious about it long after his annual royalties could have supported a hundred writers.

Since Fate will never give in, the Hero is never satisfied. "I had forgotten," remarks Hotchner, "how he distrusted chance and how he planned fun as seriously as work, for he considered them of equal importance to Well-Being." Hotchner joined the party in 1948, long after it had gotten out of hand, when much of the host's writing and nearly all his conversation consisted of instructions for getting the most out of life. Hemingway was the Tom Sawyer of his devoted group, who never let up for a moment in directing his planned fun, except to tell anecdotes in which he had stored the fun of the past.

Hotchner describes an automobile trip through France, in which Hemingway gave a town-by-town commentary on "local terrain, weather, customs, history, battles, grain, grapes, orchards, song birds, game birds, wines, dishes, cattle, wild flowers, morality, architecture, irrigation, government, and accessibility of local women to outsiders. . . ." Here, as throughout, one's awe of Hemingway's prodigious capacity for detail only intensifies one's frustration with his emotional narrowness. In his worshipful innocence, Hotchner exposes in abundance the compulsive pettiness that so often accompanies literary ambition.

Once he made of himself a full-time Hero, it was appropriate—in the dramatic sense only—that Hemingway should have succumbed at last to the

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paranoid fear that others were out to get him, to expose him personally and undermine him financially. It is as though the audience that he had worked so hard to control turned around in his mind to control him. A psychiatrist whom Hotchner consulted in his friend's behalf "speculated that Ernest's fears of impoverishment and of being in jeopardy physically and legally were probably related to his feelings of impoverishment as a writer, with attendant jeopardy of his identity and stature."

In jeopardy or out of it, fearful or free of fear, losing weight or full of food and drink and life, Hemingway never ceased to carry on his own version of the good fight against all odds "If I can't live on my own terms, then existence is impossible," he told Hotchner towards the end. His great weakness was his inability to relax now and then into mere mortality. For a writer, such an inability amounts to grave ignorance, but Hemingway was not about to see that. He was too busy trying to build his fortress against dread, an entire life as hermetic as a work of art. Had he succeeded, he would have mastered the world. Instead, he found himself the world's victim, with nothing of his own left inside him, and nothing more to do but destroy the physical shell of himself.

JEREMY LARNER

INDIA AND CHINA (continued from page 132)

ure of the monsoon. The Congress party and the government also share responsibility insofar as their agricultural planning program has by and large been unsuccessful and they have not managed to build up sufficient reserves of food. Yet India has made economic progress in recent decades—as the article by Asoka Mehta in the current issue makes clear. And even as the government struggles with the food problem, it continues to respect the processes of democratic life, the right of its domestic opposition to criticize.

In China the immediate political struggle rages in part over the succession of leadership: after Mao, who? Those who sneered at Indian democracy used to say: after Nehru, who? Well, India answered that question. It has experienced two transfers of office since Nehru (first to Lal Bahadur Shastri and then to Mrs. Gandhi). Both took place in tranquility; neither convulsed the nation. India's fourth general election will have occurred by the time this comment appears. It has been conducted in an atmosphere of passionate debate, with a multitude of parties freely challenging the ruling party. Yet no one has been banned or purged. Nor has anyone been paraded through the streets with a dunce cap on his head. The continuity of democratic government in India seems assured.

When one considers the terrible handicaps under which the Indian people are laboring, does not their political achievement warrant a certain admiration? To be sure, intellectuals and some kinds of leftists are fascinated by scenes of drama, sometimes violence; and for that Maoist China provides a vivid stage. But for people like ourselves there ought be a value far more important than that of drama —the value of liberty which, almost alone among the peoples of Asia, India is determined to preserve.

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COMMUNICATIONS

On Participatory Democracy

In the November-December 1966 issue of DISSENT *appeared an article by Richard Flacks entitled "On the Uses of Participatory Democracy." We print below comments on this article by Tom Kahn and Paul Goodman, followed by Mr. Flacks's reply.*—Ed.

Comment by Tom Kahn

Richard Flacks's article is the most serious discussion of "participatory democracy" that has yet come out of the New Left, and with most of it I am not in fundamental disagreement. I have some questions, or different emphases.

Flacks defines "participatory democracy" in a way all democrats can accept, namely, that "men must share in the decisions which affect their lives." When he says that participatory democrats "seek to extend the conception of citizenship beyond the political sphere to all institutions," he speaks in the best traditions of the democratic socialist movements. That their ideals have been inadequately served, shunted aside, and sometimes betrayed is certainly true; but to those who retain a democratic socialist conviction, the values suggested by "participatory democracy" are more crucial than ever.

Questions of emphasis arise, however, because in politics language becomes the property of movements and moves away from dictionary neutrality. Having defined participatory democracy in terms upon which we can agree, Flacks proceeds to assign it to specific political goals and to groups promoting them. He views the "ideology of participatory democracy" rather exclusively as the expression of the New Left, with its distinctive opposition to coalition politics (at least for now) in favor of guiding independent grass-roots organizations of the dispossessed. (The counterposition is his.) In the first part of his article, he focuses on internal relations, for instance, those prevailing within "the movement." He speaks of building a sense of community between staff and rank-and-file, facilitating self-expression, enabling people to gain dignity by participation, rotation of leadership, etc. He is concerned with creating new models of democratic interaction in which the participants become transformed.

Although some of these concerns recall unsuccessful experiments in utopian socialism, they are not outside the realm of political reality. But a connection must be made—the connection between internal and external politics. Assuming that participatory democracy, constantly refining itself, becomes the norm in grass-roots organizations, how does it establish its sway, how does it gain concrete embodiment, over the dominant social, political, and economic institutions?

The arguments for "coalition pol-

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itics" have been made; repeating them here is not entirely relevant. But one question is in order. What if the New Leftists are wrong in attacking the conception (or the timing) of coalition politics? What if it turns out that the "participatory democrats" made strategic errors, helped to divide and weaken the civil rights, anti-poverty, and other reform movements of the mid-sixties, contributed to political defeats for the liberal coalition, unintentionally assisted in a resurgence of conservatism and, in the process, helped to isolate grass-roots organizations from possibilities for victories?

I am not now making such an indictment of the New Left, merely stating a hypothesis for the sake of argument. Granted this assumption, how significant would "participatory democracy" be, if it described the inner organizational life of merely a handful of people whose opinions could find no echo in the larger society? Would not purity then become a sign of impotence?

Flacks points with satisfaction to the fact that SNCC used much of the "same rhetoric and organizing technique" as SDS. Yet SNCC and CORE, the most anti-coalitionist of the civil rights organizations, now give rise to the slogan "black power" and interpret it in a fashion that, no matter what other defenses can be offered for it, hardly "offers a possible bridge between Negroes and other groups of poor or voiceless people." When Stokely Carmichael proclaims that he is renouncing all of his white friends, where, for all practical purposes, lies the difference between his brand of "participatory democracy" and black nationalist ideology? And how has "participatory democracy" here been "useful in effectively criticizing 'charismatic' styles of leadership . . . tendencies toward demagoguery . . ."?

It is important to remember that Stokely Carmichael and Floyd McKissick rose to leadership at a time when their organizations were in decline, that this decline affected most of the civil rights movement but most acutely these organizations, because of their increasingly sectarian and anti-white-liberal politics. Their present phase begins with losses of membership, financial support, and staff—the product, in turn, of programmatic failure, frustration, and defeat. Their response has been the call for "black power," exercises in the rhetoric of violence, intensification of divisions within the movement, and opposition to the civil rights bill—in the last case, contributing in some measure to the first major legislative defeat for the civil rights forces in years.

The reasons for these reverses are many and complex; but it can be said, at the very least, that the tactics adopted by forces with whom the New Left identifies not only provided a rationale for conservative interests but helped shift the political mood of the nation. The new climate may encourage desperate and even violent responses in the ghettos, but it will not be hospitable to the growth of viable grass-roots movements along the lines of participatory democracy. It is much more likely to foster disillusionment and a bitter, ingrown style of organizational life.

I am troubled by another aspect of "participatory democracy," at least as I have seen it operate in some New Left groups: its emphasis on consensus. In the name of anti-factionalism, minority viewpoints are not so much

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voted down as gently obliterated. A subtle if uncalculated authoritarianism runs through this quest for unanimity. (Sometimes factionalism is repressed with a quite factional ferocity.) Factionalism, after all, can be healthy, if it is contained by a framework of common assumptions and purposes. It can be a stone against which issues are sharpened and clarified. I have heard more than one SDS member complain that each convention of that organization is swept by a vague mood into which contending political positions are somehow absorbed. When moods dominate, so can charismatic and even demagogic personalities.*

My second major criticism has to do with the goals of the grass-roots organizations Flacks describes. He writes:

> Although the constituencies of these organizations include the most impoverished sectors of society, it is remarkable that—particularly in the Northern cities—the main activity of these organizations has not been focused on economic issues. They have, rather, been struggling over issues of control, *self-determination,* and *independence.*

Flacks is not only describing a state of affairs: he is endorsing it. I find it curious, perhaps revealing. For either New Left intellectuals are misreading the goals of those poor with whom they have developed contact, or, more likely, their contacts are confined to a stratum of the most ambitious and rebellious poor, those seeking liberation from the psychological and cultural straitjacket of poverty through participation in a limited political process that provides a sense of power and an opportunity for relations with middle-class people, government bureaucrats.

Opposed to the idea that the poor, once organized, should "take their place alongside other ethnic and interest groups, bargaining for benefits within the framework of the Democratic party," Flacks lists three basic functions for the kind of "community-based, self-determining organizations" he would like to see. In this list no mention is made of the aim I would

*In this connection, I have been struck by a passage in George Orwell's essay concerning *Gulliver's Travels*:

"Part IV of *Gulliver's Travels* is a picture of an anarchistic society, not governed by law in the ordinary sense, but by the dictates of 'Reason,' which are voluntarily accepted by everyone. The General Assembly of the Houyhnhnms 'exhorts' Gulliver's master to get rid of him . . . Gulliver's master is somewhat unwilling to obey, but the 'exhortation' (a Houyhnhnm, we are told, is never *compelled* to do anything, he is merely 'exhorted' or 'advised') cannot be disregarded. This illustrates very well the totalitarian tendency which is explicit in the anarchist or pacifist vision of society. In a society in which there is no law, and in theory no compulsion, the only arbiter of behavior is public opinion. But public opinion, because of the tremendous urge to conformity in gregarious animals, is less tolerant than any system of law. When human beings are governed by 'thou shalt not,' the individual can practice a certain amount of eccentricity; when they are supposedly governed by 'love' or 'reason,' he is under continuous pressure to make him behave and think in exactly the same way as everyone else."

Now I do not wish to maintain that this is the state of affairs in organizations like SDS which try to practice "participatory democracy" ("love" and "reason") with a minimum of "formal" rules; but I would say there is a tendency in this direction. It is a possibility for degeneration somewhat in the way that the "democratic centralism" of the Leninists has its tendency to degeneration.

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place at the top: *the abolition of poverty*. Not only should this be the goal of public policy, but I would venture the guess that if the poor were really mobilized into mass organizations, it would be their prime goal as well.

There is a tendency on the part of New Leftists to compare the relations of students to the university with those of the poor to the welfare state. Problems of paternalism, powerlessness, and the like are encountered in both cases. Just as students should have a voice in university affairs, so should the poor have a voice in the war on poverty. And indeed they should.

The comparison breaks down, however, at a crucial point. A successful war on poverty results, by definition, in the abolition of the poor as a "class"; a successful academic-freedom policy strengthens the role of students as a "class" in an ongoing relationship with the university. In the case of students, the emphasis on democratic relations with faculty and administration is a value in itself. In the case of the poor, emphasis on their role within the welfare system may obscure the fundamental end of abolishing poverty and lead to a new accommodationism. Democratizing relations between the poor and their social workers—or, for that matter, achieving community control of impoverished and deteriorated school systems—is quite conceivable within the limiting framework of existing economic class relations. But these approaches do not abolish poverty, even if they can alleviate some of its indignities and psychological damage.

Participatory democracy is good for the poor because it is good for everybody. If the poor are brought to greater political consciousness and activity, they will be less likely to sink into middle-class complacency once they leave poverty. That will be to the general good. But the elimination of poverty is a matter of economic policy —for our purposes, a matter of national politics.

National planning is on the agenda of American political and corporate elites, Flacks points out, and "the question for the Left has become how to *democratize* that planning." I would suggest that the answer to that question hinges on another: who will control the planners and to what purpose? Will it be the managerial-technocratic elite spawned by the corporate world, or will it be the unions, the civil rights movement, the advocates of a democratic foreign policy, the deprived in our cities, the aged poor, the liberal university forces—in short, the components of the still divided and incomplete coalition for which Flacks has little use at present. The degree to which planning will be democratic and decentralized depends upon the alignment and weight of national political power. That power could be distributed in such a fashion as to give Flacks, the New Leftists, and the "black power" adherents some control over local school construction programs, while the corporate planners continue to determine the contours of the national economy. Should this occur, then, to paraphrase Flacks's observation on the New Left, "the democratizing revolts which it now catalyzes are likely to be abortive."

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Comment by Paul Goodman

Richard Flacks doesn't pay much mind to history. The tone of his remarks against the more anarchist position of Lynd, some of the radical students, SNCC, etc. does not take into account that we have already been through much of this debate in the past hundred years; the radical movement, as a whole, did take Flacks's position; it has not turned out brilliantly. Some of what he says may still be true anyway, but he should argue it more tentatively and with some new twists.

"That no such programs now exist is, of course, a consequence of the disintegration of the socialist tradition." This *is* an odd statement. What tradition? These were the very issues on which Marx fought Bakunin and the anarchist unions; Marx won out (by administrative maneuvering), took over the socialist movement, and led it down the primrose path. Would Flacks seriously deny that the top-down planning tradition of socialism played very nicely into the bureaucratized phony pluralism and real social engineering that we have today? Both Marx and Franklin Roosevelt, when he was governor of New York, said that "government becomes administration."

Flacks promises us that it will be very "exciting" when the labor movement asks for "employee participation." Workers' management was the issue in the middle of the 19th century, when the workers were already quite educated and sophisticated. It was still an issue in 1905 in Russia. But somewhere along the line the socialists forgot it. Flacks says, "American industrial unions have had to sacrifice the struggle for control." What is this "had to"? One can plausibly argue that nothing else was politically feasible, that the members would not fight for something bigger, etc. But it is senseless to palm the problem off as if it had not been the classical problem, and to talk now in rosy future terms.

And indeed his rosy visions are still quite bureaucratic: "working conditions . . . overthrow of entrenched leadership . . . and ultimately (!) demands for elections and recall of managers." Is this the zenith of participation? What about a kind of education to make workmen more competent? A kind of organization of work to encourage invention and initiative? And a say in the social utility of the product to which a man gives his life and his brains? Is it a secret that, with a few exceptions, the American labor movement supports our armaments policy and the war in Vietnam? Flacks seems almost oblivious that we have a war economy where for more than 20 years more than half of new investment has been in armaments. "Ultimately" the workers will change this; but meantime the Vietnamese are dying like flies.

He points out that the radical students have been the leaders in the fight on our foreign policy. In my opinion, this is *not* irrelevant to the fact that they now directly resist lying college administrators, want real participation in university affairs, set up a free university if necessary. They take the dominant system as all of a piece. Flacks does not mention that the more extreme Negro groups are also trying to get us out of Vietnam; these too take the system as all of a piece and want direct control at home, not ultimately but now.

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"These publics do not have the power to change the course of this war." No, not if we take them as "publics," as opinion-blocs. But if 10,000 students and 2,000 Negroes burn their draft cards, they will have changed the course of this war. Isn't that how the French got out of Algeria? I don't know how to make this happen, but remarks like Flacks's don't help.

It is gratuitous for him to say that parallel institutions are not a substitute for "political activity." The issue is not whether or not one can dispense with political activity—of course one cannot—but what is the meaning of "political." Lynd etc. surely think of themselves as political and concerned with power. But their hope is, I think, that non-cooperation and going-it-alone will withdraw energy from the present abstract Sovereign power with its class of politicians, will threaten it and inevitably heighten conflict; and, not ultimately but beginning now and gradually, create a climate in which self-reliant groups can *prevent* the State-class from interfering with the interesting functions of life—for the State is not an interesting function.

It is likely—and I think Lynd etc, would agree—that on the way to this happy outcome there will be need for conventional coalition, for the election of peace candidates, New Politics, reviving Congress, and so forth. But this is quite different from saying, as Flacks does, that the *chief* use of making decent institutions that work is to weld people into an organization. This takes us right back to the Stalinist front organizations of the thirties, or even worse, to the beautiful Stalinist disposition to enter honest groups and take them over for some other purpose. Marx at least *thought* that he wanted the State to wither way.

In the student movement, the kind of "tactical" and "strategic" thinking by many in SDS has been terribly unrealistic. Among radical youth, the chief motives for action and forces for solidarity have always been authenticity, directness, good sense, opportunity to do it oneself, and a naive (but true) vision that a decent society, like peace, would be easily attainable and simple in structure if only "they" would let us be. Therefore the idea of take-over is discouraging to the young—who needs it? But resistance and inventiveness are inspiriting. And authenticity is indispensable.

Richard Flacks Replies to Paul Goodman and Tom Kahn

Paul Goodman didn't pay too much attention to my article. Either that—or, more likely, I failed to make my position clear. At any rate, he seems to consign me to a position I don't hold.

The first point I was trying to make is that the emphasis which the young radicals in the Negro and student movements have placed on the notion of "participatory democracy" has been: a) important as both inspiration and standard for their work; b) relevant to certain changes in consciousness which seem to be occuring in many parts of our society. Second, I wanted to suggest that the new radicals' understanding of "participatory democracy" should not be seen as flowing out of any particular tradition of radicalism —for instance, anarchism—but has been shaped by their own unique experi-

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ence. Thus, the orientation toward "parallell institutions," "non-cooperation and going-it-alone," is not necessarily that of most participatory democrats— although there has been a tendency among some interpreters of the New Left to assume, somewhat romantically, that this orientation predominates. I, myself, do not know how "anarchist" I am prepared to be and am certain that my ambivalence is widely shared within the New Left. All of us agree with Goodman—"decent institutions that work" should be created now. But at least some of us feel that the problem is how to relate such acts of withdrawal to the process of revolutionary change.

There are *hints* in Goodman, in Lynd, and elsewhere, but in the absence of a coherent analysis of this problem, there is a tendency to drift back to a more conventional politics. My intention in writing this piece was not to *refute* Lynd but to indicate that I thought he had, to a certain extent, romanticized the experiments with "parallel institutions." I wanted to encourage those with his perspective to offer—*more concretely and less rhetorically*—models for the practice of participatory democracy. In the meantime, "parallel institutions" will tend to remain "experiments," and many of us will continue to hold to the illusion that our main work must take place within "organized society."

Goodman thoroughly misreads my brief allusion to the "socialist tradition." My point was precisely his—that the socialist movements ceased to be relevant because, as Goodman says, the "top-down planning tradition" captured control of them. He further misreads me if he believes that I optimistically expect the labor movement to take up workers' control as an issue. I was trying to ask whether we could see, now, any changes in the consciousness of workers suggesting that "workers' control" might reemerge and what forms such a new consciousness might take.

As far as I know, Paul Goodman is the only one among us who has tried with any seriousness to show what participatory democracy looks like in practice. Unfortunately, as he says, "I don't know how to make this happen." For some reason, Goodman chose to read my half-formed thoughts about the sociological possibilities for participatory democracy as thoroughly alien to his own way of thinking—he even seemed to find Stalinist dispositions along the way. This I don't understand.

I had not noticed that SDS was overly strategic in its thinking. I also do not think that we are interested in "take-overs." But I am afraid that the experience of the students—both black and white—in these past few years has been that simple, authentic, and direct acts of resistance and invention do not end wars, abolish racism, redistribute wealth, or recreate the universities. I am willing to grant that I may be both unrealistic and corrupted; but I cannot see how tens of thousands of draft card burnings will end the war, after observing the way our leaders respond to the burnings of elderly women, gentle Quakers, young Catholics, and Buddhist monks and nuns. I do not want to be misunderstood—I believe in the power of direct action and personal resistance and am opposed to a politics of manipulation and take-over. But I also believe what Goodman says about the war economy. Are we wrong in

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thinking that one essential condition for transforming that economy is a radical movement, concerned with organizing a political opposition, sensitive to problems of strategy, and continually learning how to use the levers of power and change? Is not the existence of such a movement the only way to give form and meaning to acts of resistance, withdrawal, inventiveness?

To turn to Tom Kahn is to re-enter a debate that seems interminable.

1. Kahn formulates a cunning critique of the "sectarianism" of the "anti-coalitionists." That the "anti-coalitionists" have "assisted a resurgence of conservatism" is not, of course, a "hypothesis" on his part—he seems to be convinced of this and should have said so. I agree that there has been a resurgence of conservatism and a defeat for the "liberal coalition"; but it seems obvious to me that this is a consequence of both the Vietnam War and the disgraceful default of the liberal leadership. I find it incredible that someone who imagines himself to be politically astute should blame radicals because they have been too insistent on radical goals.

The position I hoped Tom Kahn would take is this: This society, because it is militarized, corporation-dominated, and shot through with racism is drifting, and sometimes sliding, toward both international and internal disaster. There is a modest hope of staying this drift—it lies in a re-invigoration of the liberal wing of the Democratic party. This group must, first of all, develop a comprehensive program that can recapture the imagination of those groups now disaffected with it—especially ghettoized Negroes, urban ethnic minorities, intellectuals, and rank-and-file trade unionists. Second, it must actively initiate efforts in grass-roots organization—not through the corrupt and reactionary urban machines, but through new political mechanisms. Third, it must recognize that it has to confront and defeat those political forces which emanate from racist and militarist institutions in the society. This probably includes a decisive break with the present Administration on foreign policy, and an aggressively independent program with respect to economic policy and social legislation.

Now (I hoped Tom Kahn would continue), the responsibility for achieving this lies largely with liberal politicians, labor leaders, liberal intellectuals, and rank-and-file activists. Probably, some radicals, socialists, and pacifists should be involved directly in this as a force for integrity and clear-headedness. But there is also a desperate need for radicals to stay independent of this coalition. First, a left-wing movement, with its own expanding constituency, is a most important mechanism for keeping the liberals in motion. Second, the liberal program, if successful, will create its own problems—in particular, it is likely to strengthen national trends toward top-down planning, centralization, and social engineering. It is unlikely to achieve much demilitarization. Consequently, if democracy is to survive and prevail, there must be a recalcitrant, autonomous, self-directed radical movement, engaged in building independent centers of power (black, white, etc.), helping self-determining communities to grow, attempting to undermine the legitimacy of militarism and the nation-state, arguing for socialism, workers' control, and the abolition of

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corporate power. Certainly, these people are "extremist," and create "backlashes," but an American Right can only succeed if the liberals stagnate.

If these were the things Tom Kahn were arguing for, I would feel politically comfortable with him. Instead, I hear him telling SDS and SNCC to do the liberals' work for them, to cease being independent, to coalesce around programs that are meant to deceive the people and are *not* intended to achieve genuine reform.

2. "Black power" is the way SNCC and CORE have found to make participatory democracy concrete to bitter and cynical young people in the ghettos. The vision, as far as I can tell, remains much the same —*self-determination, control,* and *independence* for people who have been ruthlessly exploited, manipulated, policed, and made dependent all these years. SNCC argues that it is not their responsibility to carry this vision across to white America: this is the responsibility of white radicals. Incidentally, I recall that it was Bayard Rustin, in November, 1963, who first told white students at a SNCC conference to organize whites . . .

Tom Kahn should not pretend to have discovered that "New Left intellectuals" are not interested in abolishing poverty. I did not think it needed saying that we are all after a massive redistribution of wealth. My point was, first, that such a redistribution is not going to occur without the political mobilization of the poor—and that "participatory democracy" would be useful for many reasons in such mobilization. Second, even if large sums are allocated to "poverty," these will be wasted, misspent or used for corrupt ends, unless the poor themselves control the allocation. Third, programs based on social engineering will not abolish the sense of impotence that accompanies poverty but only make it worse; the thrust of SNCC, SDS, and similar efforts with the poor is to help people feel free. All of this will be true whether the machinery of the state is controlled by the managerial elite or by the "coalition" Kahn advocates.

3. Many people in SDS are dissatisfied because "participatory democracy" has not been fully realized in the internal life of the organization. By this they do not mean simply "love and reason" or "consensus," but rather a fully participative membership and a coherent and rational decision-making structure. It is true that SDS has generally contained a mood of anti-factionalism; this, however, was based not on some abstract principle of unanimity but was a response to the history of the American Left. In general, SDSers have felt that the issues raised by "factions" *could* be absorbed—that it was more important to emphasize what people shared than to fight to the finish about the issues (usually tactical) which divided them. (None of this has prevented quite active factions from flourishing within the organization.)

I am quite convinced that, at present, even the most cynical observer would be likely to conclude that SDS, whatever its other faults, is one of the most "democratic" voluntary organizations in American life, whether by democracy one meant opportunity to choose among competing leaderships, or member participation in decisions, or decentralization of authority. Whether this can be maintained as the organization increases in size, or comes under more severe attack, is in doubt.

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

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